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ABSTRACT 
Of all the issues faced by society, corruption is one of the most difficult to properly 
address. Corruption is also a phenomenon that most people have an intuitive idea and a 
subjective opinion about. Whether or not that opinion is commonly shared is another 
question. This research asks: how can perceptions of corruption inform our understanding of 
the behaviour associated with corruption and how does this translate into effective anti-
corruption strategies? By presenting a grounded theory that underpins human behaviour 
classified as ‘corrupt’, the research strives to increase our understanding of corruption. Corrupt 
behaviour is conditioned by an understanding of an action as being deviant, i.e. illegal or 
immoral. Consequently, increasing the understanding of corruption makes it easier to combat. 
Reflecting the ambition to reach a high level of abstraction, the method used is Grounded 
Theory, modified with a unique system for treating literature. The method is applied within an 
ontologically relativistic and epistemologically constructivist paradigm.  
The scientific contribution of this research is a unique methodology providing an original 
contribution to knowledge in the form of the self-interest utility maximisation theory, a 
creative contribution via the ’at-least-level’ assumption and an innovative contribution through 
the application of the findings to a situational crime prevention matrix. The self-interest utility 
maximisation theory is based on the premise that motivation is latent, and that corruption is 
the product of a degenerated decision-making process. Given that an opportunity is perceived 
as advantageous and that it can be rationalised or neutralised, corruption may be a rational 
choice. With opportunity identified as a central driver for corruption, the source of motivation 
is hypothetically explained by gaining an advantage ’at least-level’, i.e. the action causing the 
smallest cognitive dissonance which can be rationalised and neutralised while at the same time 
providing the largest advantage. Situational crime prevention, which in its simplest form can be 
seen as synonymous with opportunity reduction, is presented as a framework for anti-
corruption measures. It is recognised that an application of the self-interest utility maximisation 
theory through situational crime prevention for anti-corruption purposes requires further 
empirical research and real world testing.  
The findings indicate that, given the latent nature of motivation and its susceptibility to 
rationalisation by neutralisation, the next element necessary for deviant behaviour in the form 
of corruption is opportunity. Regardless of motivation, and irrespective of ability to rationalise 
and neutralise - an agent must be presented with an opportunity. Corruption is a crime above 
all where effective prevention is regulated primarily by controlling and reducing opportunity.    
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FOREWORD  
Once upon a time there was a student who confidently knocked on the door of the 
wizard-like chambers of his professor.  
The professor, who wasn’t much for the professional epithet, gestured the student to 
enter. The room was small, no more than three strides across but required careful 
manoeuvring through several waist high piles of folders and papers. Careful not to tip anything 
over, the student took a seat in a black leather office chair across the professor’s desk. The 
professor himself sat in what can only be described as a small rigid armchair, rather 
uncomfortable from the looks of it. From this reversed seating arrangements, the student 
explained his call. The desire was to do two master’s degrees in tandem, an endeavour that 
was theoretically ambitious but practically impossible, explained the professor. The student 
was; however, welcome to enrol next year for another degree - irrespective of the outcome 
of the current one. Another option, albeit dependent on the outcome of his masters’ studies, 
was to apply for a position as a PhD student. Even though the chances of success were slim, 
made even slimmer by the fact that only a fully-funded bursary could financially sustain the 
student and his family, an application was concocted. The professor explained that if 
successful, the PhD-dragon was one the student would have to slay himself but that the 
training and weapons of the trade would be provided. This all sounded good to the student, 
but he was also wary of the many tales of academic mentor-mentee relationships turning sour, 
where the student was effectively left alone and defenceless against the vicious and unforgiving 
creature that is doctoral research. When finally granted the fully-funded bursary, these worries 
became a thing of the past, as the professional bonds forged with the professor were strong. 
With wisdom continuously passed down and mischievous curiosity passed up, the student 
soon forgot the tales of malevolent supervisors. With an unwavering focus on reaching the 
goal, the student spent endless hours preparing, reading and learning all for the final battle. 
And now here we are, at the end of the line, face to face with the PhD-dragon. Surrender is 
not an option, nor is defeat. Everything that has led to this point is valued, the top-notch 
facilities of the university, the helpful senior academics, the friendly administrative staff, the 
motivation of fellow students, the informative and cooperative participants, the experiences 
and acquaintances from conferences all over the world, and last but certainly not least, the 
exceptional support of the professor, as supervisor, as mentor and as friend.  
The thesis in your hands tells a great story, not only of academic research but also of a 
student becoming a researcher. One that will happily do research ever after...   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Corruption is a phenomenon about which most people have a subjective opinion. 
Whether or not that opinion is commonly shared, universally applicable, or even contextually 
appropriate is another question. One thing is certain, corruption is a substantial concept and 
when colloquially spoken about, the discussion often pertains only to a smaller part, limited by 
any combination of concept, context or intellect. This work strives to enlighten the reader on 
the last of those limitations, in an effort to increase our understanding of corruption. By 
searching for a grounded theory that would underpin human behaviour classified as ‘corrupt’, 
the idea is to supersede contextual restraints - at least partially. There is, however, no escape 
from establishing conceptual limitations by clearly defining corruption as a conceptual 
boundary in which the theory resides.  
For this to effectively increase our understanding of corruption, it will have to provide a 
simplified map of reality - a theory. What cartography has in common with cognition is that it 
relies on simplifications of reality to allow us to see where we are, and where we are going. 
Explicitly formulated theories can help guide behaviour, through a maze of hidden 
assumptions, biases and prejudice that otherwise could corrupt our actions. Thus, according to 
Huntington (1997) explicit or implicit theories are needed to: order and generalise about 
reality; understand causal relationships among phenomena; anticipate and predict future 
developments; distinguish what is important from what is unimportant; and show the paths 
that should be taken to achieve certain goals. The theory produced in this research is intended 
as an abstraction for an increased understanding of a particular behaviour in a particular 
context. As the resolution of a map can change and provide a varied level of detail with some 
details more useful for some purposes than others, so can the conceptual resolution of a 
theory. The more detailed a map is, the more fully it reflects reality: the same is true for a 
theory. Nonetheless, an extremely detailed map may not be useful for all purposes. Hence, 
the challenge is to find a theory that portrays reality while at the same time simplifies it in an 
appropriate way. 
This research has been undertaken in an EU context, which within the given time frame 
of three years of data collection and theory development implies definitive geographical 
boundaries, a degree of cultural homogeneity and an overarching political will to combat 
corruption expressed by the EU. In 2014, the first EU Anti-corruption report was published 
and when introducing the report, the then Commissioner for Home Affairs Cecilia Malmström 
stated:  
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”Corruption seriously harms the economy and society as a whole. Many countries 
around the world suffer from deep-rooted corruption that hampers economic 
development, undermines democracy, and damages social justice and the rule of law. The 
Member States of the EU are not immune to this reality. Corruption varies in nature and 
extent from one country to another, but it affects all Member States. It impinges on good 
governance, sound management of public money, and competitive markets. In extreme 
cases, it undermines the trust of citizens in democratic institutions and processes.” 
(Malmström, 2014) 
Corruption is a relatively new priority on the political agenda, but has over the last three 
decades gained attention from both citizens and politicians. The reason for this is the 
increasingly clear message that corruption is detrimental to society and the true impact of 
corruption is now widely acknowledged. Corruption distorts markets and competition;, breeds 
cynicism among citizens;, undermines the rule of law; damages government legitimacy; and 
corrodes the integrity of the private sector (Heineman & Heimann, 2006). Further, corruption 
diminishes development and increases social inequalities and poverty. It also channels criminal 
activity, such as terrorism, organised crime, drug and human trafficking, and deters foreign 
direct investment by acting as an additional expense or tax for investors. Finally, corruption 
diverts government funds away from essential sectors, such as health and education, and 
enhances the public’s distrust towards political and government authorities (Brunelle-Quraishi, 
2011). In short, three particular consequences flow from corruption: diminished economic 
development and growth, increased social inequality, and further distrust of government 
(Delaney, 2005). 
Corruption is a global problem and of all the issues faced by society, it is one of the 
most difficult to properly address (R. A. Johnson & Sharma, 2004; Schwartz, 2011). Thus, it is a 
problem for all nations, and for the EU this means that corruption is a serious obstacle to the 
effective exercise of fundamental rights. Corruption is effectively widening the gap between 
the theoretical framework, i.e. the legal rules and regulations in the EU Member states, and the 
practical reality with which European citizens are faced. Therefore, the prevention, detection 
and control of corruption should be, and in many ways is, a priority for the EU, as it deprives 
EU citizens of a fully functioning system based on fundamental rights, the rule of law and good 
(and fair) governance.  
The citizens of the EU could and should expect the EU to lend its political weight to the 
fight against corruption, with a significant majority being of the opinion that the EU institutions 
and member states are ill-equipped to prevent corruption (Eurobarometer, 2013b). While the 
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EU Anti-corruption report concludes that Member States have in place most of the necessary 
legal instruments and institutions to prevent and fight corruption, the results they deliver are 
not satisfactory across the EU. Anti-corruption rules are not always vigorously enforced, 
systemic problems are not tackled effectively enough, and the relevant institutions do not 
always have sufficient capacity to enforce the rules. Declared intentions are still too distant 
from concrete results; and genuine political will to eradicate corruption often appears to be 
missing (COM(2014) 38). Consequently, there is an increasing demand to strengthen the role 
of the EU in terms of anti-corruption measures. The EU should raise public attention to the 
issue of corruption and catalyse change to restore trust, integrity and accountability vis-à-vis 
the Union as an anti-corruption actor, its member states and the public at large. Effective anti-
corruption measures will ultimately give confidence to EU citizens that their individual and 
collective rights under EU rules will be upheld.  
”The battle against corruption has not only become more urgent, it has also 
become more obvious as the extent of its reach is growingly apparent. Not only does 
corruption impoverish economies, threaten democracy and undermine the rule of law, it 
channels terrorism, organised crime and human trafficking. These far reaching 
consequences clearly indicate that the war against corruption cannot be fought at the 
national level alone. Corruption is without a doubt a problem of international interest as it 
touches developed and developing countries alike and respects no borders.” (Brunelle-
Quraishi, 2011, p. 105) 
Essentially corruption is about money and power and through perpetuation the EU is 
being robbed of both. When corruption undermines the rule of law and good governance, 
power is effectively lost. When corruption leads to the misallocation and misuse of EU funds, 
it acts as a serious distortion of fair competition within the internal European market, and 
money is lost. For those reasons, sometimes dressed up in various shrouds in contextual, 
contemporary, and politically correct rhetoric, the EU has an obligation to make corruption a 
primary concern in all of its policies.  
The concept of corruption is as firmly lodged as its definition is fleeting in the minds of 
most, as a result definitions are often distinctly different. At the outset of any journey down 
the lines of fighting or measuring corruption let alone understanding it, definitions must be 
clarified. Such an endeavour may be easier said than actually done, as this chapter will show. 
This is mainly because corruption is broad in its reach, permeating both high-level societal 
interaction all the way down to an individual level, involving as few as two persons. What may 
constitute corruption to some may not to others. Add to that the contextual aspect that 
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where in one case, corruption is clear-cut but in another the same actions may be seen as 
acceptable and perhaps even morally justified. 
Overview of thesis 
In this thesis, the first chapter is an introduction also serving as a literature review to, and 
of, corruption. Here, some of the classifications of corruption are examined, leading to a 
definition of corruption for the purposes of this research. The cost of corruption is explored, 
and the intricacies of measuring corruption explained. Three international frameworks for 
combatting corruption are then examined.  
The second chapter outlines the philosophy and methodology of the research, which is  
a modified Grounded Theory. The philosophical paradigm of this research is ontologically 
relativistic and epistemologically constructivist.  The theory developed within this paradigm 
combines explanatory power with a high level of abstraction. The chapter also presents a 
novel tool to handle literature within Grounded Theory.  
The third chapter presents research findings in the form of a substantive theory. Based 
on interviews with 21 anonymised key informants, it describes how, from a certain point of 
view, motivation for corrupt behaviour is a constant, grounded in human nature. Motivation 
for self-interest utility maximisation is a latent variable and unethical behaviour can appear as a 
rational choice. These ‘choices’ are evaluated within a bounded rationality framework and the 
logic is that, regardless of motivation, an agent must be presented with an opportunity for 
deviancy in the form of corruption. Engaging in such deviancy is explained as a degenerated 
decision-making process conditioned by the situation in which it occurs.  
The fourth chapter applies the theory within the behavioural approach of situational 
crime prevention. The chapter presents an adaptation of traditional situational crime 
prevention to the particular phenomenon of corruption. It highlights how preventive anti-
corruption strategies based upon criminological theory can be applied. The chapter includes 
historical and theoretical accounts of the development of situational crime prevention and 
how it can be contextualised for corruption prevention purposes.  
The thesis concludes with a summary discussion and some final remarks. The research 
findings are discussed and the work’s contribution to knowledge described together with a 
qualitative evaluation of the validity and reliability of the study. Moreover, the impact and 
wider implications of the research are discussed before the entire thesis is closed with some 
final remarks on the author’s journey to become a professional researcher.   
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1.1  The dual nature of this chapter 
”A map is not the territory it represents, but, if correct, it has a similar structure to 
the territory, which accounts for its usefulness.” (Korzybski, 1933, p. 58) 
This research aims to lift both the discussion as well as the definition of corruption as 
high as possible in an effort not to leave the complexities behind but rather to find a vantage 
point where theory supersedes capricious interpretations. For many, yet not all, research 
projects of this type the way there is by first reviewing extant literature on the subject matter. 
The available body of knowledge may or may not contain the answer to many of the 
questions generated by the aims and objectives of the research and the only way to find out is 
by review. This is true for most cases, however, not for this one. Using a grounded theory 
approach partly informed by the early works of Barney Glaser, arguably one of the first to 
discover, and in many ways, define grounded theory as a research methodology, the review of 
literature is complicated to say the least. Thus, a large section of the next chapter on 
methodology is devoted to explain, expand and ameliorate the contentious concept of 
reviewing literature within a grounded theory framework. In short, this study takes on a 
uniquely developed method in relation to any and all literature used for the development of 
theory. In this chapter,  relatively few sources are analysed in the creation of the conceptual 
cornerstones of the work. The strength of this method is qualitative in areas such as control 
mechanisms, constant comparison and theoretical sampling and in the permitting of resources 
excluded at one point to be included at another. These mechanisms as well as others are 
further explained in the next chapter, creating the mould for an in-depth analysis of the 
sources that actually are chosen for inclusion. Such depth also allows for initial coding to begin 
at the outset of the study. 
Considering that this chapter will serve as both an introduction and a literature review, 
one must understand the confines of this literature review. A traditional literature review tries 
to refine the research question, determine gaps in earlier research and identify a suitable 
design, and data collection method, providing the rationale for further research. It might also 
clarify what light has been shed on this particular area of research before and whether the 
question posed by the study has been asked and answered before. It is that latter rationale for 
reviewing literature, even given the particular methodology of this study, that must be 
answered to give due validity to the research. 
Thus, during the limited yet focused literature review that follows, any indication of 
research already done directly on or on the tangent of this study must be followed, but 
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followed carefully. All methodological constraints will apply, and it is important to not overly 
bias the researcher and consequently contaminate the entire research. A corollary of the 
methodological mechanisms of the resource selection system used coupled with constant 
comparison and theoretical sampling is the inclusion of previously dismissed sources. Once 
understood, this will prevent any misconception of sources being ‘missed’ altogether and 
where sources are dismissed that this is permanent. With that the literature can be established 
with a twofold purpose: mainly to determine to what extent the research question has already 
been addressed and as a secondary product to establish a fundamental context for the 
question itself.  
To immediately satisfy the curious mind and save some time for the scrutiny of the 
critical reader, there is no indication that the specific research question posed here has already 
been addressed elsewhere. Research whose posture initially resembled this one turned out to 
be something else and of more or less use for theory-building in this study. Particular examples 
are discussed in more detail in the following sections, especially on the issue of the perception 
of corruption. Therefore, it is with confidence given by the literature reviewed, data 
assimilated, and indications given stated that this approach to the phenomenon of perception 
of corruption is truly unique. The word truly in italics was added in post interview write-up as 
a result of all interview data directly or indirectly corroborating the uniqueness of the 
approach. This uniqueness does, to some extent, rationalise the execution of the study in the 
first place.  As for actual validity, the theory must be put to the test. This research does 
develop an insightful and interesting theory, but its universality and usability can only be 
assessed by the test of time.  
There certainly have been studies on the subject in a broader perspective (see e.g. 
Rose-Ackerman & Truex, 2012), but none that takes exactly the same approach as this one. 
The study of corruption in its various forms, its causes and consequences, have been 
flourishing in the disciplines of economics, comparative politics and policy studies, sociology 
and international relations, and international law (Abbott & Snidal, 2002). However, most 
studies are either descriptive, providing overviews of the international legal framework and its 
origins (Brunelle-Quraishi, 2011; Wouters, Ryngaert, & Cloots, 2012), or they examine the 
causes, manifestations and consequences of corruption in one or more countries (Persson, 
Rothstein, & Teorell, 2013; Anagnostou, Psychogiopoulou, Khaghaghordyan, & Wagner, 2014). 
Considering that the issue of corruption has only been recognised as an issue, at least 
politically, since the1990’s, this is a reflection of the position that corruption now has gained on 
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the global agenda. International organisations with worldwide reach, like the United Nations 
[UN] and Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD] have 
established conventions that require, or at least encourage, their members to enact laws on 
corruption. Financial institutions like the World Bank have also developed programs designed 
to combat corruption in various ways, including using measurements of perceived levels of 
corruption. The EU is moving along the same lines, launching both measurement instruments 
in the fight against corruption and most recently, in producing in 2014 an anti-corruption 
report. Further, non-governmental organisations [NGO] have also joined the fight, most 
prominently Transparency International, conducting analysis and advocacy throughout the 
world. Last but certainly not least, the international media is increasingly directing attention to 
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1.2   What is corruption? 
”…there remains a striking lack of scholarly agreement over even the most basic 
questions about corruption. Amongst the core issues that continue to generate disputes 
are the very definition of ”corruption” as a concept…” (P. M. Heywood, 2014, p. 1) 
In spite of the fact that most people have their own idea of what corruption is, the 
answer to the question ‘what is corruption?’ will probably differ from person to person, 
organisation to organisation, country to country and so on. Adding to the complexity is the 
interpretive nature of the concept. Even if the same written definition is used, often unclear 
boundaries to what that definition implies lead to different interpretations. How corruption is 
conceptualised and defined is obviously important and has implications for the compatibility 
and potential effectiveness of international norms and conventions (Szarek-Mason, 2010, p. 
11). Further, a fundamental and shared understanding of the concept is a prerequisite for 
theory-building in the following chapters. Four cornerstones are dealt with here. First, an 
overview of the current classifications of corruption is given which, if nothing else, gives an 
indication of the breadth of the concept. Second, drawing upon the essence of the various 
classifications a definition of corruption is developed suitable for this research. Third, looking at 
the root causes of corruption, a short comment is provided as to the various determinants of 
corruption. Fourth, an examination of the cost of corruption is made from the perspectives of 
money, power and trust. 
Holmes (2015) notes that corruption, having existed since the beginning of human 
history has always been a problematic issue, not only due to its intrinsic qualities but also due 
to disagreement on what it actually is. Commonly, corruption involves the abuse of a position 
of trust in order to gain an undue advantage. This involves the conduct of two parties: that 
of the actor who abuses the position of trust as well as that of another actor who seeks to 
gain an undue advantage by this abuse - or the other way around. It is by this multi-actor 
nature that corruption can be difficult to detect as it always involves two or more actors 
entering into a (more or less) secret agreement. 
Corruption can occur in relation to officials as well as between private persons. It is 
particularly prevalent in certain kinds of transactions (for example, when awarding public 
contracts), in certain economic sectors (for example, in extractive industries), and in certain 
countries. Corrupt practices can range from small favours in anticipation of a future advantage 
to the payment of large sums of money to senior members of governments. The prevalence 
of corruption and its tendency to spread have led to analogies with ‘disease; for example, the 
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common case of ‘cancer’ discussed in Chapter 3. Nevertheless, as the following discussion 
around the definition will show the analogy is flawed, as it implies lack of choice. Seldom if 
ever has it been in anyone’s self-interest to choose to get cancer, and even if it was, the choice 
rarely lies in the hand of the ones afflicted.  
A distinction is typically drawn between grand corruption involving high-ranking officials 
with discretionary power over government policy, and petty corruption. The latter refers to 
the exchange of small amounts of money or minor favours (these may be referred to as 
‘grease’ or facilitation payments) between citizens and lower level officials who often control 
access to basic services such as health or education. Corruption also has an active and a 
passive dimension, capturing the offer and the acceptance of a bribe respectively. In countries 
afflicted by high levels of systemic corruption, corrupt practices may also occur in the judiciary, 
undermining the independence and accountability of judges (Anagnostou et al., 2014). 
In their research on corruption Andvig, Fjeldstad, Amundsen, Sissener, and Søreide 
(2000, p. 14) divide corruption into four main forms: bribery, embezzlement, fraud and 
extortion. While this too is a limited perspective on a vast phenomenon it does give some 
idea of the concept. In Andvig et al.’s formulation bribery is described as a payment, not 
necessarily in money, which is given or taken in a corrupt transaction. There are many 
equivalent terms for bribery, such as kickbacks, commercial arrangements or pay-offs. The 
notion of bribery as corruption is money or favours needed or demanded to make things 
move more swiftly, smoothly, favourably, or at all. Embezzlement is the theft of resources by 
those who are responsible for administering them, e.g. an employee stealing from its 
employers. From a generalised level point of view this is not considered corruption, but its 
inclusion is argued for, in a broader definition of the concept. Andvig et al. (2000) also includes 
fraud under the umbrella of corruption as an economic crime that involves some type of 
deceit. Hence, it can involve manipulation or distortion of information, facts and expertise by 
public officials for their own profit, putting it closer to corruption. Lastly, extortion is money or 
other resources extracted through the use of some type of coercion.  
Building upon these divisions, some examples of corruption may be useful. This is 
however is by no means an exhaustive account of what constitutes corruption but is 
presented more for the purpose of contextualising the phenomenon. To give an idea of the 
various types of corruption, examples are: where government officials accept bribes in the 
form of money or favours to circumvent competition; bureaucrats who favour suppliers for 
the promise of a lucrative job once they leave their current position; judicial authorities such as 
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judges ruling in favour of a party because it employs a relative; a customs official speeding up 
the administrative process for an import shipment and in return receiving part of that 
shipment; or a health and safety inspector approving a subpar restaurant in return for free 
meals.  
Although it is sometimes difficult to draw a clear line between where public corruption 
ends and private violations begin, a common understanding is that corruption is limited to 
violations of public trust. This may have its root in the world famous index produced by 
Transparency International on the perception of corruption in the public arena. The same 
organisation has also provided the most commonly used definition of corruption in 
”Corruption is the abuse of entrusted power for private gain” (Transparency International, 
2017b). As will be examined in more detail in a later section, the index does not measure 
actual corruption but rather the perception of corruption as the abuse of public power for 
private benefit. Thus, corruption would occur if a government official has the power to grant 
or withhold something desired by the petitioner and then acts in contradiction to the rules 
and regulations, trading that for something of subjective value to the official. That ‘something 
of subjective value’ is considered a bribe making the whole transaction corrupt by bribery. 
Among corrupt acts, bribery gets much attention, but corruption can also include nepotism, 
official theft, fraud, certain patron–client relationships, and extortion. Also, Brunelle-Quraishi 
(2011) maintains that It has been widely maintained that public corruption refers almost 
exclusively to bribery and that it is the most identified form of corruption. 
It can be contended that bribery has over time become almost synonymous with 
corruption. This unfortunate outcome restricts the scope and reach of anti-corruption tools, 
ignoring other activities enabling personal enrichment through the misuse of authority, which 
therefore should fall under a broad concept of corruption. There is a wide array of opinions 
on what constitutes public corruption; some are more inclusive or broader than others. There 
is indeed a lack of uniformity among international instruments regarding the scope of the 
crime, and the often broad or unspecific language used allows for differing interpretations. This 
complicates harmonisation efforts, due to differing interpretations of the offence, causing 
different standards – both legal and moral. The distinctions in what, for example is considered 
a facility payment or a culturally accepted bribe is of less interest for this research as it is first 
when an act becomes a perceived misappropriation that they become a corrupt act adding to 
the perception of corruption. In short, corruption is an outcome - a reflection of legal, 
economic, cultural and political factors amongst others. This research concedes that scholars 
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have time and again noted the far-reaching qualitative and quantitative differences in the 
nature and scope of the same phenomenon often referred to as bribery and corruption. This 
is, however, of less relevance for achieving the aim of this study. If it could be established, a 
comparison of the perception of corruption from a grounded theory perspective would be 
derived universally from the behaviour of the people interviewed, rather than hinging on the 
existence or non-existence of a conceptual description that all could subscribe to. Regardless 
of the definition used by the person interviewed, the theory abstracted should be universal for 
any interviewee - something that will be tested if such a theory would emerge.  
This should circumvent any criticism of the international normative standards in this area 
that are arguably devised without specifically taking into account the cultural context and 
background of the societies that are expected to put those into practice as this theory would 
actually be useful in creating universal international norms for good governance and anti-
corruption strategies (at least the fundamentals thereof). 
Classifications of corruption 
Before elaborating various conceptions of corruption so as to develop the definition 
used in this research, it is worth considering some of the classifications previously developed 
by analysts with similar interests. The shared interest and ambition are to better understand 
corruption, be it either for conceptual understanding from a more general public perspective 
or for methodological reasons to facilitate research. The upside with any classification is the 
possibility to sort and arrange the characteristics of a phenomenon in order to place the event 
within a certain bracket. The downside, consequently, particularly when dealing with 
phenomena whose characteristics are inherently fleeting and where interpretations are highly 
contextual, is the forced placement of things that do not easily fit into a single bracket. This 
research is an example of the latter where the epistemic foundation of this research does not 
rely on corruption being classified at all. Having said that there are still some benefits of 
exploring and explaining some of the existing classifications, one being that it provides a 
narrative backdrop to the forthcoming discussion on the adequate definition of corruption.  
A common tripartite classification still widely used or at least referred to is the 
distinction made by Heidenheimer (2001), separating ’black’, ’white’ and ’grey’ corruption. 
Based on the assumption that experts and ordinary citizens sometimes perceive phenomena 
in different ways, Heidenheimer defined black corruption as activities that most of both expert 
and citizen members would condemn and see punished. Whereas, white corruption refers to 
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activities that, while still formally perceived as corruption, are more or less tolerated by both 
groups. The final type of grey corruption refers to activities about which the experts and the 
general public would have differing views, or about which there are significant differences of 
opinion, including intra-group ambivalence. 
Perhaps even more commonplace are the various binary classifications where for 
example, separation is made between extortive and transactive corruption, active and passive 
corruption, or petty and grand corruption. The distinction between extortive and transactive 
corruption is that in the former one party exerts pressure on the other to indulge involuntarily 
in corrupt acts. In the latter, the two parties are more equal, albeit not entirely but both willing 
to negotiate a deal by means of corruption. A derivation often found in official anti-corruption 
documents is the distinction between active and passive corruption. The first typically 
describes the act of offering a bribe and the second refers to either the rather simple 
acceptance or the more complex eliciting of a bribe. This distinction, however, can prove to 
be problematic as the connotation of the term passive may imply less responsibility for the 
corrupt act, which is not always true as in the case where a bribe is intentionally and actively 
elicited.  
Another popular way to differentiate various forms of corruption is by dividing it into 
petty and grand corruption. The distinction between petty and grand corruption is perhaps 
most relevant to this research as the notion appeared in several of the interviews and became 
one of the central themes of the analysis. The distinction is primarily a reference to size, where 
petty corruption includes situations the ordinary citizen is likely to encounter in everyday life 
that relates to normality but contradicts what is perceived as fair. It occurs when citizens 
interact with public officials in places like hospitals, schools, police departments and other 
bureaucratic agencies. If money is involved, and it often is, the scale of monetary transaction 
involved is small and the impact is on an individual level. It also disproportionally affects the 
poor (UNDP, 2008, p. 8). 
Grand corruption, as its name suggests, refers to corruption at a higher level, often 
involving local or national state type authorities. It refers not so much to the amount of money 
involved as to the level at which it occurs (where policies and rules may be unjustly 
influenced). The kinds of transactions that attract grand corruption are usually large in scale. 
Although rare in occurrence, larger in scope involving several elements that are perceived as 
subnormal particularly as this concerns entities presumably held to a higher moral standard. 
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This research advances an additional dimension of ‘closeness’ to the event, a theme to be 
explored further in the analysis section.       
These classifications are not the only ones available for those inclined to bracket 
conceptualisations of corruption. Depending on the field of research and methodology there 
may be others that prove to be useful. Such is the distinction between ’administrative 
corruption’ and 'state capture’ developed by Hellamn and Kaufmann (2000) or the more 
complex typology produced by Karklins (2002). The point, however, is that some 
methodologies do not require a stringent classification to produce viable theory. This research, 
although ultimately re-translating the theory produced into a classification type matrix, does 
not rely on an initial separation of the elusive characteristics of corruption.  
The main reason for leaving the phenomena of corruption largely unclassified, that is for 
example confining it to a table with clear-cut definitions and borders, is that this research 
focuses not so much on what the perception of corruption is but rather ‘why’ it is. The 
fundamental underpinning for Heidenheimer’s (2001) divisions, also prevalent in some of the 
binary classifications, is that perceptions between experts and citizens vary. Recent research, 
however, points to the contrary. Published in 2015, Charron (2015) quite specifically 
addressed some of the early concerns relevant for this research. The shared inquiry was: how 
well do corruption perception measures reflect the actual levels of corruption? This is one of 
the fundamental tenets of this research and in many ways a cornerstone to its theory 
construction. Critics argue that perceptions, particularly those of outside experts, do not 
reflect actual corruption. Nevertheless, by a systematic analysis of the empirical strength of 
corruption measures in Europe, one of Charron’s findings is that the consistency between 
citizen and expert perceptions of corruption is high. Thus, in chorus with Charron, the 
conclusion is that concerns regarding the validity and bias of perceptions may have been 
overstated. 
With people’s perception of corruption being, neither entirely free from, nor excessively 
tainted by bias, the focus for this research is in the opinions, experiences and perceptions of 
experts, i.e. those that are assumed to be rich sources of data. Nevertheless, it is important to 
observe that even in omitting a classification for corruption, an adequate definition thereof 
cannot be neglected. As the next section will show, it is only be dissecting the various 
definitions and their underpinnings that the core concept can be uncovered and suitably 
formulated into an understandable and workable definition of corruption.  
Definition of corruption 
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Defining corruption is arguably the foundation for a doctoral research project in and by 
itself. The discussion above on the classifications of corruption is an indication of the broad 
nature of the phenomenon. This research recognises the wide spectrum of activities that may 
be considered corrupt, legal and/or morally. In establishing a definition turning to academia 
lends little comfort as the study of corruption embeds itself in a wide array of disciplines such 
as philosophy, law, sociology, economy, psychology, history, politics and criminology - to name 
some, but certainly not all. Despite the fact that the phenomenon of corruption cuts across 
several of the disciplines, however, it is not unusual to see it rooted in some kind of rational 
choice-based perspective (see e.g. Persson, Rothstein & Teorell, 2010 and Marquette & Peiffer, 
2015). This research shares that perspective. Regardless, it is important not only to 
acknowledge the difficulties inherent in defining corruption, but also to make a strong case for 
the definition used and avoiding just picking a preferred definition and simply moving on. As 
Harrison states (2007, p. 675) “in classifying corruption as a simple phenomenon, the diverse 
ways in which people engage with morality are overlooked. Comprehension of how 
opportunities are shaped, both to engage in and to escape from corruption, is important.” 
Thus, this research sets out to research corruption as a phenomenon from a general and 
universal perspective as a basis for understanding regardless of how it manifests itself.  
First, there is no international or universal consensus on the definition of corruption. This 
ambiguity has led to a number of difficulties for the anti-corruption agenda and community. 
For example, due to the wide nature of deviant behaviour possibly classifiable as corruption it 
is all but impossible to deliver accurate and objective measurements of the phenomenon. 
Aside from objective data being in and by itself hard to obtain, not having a clear-cut definition 
makes it even harder to know whether whatever data there may be is relevant. Consequently, 
the prevailing measurement systems are instead based on subjective data and may give limited 
information on actual levels of corruption within the confines of the measurement; even more 
so when aggregate indices are subject to global comparison. There is more discussion on this 
in the section on the measurement of corruption. Briefly, the literature commonly defines 
corruption as the misuse of public power for private benefit (Lambsdorff, 2008, p. 16). These 
type of ‘corruption is the abuse of public office for private gain’ definitions of definitions are 
useful but understanding corruption in this way does not fully allow for an adequate 
appreciation of context, partly because they imply a firm dichotomy between the public and 
the private spheres. In that sense, definitions are powerful and once accepted and constantly 
repeated, the problems of actually understanding them may be overlooked, effects that can be 
compounded by the popularity (and over-reliance) of certain measurements of corruption, 
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subscribing to just such a definition, like the Corruptions Perceptions Index (discussed further 
in the next section). It is less that there is not one definition of corruption, and more that, 
there are several ways of perceiving corruption and therefore an overly precise definition may 
not travel well between contexts. On the other hand, an overly inclusive definition runs the 
risk of being watered down to the point of not conveying much information at all, rendering 
the conceptual definition useless. The point is that context and perceptions matter and that 
they affect the assumptions about what is and is not appropriate behaviour, i.e. what can be 
understood as corrupt and why. As expressed by Harrison (2007, p. 672) "there is a need to 
destabilise ‘taken for granted’ assumptions about what corruption is and how it operates. This 
means generating an understanding of how meanings of corruption vary…”. The argument is 
that perceptions of corruption matter, that all perceptions develop out of context, and that 
context varies.  
This research therefore requires a definition that will facilitate an exploration of the 
perceptions of corruption, which is what corruption means for different people in different 
contexts. As Pardo (2004, p 2) puts it: “corruption is a changing phenomenon, some of its 
aspects and received morality are culturally specific and its conceptualization is affected by 
personal interest, cultural values and socio-economic status. In this key sense, corruption needs 
to be treated contextually…”.   
Second, one must understand that corruption is regarded as far more than a question of 
bribery. For the most part, contemporary corruption in the West, Member States of the EU 
included, is not the exchange of brown envelopes of cash, but the corruption of influence, 
formulated by Cockroft and Wenger (2017) as the buying of influence and the selling of 
power. Here government and its institutions, associations, organisations and industry interests 
are captured for illicit gains, which in other words could be described as undue advantages. 
Corruption can also take the form of collusion between individuals or groups that leads to a 
misappropriation of goods, tangible and intangible alike. Some activities will balance on a legal 
borderline with lobbying, political campaign contributions and revolving door allocation of 
assignments as shining examples. The difficulty in defining, let alone regulating corruption, 
becomes crystal clear. This difficulty is sometimes aggravated by the mistrust in using subjective 
data for use in measuring corruption, but as argued by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2006), 
all efforts to measure corruption using any kind of data involve an irreducible element of 
uncertainty. There is more discussion of this this in the next section on measuring corruption, 
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but it is relevant at this stage to note that when defining corruption, one must consider the 
subjective nature of the phenomenon. 
In a traditional sense, Holmes (2015) refers to corruption as moral impunity, as a 
continuation of Anagnostou et al.’s (2014) argument that corruption is deeply rooted in a 
wide range of cultural and economic practices, where large variation in its nature and scope 
across countries has rendered its conceptualisation and definition difficult. The World Bank is a 
significant contributor in the anti-corruption arena (Marquette 2003; Polzer 2001), 
strengthening the economic perspective. Corruption is something that is not only legitimate 
but also expected, for the World Bank to address, precisely because it is defined as an 
economic concept. The formula developed by Klitgaard (1998, p. 4) “corruption may be 
represented as following a simple formula: C = M + D - A. Corruption equals Monopoly plus 
Discretion minus Accountability’ - is often cited. This research adopts a position somewhat 
similar to this, at least in essence, and claims it is rather simple to give a universal definition 
with appropriate caution due to the risk of that definition being overly general to the extent of 
not being very useful. On the other hand, a simple yet universal definition is necessary as a 
common ground to build a theory explaining corrupt behaviour.  
As outlined by Hough (2017) there are in essence for types of contemporary definitions 
of corruption. First there are those based on legal understandings, second those that centre 
around abuse of enthused power, third those that involve business transactions, and four, 
those that have been termed ’legal corruption’ (p.35). Most definitions of corruption have 
defined the phenomenon as the abuse or misuse of public office for private gain (Brooks, 
Walsh, Lewis, & Kim, 2013). There are several issues with using a definition along those lines 
for the purpose of this research. Firstly, the concept of abuse does not necessarily imply 
private gain. The actor engaging in corrupt behaviour may be clinically insane and engage in 
corruption, with private gain defined as nothing but the self-interest of a madman. Similarly, the 
concept of misuse has its shortcomings in the apparent lack of intent. Under the banner of 
misuse, corruption may be the result of incompetence rather than deliberate intention. For 
those reasons, using a word like misappropriation would probably be better, although it too 
does not fully encapsulate the decision-making process behind deviant behaviour. Further the 
definition has to be appropriately expanded beyond public corruption to also include private 
corruption, resulting in something like: corruption is the misappropriation of power for private 
gain. This would answer the questions of ‘what’, ‘how’ and ‘why’ with ‘misappropriation’, 
‘power’, and ‘private gain’. The issue of the underlying decision-making process, however, is 
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not solved by such a definition. Fortunately, there is a definition developed by Dutch academic 
Petrus van Duyne that is centred around the decision-making process: 
”Corruption is an improbity or decay in the decision-making process in which a 
decision-maker (in a private corporation or in a public service) consents or demands to 
deviate from the criterion, which should rule his decision making, in exchange for a 
reward, the promise or expectation of it.” (Duyne, 2001, p. 3) 
The definition is suitable for this research for at least four reasons. Firstly, it is broad 
enough to facilitate an unrestricted development of theory that may or may not reside within 
that which is enshrined by the traditional definitions. Secondly, it focuses on behavioural 
aspects and brings in a normative aspect rather than the static descriptive characteristics of 
those preceding it. Thirdly, by its formulation a higher level of abstraction is achieved, letting 
the definition supersede cultural differences in attitudes towards corruption such as blat or 
guanxi1. Fourthly, the definition is adequately open to encapsulate the concept of perceptions 
playing an important part in a decision-making process. As this research focuses on 
perceptions and what people think of corruption, this is of the utmost importance so as, not 
to partly or even unintentionally discard or disregard perceptions, but instead embrace them 
in order to understand the role of perceptions in corruption. Although our focus is on the 
European context, this definition does lend strength to further extended intercontinental 
research. Having said that, in line with the discussion by Brooks et al. (2013), corruption is an 
analytically diverse matter and a definition that is too inclusive runs the risk of being somewhat 
meaningless. An overly encapsulating definition of corruption may well lead to a failure, 
intentional or otherwise, to effectively engage in a specific discussion on the subject. The 
chapter on applying the emergent theory to existing criminological theory is partly intended to 
address such concerns. 
  
  
                                               
1 The Russian concept of blat, is a term that has changed its meaning in recent years, but in Soviet times referred 
to informal agreements between people to help each other through non-monetary exchange. It was a coping 
mechanism in a system where there was a shortage of public goods. Also, the concept involves the development 
of personal relations, most notably trust and a sense of reciprocity. The Chinese concept of guanxi also refers to 
relationships that develop between individuals or groups, and that involve potentially long-term mutual 
obligations - reciprocity. See Holmes (2015). 
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Determinants of Corruption 
Despite many studies examining hypotheses on causal linkages between corruption and 
various socio-economic determinants, there is still no commonly accepted explanation of the 
root causes of corruption (see e.g. Alt & Lassen, 2003). Corruption impacts society on all 
levels: individual, group, organisation, local, national, international and even supranational and 
global. Many have fallen victim to nepotism, been damaged by social injustice, seen their 
economic development hampered, expressed outrage at the absence of the rule of law, stood 
impuissant to the undermining of democracy, had their trust in the political constructs eroded 
and watched as the world seem to morally decay.  
The Member States of the EU are not immune to this reality. Corruption varies in 
nature and extent from one country to another, but it affects all Member States. While many 
of its effects are obvious, others are less so. There are so many ways in which corruption can 
negatively impact on society that its consideration must be undertaken with some type of 
delimitation. For the sake of a clearer exposition, this section considers the negative impacts of 
corruption in broad terms of social, environmental, economic, politico-legal, security-related 
and international implications. Bear in mind that in the real world, the impact of corruption 
often affects several areas simultaneously. Therefore, any one singular variable that might 
provide at least a partial explanation for corrupt behaviour, may lose its significance when 
other variables that are present are considered (Li, Xu, & Zou, 2000). 
The difficulty of establishing a root cause relationship for corruption is naturally tied into 
the difficulty of establishing a common definition of the same. Nevertheless, research has, and 
continues to, identify certain national attributes that correlate with greater amounts of 
perceived corruption in an attempt to explain why some nations suffer from more corruption 
than other. Research includes examination of income levels, literacy, hostile environments, 
legal systems, religion, freedom of press, etc. The list goes on and is continuously increasing, as 
corruption is rarely static: in the absence of an effective anti-corruption drive, it tends to 
change and often worsen over time (the “ratchet effect”2). For example, corrupt officials 
continuously seek to increase inclusivity and complexity of laws, creating monopolies that 
restrict legal, economic and social activities, with ever-increasing extraction of advantages in 
the form of bribes, influence and favours.   
                                               
2 see eg. Choi and Thum (2003). 
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According to the Corruption Perceptions Index 2016, all of the countries with the 
highest levels of perceived corruption are developing or transition countries (Transparency 
International, 2017a). There are further similarities such as that many are governed, or have 
recently been governed, by socialist governments. Also, with few exceptions, the most corrupt 
countries have low-income levels and corruption is closely related to GDP per capita and to 
human capital. It can be noted that these correlations also are consistent with the economic 
and human capital theories of institutional development (Svensson, 2005). Treisman, (2000) 
discussing the causes of corruption, argues that it is less prevalent if economic policies 
stimulate long-term growth and prosperity regarded by the population as being shared fairly. 
Corruption is further reduced, Treisman continues, if these conditions are also accompanied 
by better education, increased democratisation, and civic engagement for monitoring 
corruption. The strong relationship between income and corruption is consistent with the 
theories of corruption that argue that institutional quality is shaped by economic factors 
(Svensson, 2005). However, it must be considered a weak test of these theories, since 
economic development not only creates a demand for good government and institutional 
change but may also be a function of the quality of institutions. 
Considering some of the findings from the 2013 Global Corruption Barometer 
(Transparency International, 2013) may provide some intuitive insight to the determinants of 
corruption. Take the following seven findings from the report. First, corruption through bribery 
is widespread. A little over one in four people (27 %) reported having paid a bribe in the past 
year when interacting with public institutions indicating a weakness in political institutions. 
Second, public institutions primarily entrusted to protect people suffer the worst levels of 
bribery. There were eight services evaluated and among them the police and judiciary are 
those seen as the most susceptible to corruption through bribery. The estimate of those that 
when coming into contact with the police also having to pay a bribe is 31%. The 
corresponding figure for the judiciary is 24%. These figures are interpreted as ‘capture’ of 
important state functions. Third, following the possible capture of the state, governments are 
not considered to be doing enough to hold the corrupt to account. In fact, the majority of 
respondents around the world believe that their government is ineffective at fighting 
corruption. Further, they consider corruption to be getting worse, which may be a reflection 
of a lack of political commitment. Fourth, the democratic pillars of societies are viewed as the 
most corrupt. On a global scale political parties, who should be the main driving force for 
democracy, are perceived to be the most corrupt institutions, indicating a lack of trust in the 
democratic state. Fifth, personal connections are seen as corrupting the public administration. 
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Many of the people surveyed regard corruption in their country as more than just paying 
bribes: almost two out of three people believe that personal contacts and relationships help to 
get things done in the public sector in their country, indicating corruption is being addressed 
too narrowly. Sixth, powerful interest groups are considered to be driving government actions, 
as opposed to it being driven by the public good. Over half the respondents’ regard groups 
acting in their own self-interest rather than for the benefit of society at large largely or entirely 
run their government. This indicates a lack of transparency, for example, in lobbying and in the 
legislative process. Seventh, lastly and perhaps most importantly, people state they are ready 
to change this status quo. Nearly 90% of those surveyed said that they would act against 
corruption. The majority of people said that they would be willing to speak up and report an 
incident of corruption, indicating the lack of an outlet for whistleblowing such as a free press.  
How these intuitive connections between the common features of high versus low 
levels of corruption compare with more scientific measurements and research is beyond the 
scope of this study, partly for reasons discussed in the section on measuring corruption and 
issues pertaining to the accuracy and applicability of such measurements. Theories about the 
determinants of corruption also emphasise the role of economic and structural policies and 
the role of institutions. These theories are best viewed as complementary: after all, the choice 
of economic and structural policies is one channel through which institutions influence 
corruption (Svensson, 2005). It is nevertheless clear that corruption increases the level of what 
can be thought of as a kind of societal uncertainty that subsequently forces governments, 
organisations and individuals to expend extensive effort in attempts to reduce this uncertainty. 
Otherwise, as discussed in the next section, the cost of corruption can be great. 
The cost of corruption - Money power, and trust 
Over the last decade evidence and theories have aligned, pointing unequivocally towards 
corruption delaying and distorting financial and political development. These findings focus on 
real processes and systematic, measurable consequences, rather than specific and/or 
hypothetical accords in isolation (Rose-Ackerman, 2011).  
To get an idea of the cost, three major factors can be discerned: money, power and 
trust. A growing body of research shows that corruption has an adverse impact on a country’s 
economy, not only by reducing economic growth but also by worsening the distribution of 
income (the poor must pay bribes but rarely receive them). Added to this, the adverse impact 
on governance processes where corruption undermines the citizens' confidence that 
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democratic success results from individual effort rather than from bribery or political 
connections. Finally, corruption tends to reduce the confidence that citizens have in their own 
government and subsequently society as a whole - an erosion of social trust. The 
phenomenon of corruption can and often will have implications that pertain to more than one 
of the factors. But the examples that follow are to get an idea of the enormous impact 
corruption has on society. Note that they provide a perspective with a high level of generality 
and give few answers as to the underlying causes of corrupt behaviour. Those will be 
developed in the coming chapters.  
Money 
It is difficult to quantify the financial cost of corruption in the Member States of the EU, 
and even more so when looking globally. Corruption does, however, introduce and reward 
inefficiency in dealings between state and private actors (Rose-Ackerman, 2011) and there is 
little question that it incurs a heavy financial burden on society (see e.g. Mauro, 1995 and 
Tanzi, 1998). In 2004 the World Bank estimated that public officials worldwide receive more 
than $1 trillion in bribes each year, a figure that does not include embezzlement. According to 
a 2005 survey by the Russian think-tank INDEM, a large portion of that would pertain to 
Russia with more than $300 billion in bribes paid annually. (INDEM, 2005). Also, more than 
half of all Russians have at some point been asked for a bribe. The idea that half of the Russian 
population is subject to corruption may not come as a surprise, but the trend persists also in 
other contexts. According to the 2005 Volcker-report on the UN’s former oil-for-food 
program, more than 2,000 companies participated in the oil-for-food program and almost half 
of those may have been involved in kickback schemes (Heimann, Heimann, & Pieth, 2017). In 
the corruption-sensitive area of public procurement the costs added to a contract as a result 
of corrupt practices may amount to between 20% to 25%, and in some cases even 50% of the 
total cost of the contract according to a 2008 research project (Arnáiz, 2008). In another 
study published in 2013 on identifying and reducing corruption in public procurement the 
overall direct cost of corruption for five sectors (including the construction sector) in eight 
Member States ranged from € 1,4 billion up to € 2,2 billion (European Commission, 2017). 
Europe, generally seen as an area where corruption is low, is still playing a high monetary price 
as the 2014 EU Anti-corruption report states that corruption costs the European economy 
about EUR 120 billion a year (COM(2014) 38, 2014).  
Corruption could conceivably, yet seldom practically, have positive effects on economic 
growth. The proponents of “efficient corruption” claim that bribery may allow firms to get 
 
Page 32 of 278 
things done in an economy plagued by bureaucratic hold-ups and bad, rigid laws (Huntington, 
2006). However, these arguments typically take the distortions circumvented by the corrupt 
actions as given. In most cases, distortions and corruption are caused by, or are symptoms of, 
the same set of underlying factors, leaving bribes and extortion as an expensive way to obtain 
results (M. Johnston, 2005), and there is no evidence that corruption ”cuts through red tape” 
(Mauro, 1998, 2002). In fact, surveys indicate that where corruption is extensive the 
bureaucratic burden, and associated costs, tends to be greater, not less (Reinikka & Svensson, 
2002; J. Hellman & Kaufmann, 2004). 
In most theories that link corruption to slower economic growth, the corrupt action by 
itself does not impose the largest social cost. Instead, the primary social losses of corruption 
come from the propping up of inefficient firms and the allocation of talent, technology and 
capital away from their socially most productive uses (Svensson, 2005). According to the 
encyclopaedia of social problems (Parrillo, 2008) even crude analysis points to a significant 
negative relationship between corruption and the level of economic development. Figure 1 
shows the relationship between Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 
and income per capita adjusted for differences in the cost of living (purchasing power parity 
[PPP]) for 150 countries.  
Figure 1: Relationship between the CPI and income per capita for 150 countries (Parrillo, 2008).  
The conclusion from the figure above is that there are no very corrupt rich nations and 
there are no very honest poor ones. If studying the numbers behind the figure, the correlation 
between perceived corruption and income per capita is −.8. As always correlation should not 
be mistaken for causation, and it is possible that the causation runs the other way, i.e. that low 
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incomes provide a fertile environment for corruption (see UNDP, 1994). Corruption is more 
and more perceived as a cause of underdevelopment and poverty: “[c]orruption is now seen 
as a cause of poverty, not merely a consequence . . . . It is no longer possible to justify 
corruption and oppression on the grounds that they are part of the culture” (Sandgren, 2005, 
p. 717). It should, however, be pointed out that the discussion of corrupt nations is somewhat 
moot, particularly from the perspective of this research, as there are no corrupt nations, only 
corrupt individuals. The point, however, is that gone are the days when some pundits seriously 
argued that corruption was an efficient corrective for over-regulated economies or that it 
should be tolerated as an inevitable by-product of intractable forces (Heineman & Heimann, 
2006). The individual and often collective corrupt behaviour carries a cost, both in terms of 
money but also in terms of abuse of power.  
Power 
Besides its financial costs, corruption tends to deteriorate democratic processes and 
divert power away from its rightful holders (Doig & Theobald, 2000; M. Johnston, 2005). 
Corruption lies at the heart of politics in many countries, and EU Member States are not 
categorically exempt from this reality. Somewhat simplified, this can be understood by looking 
at Klitgaard’s (1988, p. 75) famous equation for corruption, stating “Corruption equals 
monopoly plus discretion minus accountability.” In Dahl’s (Dahl, 1973) perspective on the 
development of  polyarchy, corruption expressed as undue influence and lack of accountability 
would counter the opportunities for the people to signify preferences and to have those 
preferences weighed equally by those in power. While Klitgaard’s equation is not without 
critique (see e.g. Stephenson, 2014) it does convey the point that some corruption arises 
because unaccountable officials have the sole power to make discretionary decisions. Further, 
political party donors are buying influence and politicians are selling power. As a consequence, 
large-scale donors may override the electorate. This process, often shrouded under the 
concept of lobbying, effectively pushes agendas that are not necessarily in line with the 
prosperity of society as a whole. Even if they were it is not by virtue of power exercised by 
the hands of the people. As will be shown, neither democracy, nor affluence are by 
themselves evidence of a country not suffering corruption problems (M. Johnston, 2005). 
In their book, ”Unmasked - Corruption in the west” Cockcroft and Wegener (2017) 
outline the rising price of power in Europe. Only Sweden and Germany have some sort of 
regulated cap on party donations. Nonetheless, Cockcroft and Wegener make a compelling 
and well-founded argument for corruption being a recurrent phenomenon despite such limits. 
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They note that, the currently relatively well-governed nation state, Germany, has regulation on 
party financing largely as a result of corruption cases that characterised the late 1990s. In the 
UK the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act of 2000, based on Canadian legislative 
practise - at the time considered from an Anglo-Saxon perspective to be the best - is subject 
to significant rule-bending. The Italian system, often described as a web of favours, was riddled 
by corruption during the nine years of Silvio Berlusconi’s government. Controlling a business 
empire whose economy was larger than that of the country itself, Berlusconi wielded financial 
and political power that was abused throughout his mandate. The Italian context naturally also 
involves the mafia: 
…a constant thread in Italy’s government since the 1950s has been the reality of 
the continued effectiveness of organised crime and the need for government in power to 
deal with it directly or indirectly. This is not ”machine politics” but the politics of two 
different kinds of business empires: in the case of the mafia, this represents blatant 
corruption; in the case of the Berlusconi empire, it represents the politics of private 
interests. (Cockcroft & Wegener, 2017, p. 31) 
 Another nation with a long history of political corruption is Spain. With the huge 
scandal of 2014 in which the Minister of Health, Ana Mato, was forced to resign, Spaniards 
came to grips with the fact that the democracy installed in 1978 was riddled with corruption 
(Iglesias Carrera, 2017). Politics in western Europe is subject to both subtle and not so subtle 
forms of corruption, and it certainly seems to be pervasive.  
In each of the cases discussed by Cockcroft and Wegener (2017) there are powerful 
forces abusing power within the electoral system that undermine the democratic promise. The 
corruption in established democracies such as the Member States of the EU may incur more 
damage to democratic values than actual law-breaking (D. Thompson, 1993). Thus, the extent 
of ”capture” varies but there is no question that corruption is commodified through the buying 
of influence and selling of power: a systematic cost that is born by society.  
Trust 
Where corrupt practices occur to any significant or widespread degree, they undermine 
citizens’ trust and confidence in the established institutions and rules, and prevent a sense of 
social justice from taking hold among the society at large (Anagnostou et al., 2014). Research 
on corruption identifies trust as both cause and consequence of corruption (Morris & Klesner, 
2010). Unsurprisingly, trusting societies have less corruption (Uslaner, 2004). Societies where 
citizens have faith in others are more likely to endorse strong standards of moral and legal 
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behaviour (Uslaner, 1999b, 1999a). Subsequently, societies where citizens believe that the 
legal system is fair and impartial are more likely to trust their fellow citizens (Rothstein, 2000). 
The theoretical reason trust is important comes from “the problem with many names” 
in the social sciences. Among these names are social dilemmas, the problem of collective 
action, the provision of public goods, the tragedy of the commons, and the prisoners’ dilemma 
(Ostrom, 1998). Behind all these metaphors lies a problem that can be described as follows: a 
group of agents know that if they can collaborate, they will all gain. However, this collaboration 
is not costless but carries economic burdens or other effort for all involved. Without the 
contribution of (almost) all agents, the good will not be produced because it makes no sense 
for the individual agent to contribute if she or he does not trust that (almost) everyone else 
will contribute. Moreover, what is going to be produced is, by definition, a public good and can 
thereby be consumed by everyone regardless of whether or not any given individual has 
contributed. There is thus always a risk that agents will act opportunistically, hoping that they 
can reap the benefits of the good without contributing. Without trust that most agents will 
refrain from such treacherous behaviour, most agents will not contribute to the good in 
question. The end result of this lack of trust is that everyone in the group stands to lose, 
although all know that if they could trust each other they would all be better off. 
On a more practical level, social trust is important because it relates to a number of 
variables that are desirable for a prosperous and well-governed society, i.e. a non-corrupt 
society. As measured by surveys, at an individual level, people who believe that most other 
people in their society in general are trustworthy are also more inclined to have a positive 
view of their democratic institutions. Trusting people also have a more optimistic view of their 
possibility of influencing their lives and subsequently their societies (Uslaner, 2002; Delhey & 
Newton, 2005; Helliwell, 2006). Similarly, on a societal level, cities, regions and nations with 
more trusting people are more likely to have more open economies with greater economic 
growth, better working democratic institutions and less crime - including corruption (Keefer & 
Knack, 2008; Uslaner, 2008; Sean, 2009; Bjørnskov, 2012).  
Corruption seems to have a detrimental effect on trust, on an individual but also on a 
societal level. As Johnston (2005), argues in his book Syndromes of Corruption, that if politics 
builds only on a limited public trust and commitment, citizens may see the process as a rich 
man’s game and their own choice at election time as unconnected to the wellbeing of society. 
When there is widespread belief that corruption prevails and the powerful in particular are 
able to get away with it, people lose faith in those entrusted with power (Hardoon & 
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Heinrich, 2013). It is, however, interesting and relevant to this research to take note of a point 
made by Rothstein (2011), that when the social trust research agenda went comparative, the 
Nordic countries came out on top irrespective of what measures were being used. This is 
relevant for this research with its origins in the Nordic countries:  the research question in a 
sense is born partly out of this fact. But to understand why the Nordic countries excel, one 
would first have to examine the way in which corruption is measured: the focus of the next 
section.   
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1.3   Measurement - the perception of corruption 
”In this messy controversy about quantification and its bearing on standard logical 
rules we simply tend to forget that concept formation stands prior to quantification. ” 
(Giovanni, 1970, p. 1039) 
It is important to remember that there is no international consensus on the definition of 
corruption. Even locally, where an accepted definition may apply, the interpretation and 
meaning of the concept could still vary quite significantly. Even so there are at least three 
reasons as to why corruption should be measured accurately (P. Heywood, 2015). First, it is 
important to assess the scale of the issue; second, to determine patterns, and third, to identify 
variables that will aid understanding of why and where corruption occurs. ‘Measure’ and 
‘accurately’ are, however, two notions not easily combined.  
Given the clandestine nature of corruption, the lack of definition, variance in 
interpretation and meaning, corruption is a variable that cannot be measured directly. Further 
complexity is added when attempting to measure corruption across countries and cultures, 
both due to the secretive nature of corruption and the variety of forms it takes. However, 
since corruption reflects an underlying institutional framework, different forms of corruption 
are likely to be correlated (Svensson, 2005).  
The number of corruption indices, however, is constantly growing but can be grouped 
according to three types (UNDP, 2008). One, perceptions- and/or experience-based 
indicators; two, single source or composite indicators; and three, proxy indicators. Perceptions-
based indicators are derived from the opinions and perceptions of corruption expressed by 
citizens and experts for a particular country or context. Experience-based indicators measure 
individual experiences of actual corruption, e.g. whether having been offered or given a bribe. 
Indicators based on a single data source are produced without recourse to third-party data 
whereas composite indicators aggregate and synthesise different measures generated by 
various third-party data sources. Partly due to their near global coverage, composite indicators 
remain the most widely used measurement tools (Rohwer, 2009). Lastly, proxy indicators try 
to measure corruption indirectly. Measurements can, for example, aggregate subjective and 
objective data, or make estimations by measuring ”opposites” of corruption such as anti-
corruption regulation, good governance and transparency. 
The most prominent measurements of the perception of corruption is presented and 
critically evaluated below, and then some of the difficulties surrounding this approach are 
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discussed. Lastly, some other measurement techniques are introduced to situate the 
measurements behind this research and its subsequent theory.   
The perceptions-based measurements of corruption 
The leading method of measuring corruption from the mid-1990s up until recently has 
been perception-based cross-national composite indices drawn from a range of surveys and 
expert assessments. Most prominently featured in Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI) and the World Bank Group’s Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(WGI). The CPI and the WGI are both composite indicators, made up of distinct component 
data sources that assess a wide and differing range of corruption (Knack, 2006, p. 15; UNDP, 
2008, p. 6). Such indices have proven immensely important in raising awareness of the issue of 
corruption, as well as forming the basis of cross-country comparisons (Transparency 
International, 2009). Yet, despite the important task of raising awareness, there are also some 
well-established concerns around these types of measures as inherently prone to bias, 
difficulties in longitudinal comparisons, and imperfections as proxies for actual levels of 
corruption (Andersson & Heywood, 2009; Razafindrakoto & Roubaud, 2010; P. Heywood & 
Rose, 2014; Charron, 2015). Broadly, indications of corruption tend to be biased towards a 
specific and often contextual dimension of corruption. Using the aforementioned composite 
indices as examples, the CPI measures corruption only in the public sector whereas the WGI 
also includes governance. 
The fundamental purpose of composite perceptions-based indices - to raise awareness 
of corruption and to provide researchers with better data for analysing the causes and 
consequences of corruption (Knack, 2006, p. 16), - has largely been fulfilled. The question is 
then if they still serve the same purpose or if they can be used to extrapolate further 
information that is useful for the anti-corruption efforts around the world. For instance, the 
ranking systems do allow limited comparisons between countries and the subsequent shaming 
of corrupt governments; however, they still remain based largely on the perceptions of 
experts. The limitation in comparison stems from the breadth of the concept of corruption 
when calculating aggregated corruption indices.  It is unclear what the corruption indices 
actually tell us because the types of corruption and their meaning vary from one country to 
the next (T. Thompson & Shah, 2005, p. 8). Further, experience is a poor predictor of 
perceptions and that ‘the “distance” between opinions and experiences vary haphazardly from 
country to country’ (Weber Abramo, 2008, p. 6). Hence, the indices fall short in both 
specificity and transparency (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2017). This implies significant challenges in terms 
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of discerning what actually needs to be done to create an effective anti-corruption framework. 
What follows is an outline of some of the challenges intrinsic to composite perceptions-based 
measurements of corruption, and why they shed little light in terms of understanding how to 
combat corruption, where corruption occurs and identifying relevant changes as they happen.   
Corruption can be measured; the question is how to measure it accurately and the 
practical utility of the measurement. Analysing the two main composite perceptions based 
incites, the CPI and the WGI, reveals some pertinent points of critique and distinct limitations. 
Leaving aside the difficulties of measuring something that lacks a uniform definition, there are 
also issues with method. The CPI methodology can be summarised as follows. The index ranks 
countries in terms of the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist. It is a composite 
index, i.e. a poll of polls. Corruption-related data is drawn from expert and business surveys 
from a variety of independent and (more or less) reputable institutions. The views reflected in 
the CPI are from around the whole world, but primarily from surveys of experts living in the 
countries evaluated.  
On the other hand, the methodology of the WGI adopted the basic approach of the TI 
CPI but attempted to improve on it in several respects (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Zoido-Lobatón, 
1999) in their initial Worldwide Governance Indicators project. The project reported 
aggregate and individual governance indicators for 212 countries and territories over the 
period 1996–2008, for six dimensions of governance: Voice and Accountability, Political 
Stability/Absence of Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and 
Control of Corruption. Examining both indicators further reveals that the WGI measures 
corruption as perceived by experts and opinion polls in both the public and private sector, 
whereas, the CPI measures of corruption are limited to the public sector, as perceived by 
experts only. 
The challenges of perceptions-based indicators 
As mentioned above, both indices are based on perceptions-based indicators, and there 
are at least two reasons for this. One, objective criteria are hard to collect and, two, available 
objective data is often misleading. Considering that the aggregate indicators combine the views 
of a large number of entities such as, citizen and expert survey respondents. In turn, the 
individual data sources underlying the aggregate indicators are drawn from a diverse variety of 
survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organisations, and international organisations. 
By using this data from carefully constructed surveys, perceptions measures about corruption 
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may possibly reflect realities of life better than objective measures. Perception-based indicators 
will, however, always reflect perceptions. Therefore, their reflection of reality depends on 
whether perceptions reflect reality, and perceptions can change faster or more slowly than 
reality (Maurseth, 2008, p. 27). There are other risks as Apaza (2009, p. 141) has pointed out., 
By collapsing different data sources – often selected only on the basis of convenience rather 
than theoretical justification – the aggregation models are unable to offer any nuance on the 
nature, category, or concept of corruption. It is therefore difficult to ascertain the underlying 
accuracy or what is actually measured. Therefore, even if consensus and high correlations 
exists between the CPI and WGI, this is not necessarily indicative of validity or reliability: 
”In a nutshell, data on corruption suffer from a fundamental problem, the fact that 
different data sets used in quantitative research are routinely associated with different 
findings, and that the relative validity of different measures of corruption and hence of the 
different findings is not readily apparent.” (Hawken & Munck, 2009, p. 2).  
The task of measuring corruption in general, and by developing cross-national data 
comparisons, is laudable and probably necessary to keep the issue alive politically. This is in 
spite of methodological constraints where variations in reported levels of corruption may be a 
product of the prevailing methodologies as opposed to actual levels of corruption. Resonating 
with the Glaserian tenet that ’everything is data’ (see e.g. B. Glaser, 2001), the injunction 
offered by Hawken & Munck (2009, p. 21) is to ’know your data’. Thus, despite any possible 
shortcomings, available data should not be jettisoned out of hand, but instead employed to 
generate a better index, through sensitive analysis of methodological choices on the basis of 
available data. Further, there should be more control of the criteria and of the methods of 
obtaining aggregated indicators to better understand what they are measuring, and to 
determine (roughly) their degree of interdependence. 
Another problem highlighted by Heywood (2015) with the CPI that also resonates with 
the WGI relates to the question of how to properly and accurately gauge and interpret what 
respondents to the various surveys actually understand by corruption. It is difficult to ascertain 
whether the expert respondents share a common understanding of what constitutes 
corruption in a particular location at a particular time on a highly subjective scale; what seems 
low, modest or very high levels of corruption may not resonate harmoniously throughout the 
population of respondents. The same question can be posed for the correlation of export 
respondents’ perceptions to the experiences of ordinary citizens, i.e. actual corruption.  
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An answer to how well corruption perception measures reflect actual levels of public 
sector corruption is provided by Charron (2015). Given the amount of theoretical and 
empirical scrutiny that the prominent cross-national perceptions- based corruption measures 
have suffered in recent years, the implications for the validity and reliability of the data are 
significant. Critics argue that perceptions, in particular, those of outside experts  do not reflect 
actual corruption in that they are far too ‘noisy’ or simply biased by external factors. Moreover, 
Charron, continues, a number of empirical studies on developing areas have produced 
evidence that external expert assessments of corruption correspond poorly, if at all, with the 
experiences of actual citizens. Such lack of correspondence generates pessimism for 
perceptions-based measurements. The study undertaken by Charron offers a systematic 
analysis of the empirical strength of corruption perception measures in a previously 
unexplored area in this debate – Europe, an area that corresponds almost perfectly with the 
scope of this research., But whereas this study uses a small N with little over 20 respondents, 
the data used by Charron is based on 85,000 European respondents in 24 countries. The 
findings provide strong counter-evidence to the prevailing pessimistic claims of non-correlation 
of experts and citizens perceptions on corruption. The consistency is remarkably high and such 
perceptions are swayed little by ‘outside noise’. 
From this discussion there is value in perceptions-based measurement tools that 
aggregate a number of data sources, like the CPI or WGI. Both have their strengths and 
weaknesses. On the one hand, composite indicators can be useful in summarising large 
quantities of information from several sources. Further, they can limit the influence of 
measurement error in any one individual indicator and thus potentially increase the accuracy 
of measuring corruption. On the other hand, one can run the risk of losing conceptual clarity. 
In line with the conclusive remarks by Hawken and Munch (2009, p. 24), it is at this point 
where it would be preferable to test theories about the causes and consequences of 
corruption with a smaller N than is provided by the CPI and the CCI. This could lead to a 
greater certainty that at least the data is more valid. This research answers exactly such a 
preference, which is part of the fundamental rationale for this work discussed at the end of 
this chapter. There are, however, other ways of measuring corruption - some of them 
mentioned in the following section. 
Other measurement proxies of corruption 
There are other methods to measure corruption such as those used by Knack and 
Keefer (1995) and Mauro (1995), based on indicators of corruption assembled by private risk-
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assessment firms. From these, it would seem that the corruption indicator published in the 
International Country Risk Guide has become the most popular, probably due to better 
coverage across time and countries. Moving chronologically there is also Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi (2003) who derive a complementary measure, Control of Corruption, drawn from a 
large set of data sources. With a broader definition of corruption and including most cross-
country indices that rank countries on some aspect of corruption they use a different strategy 
than Transparency International to aggregate the corruption indicators. Nevertheless, as 
Svensson (2005) observed, definitions and aggregation choices seem to matter only marginally. 
The simple correlation between the results of the different methods is relatively small. 
Svensson also makes the important observation that the aggregation procedures used by both 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2003) and Transparency International presume that the 
measurement errors associated with each sub-indicator are independent across sources. This 
assumption allows them also to report measures of the precision or reliability of the estimates. 
In reality, the measurement errors are likely to be highly correlated, because the producers of 
the different indices read the same reports and most likely gauge each other’s evaluations 
(Svensson, 2005).  
In the introduction to ”A Users’ Guide to Measuring Corruption” (UNDP, 2008) Heller 
states that one could persuasively argue that the science of measuring corruption is more an 
art form than a precisely defined empirical process. She also claims that no single data source 
or tool will offer a definitive measurement. Note that the highly qualitative nature of this 
research originates in a school of thought more often associated with art than its quantitative 
counterpart, acknowledging the art in it while also striving for empirical precision. The 
argument built up by Heller, however, leads to the conclusion that it is only through the 
careful parsing and comparison of the available tools that we can arrive at a more accurate 
measurement. The guide then goes on to examine fifteen different corruption indices in an 
attempt to outline actionable measurements as a road map for reform.  
Not included among these indices but worthy of mention is the work on financial 
tracking in China by Li (2001, 2002). It is based on and around the dual-track system, a 
hallmark of the Chinese reform but one that is also believed to have increased corruption. Li 
(2001) describes the dual track system as “a hybrid economic system under which traditional 
central planning (the plan track) and the emerging product market (the market track) 
coexisted as means of resource allocation”. Using data from a survey of state-owned 
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manufacturers supplemented by aggregate input-output data, Li (20002) finds that the leakage 
in the plan became more significant after the introduction of the dual-track system. 
Broadly, and as outlined by Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2006), corruption is being 
measured in three ways. Firstly, by gathering the informed views of relevant step holders; 
secondly, by tracking countries’ institutional features; and thirdly, by careful audits of specific 
projects. A year prior, the same authors had provided an exhaustive list of 22 different sources 
that provides data on corruption (Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2005). Here, examples of 
measuring institutional features include the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability 
[PEFA] framework, and the Public Integrity Index of Global Integrity. Examples of audits 
include Olken's (2005) research in Indonesia and Hsieh and Moretti's (2006) study on Iraq’s 
relationship with the UN. The PEFA initiative on monitoring fiscal procedures in the public 
sector bears resemblance to Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys [PETS] and is sometimes 
accompanied by Quantitative Service Delivery Surveys [QSDS]. These are tools that seek to 
document service delivery on the supply side, used in scenarios with systemic corruption such 
as Uganda (see e.g. Emmanuel and Reinikka, 1998). These types of surveys have two brand 
uses. They serve as a tool to gauge service delivery, enabling the analysis of public expenditure, 
taking into account the implementation capacities of governments. In addition, they provide 
primary data on service providers for empirical research purposes. Reinikka and Svensson 
(2002) provide an overview of the diagnostic, data collection and research benefits of these 
tools along with the potential for capacity building. Fuller discussion lies outside the scope of 
this research, but nevertheless could benefit from the findings of perceptions-based research 
like this.  
Having explored a number of ways of measuring corruption it is important to 
acknowledge the fact that subjective corruption measurements spawn ordinal indices, although 
quite often these are mistaken by media and academics alike as cardinal. This is important to 
keep in mind, particularly when attempting to interpret trends or changes in the indices over 
time or across countries. The macro-level rankings of countries as more or less corrupt based 
on subjective judgments as such cannot be used to quantify the magnitude of corruption. Nor 
does this research attempt to do so. Instead the focus resides in individuals’ perspectives in an 
effort to understand corruption rather than measure it. This research encompasses the 
individual perspective by including participants’ interpretations of the indices. Such 
interpretations are intrinsically subjective and fundamentally created on an individual level 
where the focus of this research primarily resides, not only for one particular country, at a 
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particular time or compared to another particular country, but from a holistic perspective. The 
laudable struggle to accurately measure corruption goes on and is perpetually fuelled by the 
urge (at least by some, and hopefully most) to combat corruption. The next section discusses 
various efforts to do just that. 
The role of perception in this research 
While there have been developments in terms of the development of corruption 
measurements proxies (see e.g. Fazekas, Cingolani, & Tóth, 2016) the composite indices still 
play a major role in forming public opinion and subsequent policy. In 2007 Urra (2007) 
examined how the different corruption measurement frameworks are built and defined the 
main problems that corruption measurement encounters. These are labelled as the 
“perception” problem; the “error” problem; and the “utility” problem.  To summarise the - 
still valid – arguments, firstly, the perceptions problem is based on the unanimous acceptance 
of perception as a relevant factor in corruption. Relevance, however, does not translate into 
real; but perceptions-based indices are sometimes read as literal accounts of actual levels of 
corruption. Also, the complex statistical constructions of composite indices using aggregate 
indicators can easily create an illusion of quantitative sophistication. Such sophistication can be 
misunderstood or even wilfully misused and interpreted as an indication of actual levels of 
corruption. Secondly, the error problem is still one of the most challenging when it comes to 
the actual accuracy of perceptions-based composite indices. Social science in general has to 
consider a level of confidence and a subsequent margin of error. Corruption composites have 
a supplementary challenge in that the data used already include, sometimes large, margins of 
error. Thirdly, one of the main reasons for the increase in corruption research is the interest of 
policymakers. This in turn has not always led to efficient policies, and the corruption indices 
have been criticised for being difficult to convert into concrete anti-corruption efforts. This is 
obviously not always the sole or even main purpose of the indices, but it is clear that 
measurement does not necessarily mean utility (Kaufmann & Kraay, 2007). 
It has been shown that indicators can provide statistically reliable measurements, but 
what they reliably measure is not so clear (Langbein & Knack, 2010, p. 365). Rather it has been 
argued that the indicators are poorly defined and may be meaningless (Thomas, 2010). The 
UNDP (2008, p. 26) commented that ”by aggregating many component variables into a single 
score or category, users run the risk of losing the conceptual clarity that is so crucial”. If users 
are unable to understand or unpack the concept that is being measured, their ability to draw 
out informed policy implications is severely constrained (P. Heywood, 2015) Thus, in line with 
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a central statement in the UNDP’s (2008) Users’ Guide to Measuring Corruption, there is little 
value in a measurement if it does not indicate what needs to be fixed. 
Given the current and seemingly continued prominence of the perceptions-based 
indices and the issues raised by Urra (2007), the next section is devoted to clarifying some 
issues around perceptions-based indices. This will also serve as an important intellectual 
backdrop to this research as it is to some extent, although quite differently, perceptions-based. 
One of the fundamental drivers of this research project is to increase understanding and 
enhance anti-corruption activities through theoretical development. Theory is derived and 
developed from the subjective accounts of participants, rendering it to an extent perceptions-
based. As previous sections have shown, understanding and subsequently using perceptions-
based aggregate indicators can be problematic. That does not mean that perceptions should 
not be taken seriously nor completely discarded from the corruption research agenda. If 
anything, the opposite is true: there is still much to discover and learn from the analysis of 
perceptions in the fight against corruption. As Hough (2017, p 69) points out - and very much 
in line with the aim of this research - the measurement of corruption is not an exact science. 
While perhaps not providing definitive answers, perceptions-based research can help in 
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1.4   Corruption and rational choice 
“Being the rational animal, man must be capable of thinking if he really wants to. 
Still, it may be that man wants to think, but cannot.” (Heidegger, 1972) 
This research is about individuals, their perception and decisions, thus a rational choice 
perspective is used. This section will explain and justify that assumption. After an introduction 
to the relationship (at least academically) between corruption and rational choice, the section 
will provide a background to the rational choice paradigm. The positioning of this research 
within the rational choice paradigm is then discussed. Finally, there is an exploration of some 
of the issues with a rational choice approach.  
Rational choice theory is based on the expected utility principle in economic theory 
(Akers et al. 2017: 24). The expected utility principle states that an agent will make rational 
decisions based on the extent to which the decision (or rather the outcomes thereof) is 
expected to maximise gain and minimise loss. Rational choice theory formulated around 
individual motivation and as a reflection of self-interest marks a distinct shift in focus and thus 
appears to have some credence for explaining human behaviour. Relevant to this research and 
outlined by Bronfenbrenner (1979) individuals inhabit ecological systems composed of 
numerous dynamics, that in turn are based on the way that the system operates. These 
dynamics include macro, meso and micro factors. Whilst this research puts emphasis on the 
latter, that is not to say that the other two factorial levels are irrelevant.  The macro level is 
commonly used in estimates of corruption via composite indicators such as Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, (see section 1.3). Therefore, this perspective is 
largely used to generalise macro level developments of corruption from the perspective of the 
nation state. While this in certain contexts can be a useful level of categorisation it does not 
lend itself well to an analysis based in rational choice theory. The other two levels, however, 
do.  
While this research is primarily based on a micro perspective of rational choice, i.e. the 
individual level of decision making, the relevance of the meso level i.e. the collective level, is 
still worthy of examination. Analysis at this level is largely based on micro perspective 
fundamentals. The relevance of rational choice-based theorising in corruption, and anti-
corruption, research is exemplified by the work of Persson, Rothstein and Teorell (2010) and 
Marquette and Peiffer (2015). In “The failure of Anti-Corruption policies, a theoretical 
mischaracterisation of the problem” Persson, Rothstein and Theorell (2010) examine the anti-
corruption movement in Africa from what can be interpreted as a meso level perspective. The 
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question posed by the authors is “Why does corruption in Africa prevail despite a large 
number of efforts to fight it?” (p. 2). Providing a convincing argument for collective action 
theory, the findings are perhaps best summed up by Klitgaard’s (1988) famous statement that 
“corruption equals monopoly plus discretion minus accountability”. Under rationalist logic this 
implies that corruption is likely where agents hold monopoly over a product, service or scarce 
resource; where agents have the discretion to decide and control distribution; and where 
accountability and transparency is weak. Now, rational choice theory in and by itself may be 
inadequate to explain the failure to successfully implement anti-corruption reforms in Africa. 
Thus, a meso perspective is of utmost importance to address a number of additional factors 
associated with the cost and benefit of deviance such as self-control, moral beliefs, strains, 
emotional state and association with delinquent peers (see Clarke and Cornish, 1986). A 
singular perspective, as opposed to a multiple lens perspective, may be intrinsically limiting - an 
argument supported by Marguette and Peiffer (2015). It is, however, necessary that all lenses 
in such an approach are clear in order to not distort the entire picture. Hence, the importance 
of research like this work with its focus on the micro lens.  
In “Corruption and Collective Action” Marquette and Peiffer (2015) draw upon rational 
choice theory to look at what shapes the individual propensity for certain decisions. They 
argue that the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures is context- dependent and that under 
certain circumstances principal-agent theory provides better explanations of deviant behaviour 
than collective action theory. Expanding the perspective of the self-interested individual to 
reflect on how ground dynamics shape actions. The analysis emanates from “The Logic of 
Collective Action” by Olson (1965) and its claim that collective action becomes problematic 
when some members of the collective fail to act in accordance with the common (collective) 
goal. On one hand, Marquette and Peiffer (2015) challenge the fundamental principles of 
rational choice theory and focus on the collective rather than the individual choice. This makes 
sense since individuals rarely exist apart from some sort of collective context. As Heidegger 
(1996) states man is thrown into the world and has to make sense of it. This sense-making 
process does not occur in isolation and an overly instrumental rational choice theory approach 
would thus run the risk of ignoring how individuals are socialised. On the other hand, it is 
important not to misinterpret self-interest. This concept is treated twice in chapter three in 
two different yet conceptually similar instances. As noted by Agnew (2014 REF) self-interest is 
a core assumption of criminology, yet nonetheless it is arguably an ideological construct. As 
useful as it can be on an individual level, it becomes increasingly obstructive when moving up 
the scale towards a macro perspective.   
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From the examples above and others we will discuss later, it is clear that rational choice 
theory has a role to play in explaining corruption, but it remains unclear exactly what that role 
is. There is no doubt about the individual element as part of the degenerating decision-making 
process that leads to corruption; but there is also little doubt that this degeneration takes 
place in a social context. Here the individual is more or less part of some collective that 
influences decisions and shape outcomes. Thus, whether rational choice theory can predict if 
an agent calculates before acting that the benefits outweigh the costs depends whether one 
subscribes to pure or partial rationality. This research maintains that it is the latter that will 
prevail. It does not require much consideration to realise that from a perspective of an agent 
choosing deviancy based upon perfect knowledge and untethered free will, taking into account 
only accurately estimated objective and subjective costs and benefits, the rational choice 
theory would hold little, if any, empirical value. The purely rational (and accurate) calculation of 
the probable consequences of a decision is arguably a rarity for decision-making in general, 
including non-deviant decisions. In a study, albeit on burglary, Cromwell, Olson and Avary 
(1991) found that a completely rational decision-making process cannot be supported, and 
that opportunity and situational factors often plays a vital part.  In essence, that is why this 
research expands the scope of a pure and narrow interpretation of rational choice to 
incorporate a more comprehensive and subsequently more complex iteration. This 
interpretation can be better appreciated by first looking at the historical development of 
rational choice theory within criminology.  
The origins of the rational choice paradigm 
There is a large and diverse body of literature on and around the topic of rational choice 
theory. With its roots in economic theory most of it pertains to the economic domain, but it 
has also expanded to include political theory as well as being an integral part of Game Theory. 
Rational choice theory also has its place in criminology.  
Indeed, Akers (1990) noted that rational choice theorising is a return to classical 
criminology where, the literature emphasises limitations and constraints on rationality. The 
criminological literature on rational choice theory describes a complex phenomenon of 
perception and motivation. The phenomenon is explored and analysed, deconstructed and 
reconstructed to facilitate anti-corruption efforts.  
From a criminological perspective, the concept of humans as rational actors where 
criminal actions is committed to maximise pleasure (benefit) and avoid pain (cost) can be 
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traced back to the eighteenth century and the advent of the Classical School of criminology. 
During the enlightenment, contemporary influencers like Bentham and Beccaria inaugurated a 
new set of characteristics for offenders, well-captured in the following route by Cornish and 
Clarke; “Offenders seek to benefit themselves by their criminal behaviour; that this involves 
the making of decisions and choices, however rudimentary on occasion these processes might 
be; and these processes exhibit a measure of rationality, albeit constrained by the limits of time 
and the availability of information” (2014, p. 1). The quote encapsulates some of the 
important limits to rationality and how it is bound, a theme developed further in section 3.4. A 
key assumption of rational choice theory is that the decisions an agent makes are “purposive”. 
That is, they are “deliberate acts, committed with the intention of benefitting the offender” 
(Clarke & Cornish, 2001: 24 in Lilly 2015 p. 363). Thus, a rational agent is generally doing the 
best it can within the context of the limited time and information resources, available to it. 
This is why the decision-making is characterised as rational, albeit in a limited way. This is an 
excellent lead into the position of this research within the rational choice paradigm - to 
explore the limits of rationality within the context of corruption. 
Central to Bentham’s writing in the late 18th century was the pleasure and pain principle 
- the idea that human behaviour is generally directed at maximising pleasure and avoiding pain.  
“Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain 
and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as we as determine 
what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the 
chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all 
we say, in all we think: every effort we can make to throw off our subjection, will serve 
but to demonstrate and confirm it.” (Bentham, 1789/1973: 66) 
Similarly, while Beccaria in a criminological sense may be best known for his ideas 
around the certainty, celerity and severity of punishment - concepts generally associated with 
deterrence theories - these are fundamentally underpinned by the notion of a rational actor. 
As the logical conclusion around this thinking, Beccaria simply stated, “it is better to print 
crimes than to punish them” (Beccaria, 1764/1963: 93). Some 250 years later his statement 
still resonates through this research. 
By the second half of the twentieth century, the genealogy of rational choice theory can 
be found in the writings of Matza and Sykes. Here the idea was that crime has a purpose 
rooted in the desires of an agent who seeks benefits in the form of acquisition (Matza, 1964). 
In this research, questions are raised around what that purpose might be and what an 
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abstraction of the essence of that which is acquired would be. To limit the potentially 
criminogenic nature of rational choice theory, Sykes and Matza (1957) proposed crime 
prevention measures and various sanctions for committing crime, where the former resulted in 
an audit of the situation in which the deviant act occurred. Similarly, this research applies a 
situational crime prevention approach to corruption.  
The position of this research within the rational choice paradigm  
The defining feature of this research in relation to its application of rational choice 
theory to corruption is the criminological underpinning. Where most rational choice 
approaches stem from either economics or political sciences, this research has different roots. 
While much of the theorising around rational choice is similar across disciplines, it is highly 
relevant to understand and to some degree, at least epistemologically, adopt its origins. This is 
because there may be small yet important variations in the usage and meaning of various 
elements in the construction, deconstruction and reconstruction of theory - processes that 
play a methodological role when research is informed by grounded theory. This research is a 
purely qualitative piece of research on the perception of corruption drawing upon the 
criminological underpinnings of rational choice theory. In doing so, it provides an addition to 
the already large and somewhat diverse literature on perceptions, rational choice and its role 
in corruption.  
Deviance is thus not considered solely from underlying motivations or predispositions, 
but as also including a choice, or often more precisely a sequence of choices. It is this 
sequence that then, from the perspective of corruption as a degenerated decision-making 
process, which results in the transformation of motivation into corruption. From that 
perspective the rational choice paradigm invites contemplation as to how motivation is 
created and in turn how this can be used to predict where decision-making degeneration and 
subsequent deviance occurs. As Clarke and Cornish (2001) argue, the tradition of rational 
choice points toward being more interested in the “wider social and political contexts that 
mould beliefs and structure choice. Consequently, they have taken little interest in the details 
of criminal decision-making”. In contrast, for this research, and as Clarke and Cornish 
continues, “it is these details that must be understood” (p. 32).    
Alternatively, and perhaps as an intermediary step in reaching this understanding, one 
can turn to an adjacent yet related theory - routine activities theory. Routine activities theory 
does not, to the same extent, rely on an exact interpretation of what motivates an agent to 
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deviance. It argues only that for particular acts of deviance to occur a motivation of some sort 
must be present. Conceivably, this perspective could be further elaborated along the lines of 
other motivational theories of crime, such as social learning theory, strain theory, etc. but such 
systematic exploration lies beyond the scope of this research. Instead, in using rational choice 
theory this research draws on the implicit (or sometimes explicit) view used in routine 
activities theory that an agent seeking an advantage wishes to “gain quick pleasure and avoid 
imminent pain” (Felson, 1998, p. 23). This point about advantage-seeking agents is why both 
rational choice theory and routine activities theory, lead to policy recommendations that fight 
crime through “situational crime prevention” measures (See Lilly, Cullen and Ball, 2015). The 
approach in this research bears some resemblance to Wikström’s (2005) “situational action 
theory”, which attempts to reconcile an agent’s motivation with the context of routine 
activities and situations. For Wikström (2005), the likelihood of engaging in crime is based on 
the interaction of an agent’s level of self-control, moral judgment, and situational factors. 
Preliminary empirical tests by Wikström and his colleagues have yielded some support for this 
extension of the routine activities’ framework (Wikström, 2009, 2012; Wikström et al., 2012), 
which, due to its similarity to the idea of interacting decision-making, motivation and situations, 
lends some validity to the conclusions drawn later in this research. The key point is, as 
behavioural economics shows, all decision-making is shaped by a complex process that 
sometimes does not lend itself well to being simplistically reduced to just utility - costs and 
benefits (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). Nevertheless, by elevating this reductionism to that of a 
search for advantages, what research discovers is, why, from a rational choice perspective, 
corruption happens.  
Addressing some of the issues with a rational choice approach 
There are a number of studies that part with the rational choice paradigm, at least in its 
simplest and most pure neo-classical interpretations. For Hellmann (2017), the analysis of 
corruption has undergone radical revision increasingly emphasising a move away from studying 
corruption as an individual act of deviant behaviour. The argument instead is that corruption 
can be institutionalised as informal rules and routines putting pressure on behaviour in 
accordance with these norms. Hellman’s exploration is, however, focused on the developing 
world and although it is pointed out that similar arguments have been made by scholars 
exploring corruption in post-communist societies (see. Ledeneva, 2006 and Roman, 2014), 
these too are somewhat different from the context of the European Union. Further, as 
Hellman concludes, the choices leading to the institutionalisation of corruption were 
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conditioned by the political market place and could be described as an expression of an “elite 
cartel” searching for advantages. While the corrupting effect of this search is influenced by the 
historical sequence of institutionalisation of the political market place, it is nevertheless the 
search for advantages that ultimately corrupts.  
The sequencing of institutionalisation is something that has been studied before. In a 
contextually interesting article appropriately called “Becoming Denmark” the performance of 
historical governance achievers is explored (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2014). The focus is diverted from 
the present organisation of legislation and political institutions as a cause for good and 
corruption-free governance, as these act more for the maintenance, rather than the actual 
creation of good governance. The early achiever Denmark exemplifies successful 
establishment of good governance in modern times. Using the best in class benchmarks of 
good governance when modernising in those nation states where corruption is more prolific 
seems to have a limited effect. As Mungiu-Pippidi (2014) concludes “modernisation in itself 
does not bring good governance” (p. 2). Rather, it is important to understand the framework 
created by the institutions in which agents are expected to make their decisions. Institutions, 
while partly but not solely, responsible for enforcing some sort of societal ethical universalism 
must be examined from a historical perspective to see what sequence they followed. This 
goes to better understanding the situation in which the decision-making process is taking place 
and where the same process sometimes degenerates. This macro perspective is very much 
similar to the micro, i.e. individual perspective used in this research.   
The point of a strictly individualistic perspective cannot be stressed enough when 
exploring, examining and ultimately evaluating the conclusions drawn in this research. In a 
review of a number of corruption-related sources that more or less rely on some sort of 
rational choice assumption, Hopkin (2002) argues that the rational choice approach to the 
study of the state is fundamentally flawed. Further, it fails to provide a satisfactory account of 
cross-national variations in levels of corruption and state capacity. It is clear that a rational 
choice approach is less suited to macro level analysis. Such findings direct microanalysis 
research endeavours such as this one to maintain and limit the scope of both analysis and 
conclusions drawn. Further direction is provided by Sutherland Award-winning scholar Daniel 
Nagin, who argues for moving choice to centre stage in criminological research and theory 
(Nagin, 2007). Individual agents should not be portrayed as propelled in and out of deviancy 
by forces over which they have absolutely no control. Human agency is of utmost importance 
when elaborating a criminological theory based on a rational choice perspective and the failure 
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of the same perspective to provide macro explanations should not divert us from its potential 
on an individual level to explain how perceptions could influence decision-making.     
As summarised in Lilly, Cullen and Ball (2015, pp. 365-366) there are qualms about what 
is rational. It can be difficult to provide clear criteria as to whether or not a choice is 
considered rational. Sometimes it seems as if the mere fact that agents makes a certain choice 
is used as a basis for the assertion of rationality. If no standards are presented to judge 
rationality, then a certain choice cannot be shown to be irrational either. In such cases the 
thesis that offenders make rational choices becomes an assumption that is difficult, if not 
impossible, to falsify. Even when, as in this research, adding the notion of bounded rationality it 
can be hard to outline the contribution made from studying the rational component of 
decision-making. This is due to the decision-making process being influenced by a wide range 
of factors and only by studying each factor individually and then as part of a complex system 
could any deductions be made. In this research the intricacies of such an analysis is bypassed 
by elevating the analysis to a higher level of abstraction where the influential factors are subject 
to an internal analysis towards a decision being perceived as advantageous. Thus, instead of 
getting bogged down in whether deviance is the result of an agent holding anti-social values, 
wish to relieve strain, etc. which may distort more than it illuminates, this research focuses on 
how the end calculus is perceived - as either advantageous or not.  
This indicates that the issue around rationality arguably also extends to the realm of 
social psychology. Within this discipline it has since long been established that decisions are 
systematically biased by the methods employed by agents making choices (see e.g. Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974, 1981). In certain circumstances it is all but impossible to weigh all 
information available in what could be considered a rational manner. Rather than being strictly 
rational, i.e. accurately weighing costs and benefits, agents employ a rule of thumb to facilitate 
a good enough decision. On a fundamental level, “good enough” ensures survival. These 
mental short cuts are what are referred to as “heuristics”, allowing decisions to be made 
quicker, and are discussed further in several sections of this research. Here the point is that, 
from a purely objective standpoint, these choices would be seen as irrational, but from the 
perspective of the individual as the most advantageous. Since human judgements are shaped 
by complex biological, psychological, and sociological factors, this complexity must be 
appreciated and investigated (Nagin, 2007). This research is one of those appreciations and 
investigations. And so, what of the role of institutions and governance in a rational choice-
based approach to studying corruption? As Hough (2017, p. 88) writes, the rational choice 
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approach makes sense in a setting where the rule of law is strong, public officials work in a 
climate of transparency and accountability, and there is widespread trust in government 
(generally) doing the right thing. Such a setting is embodied in this research by the Member 
States of the EU, where in a global context there, are few if any weak states where corruption 
is the norm.  
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1.5   Combatting corruption 
“Whoever fights monsters should see to it that in the process he does not become 
a monster. And if you gaze long enough into an abyss, the abyss will gaze back into you.” 
(Nietzsche, 1886 - Aphorism 146) 
Little over a decade ago the review of anti-corruption frameworks would probably have 
led to some conclusions along the lines that the existence of tangible evidence on how to 
combat corruption was scant (Svensson, 2005). Since then anti-corruption research has 
increasingly become in vogue. The profound recognition of the threat that corruption poses to 
institutional integrity, economic development, and to the rule of law and democracy, not only 
in developing countries but also at the very heart of developed European democracies, has 
instilled a strong determination to create rules and mechanisms to fight against it (Heineman & 
Heimann, 2006, pp. 75-76). 
While the purpose of this research is to generate theory to facilitate a greater 
understanding of corruption, in order for that understanding to have any anti-corruption 
bearing the theory must be placed in an anti-corruption framework. It is therefore only logical 
to first examine the already existing frameworks for combatting corruption. As the scope of 
this research extends only as far as the Member States of the EU, the choice of frameworks to 
examine is somewhat delimited: a point that also holds true for the future applicability of the 
theory. Therefore, some conventions on corruption are excluded, perhaps most notably the 
Inter-American Convention Against Corruption (IACAC) and African Union Convention on 
Preventing and Combating Corruption. Instead the frameworks examined are: first, the OECD 
Anti-Bribery Convention; second, the United Nations Convention Against Corruption 
(UNCAC); and third, the Council of Europe’s Criminal and Civil Law Convention on 
Corruption. Finally, this section concludes with an examination of the EU’s efforts to curb 
corruption within its Member States as stated in the 2014 EU anti-corruption report.  
An overview of global Anti-Corruption frameworks 
Just as the establishment of the idea of corruption being widespread, the subsequent 
consensus on its deeply detrimental effects on society is relatively new. So is the proliferation 
of conventions, normative declarations and other standardised frameworks and activities 
among the international community of states. The ANTICORRP Background report on 
International and European Law Against Corruption provides a comprehensive overview of 
the historical development of international anti-corruption frameworks (Anagnostou et al., 
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2014). The report sets out the development of international standards and rules against 
corruption; work that accelerated from the end of the Cold War and the associated 
geopolitical developments in Europe.  Driven by the opening-up of markets and the growing 
privatisation of state companies, the costs to business of engaging in corrupt practices 
increased. Financial support for corruption-ridden regimes in allied countries in the Third 
World also lost momentum after the Cold War ended (Kubiciel, 2012, pp. 421-422). It was 
only in the 1990s that the first international norms and conventions in this area were drafted 
and adopted. The ANTICORRP Background report cites this as partly responsible for the 
pronounced paucity of studies exploring state compliance with and implementation of 
international anti-corruption norms, in stark contrast to a burgeoning scholarship of state 
compliance with international law more broadly (Anagnostou et al., 2014). There is an 
assumption, even an explicit argument, that international anti-corruption norms and values - 
designed to promote the creation and strengthening of national legal and regulatory 
frameworks - make a positive contribution in tackling state-level corruption (at least to some 
degree) (Wolf, 2010).  
With movements towards single-market-type socio-economic structures, 
interdependence, through increased internationalisation via the free movement of people, 
goods and services, increases. This increase revealed unilateral nation-based measures were 
insufficient in addressing transnational corruption (Anagnostou et al., 2014). Bringing together 
actors from opposite ends of the corruption continuum, both conceptually and practically, 
makes corruption difficult to detect - and even more so when opportunities are amplified by 
globalisation (Williams & Beare, 1999). The mobilisation of public opinion created momentum 
to set up international rules discrediting corruption. Such mobilisation was partly facilitated by 
campaigns headed by NGO’s like Transparency International. Founded in 1993 by Peter Eigen 
it has established an impressive worldwide presence, including chapters in several European 
countries. The activity by NGOs has been and arguably still is a significant catalyst in the anti-
corruption societal reaction. Abbott and Snidal (2002) convincingly demonstrate that both 
instrumental motivations and value-based commitments on the part of state and non-state 
actors coexisted and were closely intertwined in the process that led to the 
internationalisation and legalisation of anti-corruption norms.  
The first global instrument against corruption, or more specifically bribery, was agreed in 
1997 when 28 states signed the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
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Officials in International Business Transactions. The scope has been criticised for being 
somewhat narrow:  
”…take such measures as may be necessary to establish that it is a criminal offence 
under its law for any person intentionally to offer, promise or give any undue pecuniary or 
other advantage, whether directly or through intermediaries, to a foreign public official, for 
that official or for a third party, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in 
relation to the performance of official duties, in order to obtain or retain business or 
other improper advantage in the conduct of international business.” (OECD, 2009 - 
Article 1) 
The convention is still relevant as to date the 35 OECD countries and 8 non-OECD 
countries - Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Colombia, Costa Rica, Lithuania, Russia, and South 
Africa - have adopted this Convention (OECD, 2017) From the perspective of international 
business and global markets this is important because the states host some of the world's 
largest multinational corporations. The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention establishes legally 
binding standards to criminalise the bribery of foreign public officials in international business 
transactions and provides for a host of related measures that make this effective. 
Through a peer-driven monitoring mechanism established by the convention, the 
thorough implementation and enforcement of the obligations, recommendations and related 
instruments of the signatories is ensured.  Monitoring is performed by the OECD Working 
Group on Bribery made up of representatives from the States Parties to the Convention and 
meeting four times a year in Paris. The monitoring program involves country visits by experts 
from peer governments and meetings with local prosecutors and representatives from the 
private sector and civil society. The resulting country monitoring reports contain 
recommendations formed from examinations of each country. By probing the State Parties to 
determine whether their governments have legal loopholes (such as short statutes of 
limitations), whether they provide sufficient resources for enforcement, and whether local 
corporations have adequate compliance programs, the reports also create incentives for 
improvement (Heineman & Heimann, 2006).  
In contrast to the OECD convention, UNCAC can create a truly global framework for 
combating corruption because its 140 signatories include both developed and developing 
nations. It also covers a much broader scope of issues: extortion in addition to bribery, payoffs 
to the private sector as well as to public officials, and both domestic and foreign corruption. 
UNCAC also includes a wide range of preventive measures, including the establishment of 
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anticorruption agencies, anti-money-laundering rules, conflict-of-interest laws, legal assistance 
among states for the extradition of suspects and for evidence-gathering abroad, and the 
means to recover funds deposited by corrupt officials in foreign banks.  
Four main areas can be identified in the UNCAC, each divided into separate chapters: 
preventive measures, criminalisation, international cooperation, and asset recovery. These 
issues are the UNCAC’s founding pillars. The purposes of the convention as stated in its first 
chapter are to: (a) ‘promote and strengthen measures to prevent and combat corruption 
more efficiently and effectively’; (b) ‘promote, facilitate and support international cooperation 
and technical assistance in the prevention of and fight against corruption, including in asset 
recovery’; (c) ‘promote integrity, accountability and proper management of public affairs and 
public property’ (UNODC, 2003). 
”This Convention deals with what, in the law of some countries, is called “active 
corruption” or “active bribery”, meaning the offence committed by the person who 
promises or gives the bribe, as contrasted with “passive bribery”, the offence committed 
by the official who receives the bribe. The Convention does not utilise the term “active 
bribery” simply to avoid it being misread by the non-technical reader as implying that the 
briber has taken the initiative and the recipient is a passive victim. In fact, in a number of 
situations, the recipient will have induced or pressured the briber and will have been, in 
that sense, the more active.” (OECD, 2009, p. 14) 
The UNCAC attempts to create global anti-corruption standards and obligations, and 
with its claim to universality, some argue, it is positioned as the leading international anti-
corruption tool (Low, 2006). The ANTICORRP Background report cites the Council of 
Europe as taking the leading role in the 1990s in developing a political strategy and a 
comprehensive set of norms and rules against corruption in Europe (Anagnostou et al., 2014).  
The Council of Europe [CoE] is the continent's leading human rights organisation. It 
includes 47 member states, 28 of which are members of the European Union. Within the CoE 
there is The Group of States against Corruption [GRECO]. Established in 1999 by the CoE 
one of the purposes with GRECO is to monitor states’ compliance with the organisation’s 
anti-corruption standards.  GRECO’s objective is to improve the capacity of its members to 
fight corruption by monitoring their compliance with Council of Europe anti-corruption 
standards through a dynamic process of mutual evaluation and peer pressure. It helps to 
identify deficiencies in national anti-corruption policies, prompting the necessary legislative, 
institutional and practical reforms. GRECO also provides a platform for the sharing of best 
practice in the prevention and detection of corruption.  
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Membership in GRECO, which is an enlarged agreement, is not limited to Council of 
Europe Member States. Currently, GRECO comprises 49 Member States (48 European States 
and the United States of America). Any state, which took part in the elaboration of the 
enlarged partial agreement, may join by notifying the Secretary General of the Council of 
Europe. Moreover, any state, which becomes party to the Criminal or Civil Law Conventions 
on Corruption automatically, accedes to GRECO and its evaluation procedures. 
Thus, a major achievement for the international community of states in terms of 
combatting corruption has been the development and adoption of several conventions. The 
conventions are designed to aid the signatory states by filling gaps in existing national anti-
corruption law. Compliance with the conventions is however difficult to ascertain. The bodies 
overseeing the conventions have little or no powers of enforcement. Instead by more or less 
voluntary monitoring programs it can to some extent be determined whether governments 
fully enact and implant the conventions’ provisions Such monitoring, creating publicity and 
peer pressure disclosing governments’ shortcomings and even failures, and calling for 
corrective action, is the only tool available to hold signatory states to their undertakings 
(Heineman & Heimann, 2006). 
In 2011, in its Communication on Fighting Corruption in the EU (COM(2011) 308), the 
European Commission set up a new mechanism, the EU Anti-Corruption Report 
(COM(2011) 376). Supported by an expert group and a network of researchers, the EU Anti-
Corruption Report aims to monitor and assess Member States’ efforts against corruption, and 
consequently encourage more political engagement. The report seeks to: (a) provide a fair 
reflection of the achievements, vulnerabilities and commitments of all Member States; (b) 
identify trends and weaknesses that need to be addressed; and (c) stimulate peer learning and 
exchange of best practices. The report also came with its own perceptions-based index on 
how the Member States ranked in terms of corruption. Using a methodology not dissimilar to 
the CPI, the report explicitly acknowledged the potential limits in interpreting the results and 
encouraged further research into both indicators for an increased understanding of corruption.  
The EU Anti-Corruption Report states that corruption continues to be a challenge for 
Europe and costs the European economy approximately €120 billion per year (COM(2014) 
38). According to ANTICORRP calculations, if EU Member States would all manage to control 
corruption at the Danish level as a benchmark, tax collection in Europe would bring in yearly 
about €323 billion more, so the double of the EU budget for 2013 (Mungiu-Pippidi & 
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Kukutschka, 2013). Arguments like this make a strong case for an EU anti-corruption 
mechanism.  
It must, however, be remembered that none of the aforementioned conventions 
directly applies to laws but only indirectly as guidance for national legislation. Existing studies 
have debated the effects of legal regulation and the effectiveness of complying with 
international treaties (Kubiciel, 2012; Wolf, 2010). There are also those that question the 
effectiveness of the legal approach to regulating corruption (see e.g. Bryane, 2010), partly 
because the ratification of treaties has not led to any discernible reduction in national levels of 
corruption, at least not as captured in the various indices. Hence, despite a proliferation of 
laws and well-developed legal frameworks in some states, adopted in compliance with EU 
accession-related criteria or international treaties to fight against it, corruption remains 
rampant (Batory, 2012). 
There seems to be a supposition that through measurement, and establishment of 
supranational guidelines, a form of modernisation of society will occur, that in turn inexorably 
will work to reduce corruption. Naturally the counter- supposition also exists, that anti-
corruption campaigns however well intended act mainly as a discursive expression of 
contested public values - themselves very much a product of that same modernisation. 
However, from the perspective of a Weberian norm, there are doubts that the success of 
anti-corruption efforts can be determined by extrapolating any usable generalisations from 
history. While accepting the importance of measuring or combatting corruption, it is worth 
noting that this research is not about measuring corruption, nor about what works in terms of 
fighting corruption. It is perhaps tempting to see the international discourse on corruption, 
which also include that on anti-corruption, as the changing course of ”public values” (Johnston, 
1996). It is here with those values that attempt to establish the right ways of thinking and 
acting that this research begins. The generated theory stemming from this research provides 
value-added by its possible effective application for anti-corruption purposes. This possibility is 
proposed and discussed in later chapters, but ultimately determined only by future application 
and evaluation.  
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1.6   This research 
”As countless surveys show, the EU remain a more trusted set of institutions that 
national institutions across swathes of Eastern Europe, in part because it is seen as a 
bulwark against the self-interest and venality of their governments. At a time when the EU 
is struggling to win over hearts and minds in its traditional heartlands, a strong voice and 
visible presence in fighting corruption is the best bet to ensure its continued relevance 
and legitimacy.” (Dolan, 2017b) 
In an effort to contribute to the anti-corruption agenda, the European Commission 
adopted the Communication on Fighting Corruption in the EU in 2011. This established the 
EU Anti-Corruption report as an instrument to monitor and assess the Member States’ level 
and efforts in the area of corruption. This also included a revision of the Public Procurement 
Directives, including oversight of implementation of public procurement regulation, red-flagging 
and other alert systems allowing early detecting of corruption. These efforts are undertaken by 
the EU with a view to stronger political engagement to address corruption effectively. It is, 
however, difficult to address a problem that is not fully understood. Things that are not 
recognised as corruption may slip through the most rigorous early detection systems. This calls 
for an increased understanding of corruption. The first (and only) EU Anti-Corruption Report 
states that the European Commission intends to analyse feedback in relation to the report, 
reflect on possible gaps and errors, and to learn lessons for the second report. The 
methodology would be revised with special attention directed to the possibility of developing 
new corruption indicators (COM(2014) 38).  
In early 2017 the European Commission communicated the disbandment of the second 
EU anti-corruption report (Timmermans, 2017). This move puzzled not only the anti-
corruption establishment with the Director of Transparency International EU stating that ”the 
gap between the rhetoric from President Juncker and Vice-President Timmermans and the 
reality on the ground is striking” (Dolan, 2017a);, but also the European Parliament itself. In a 
parliamentary question a number of MEPs questioned the Commission’s decision as it was 
taken despite previous assurances that the Commission would publish a second report in 
2016, and despite Parliament’s explicit call for publication (European Parliament, 2016). 
Another consequence of the non-publication of a second report is that the anticipated internal 
assessment of EU institutions originally meant to be a part of the first report, was dropped 
too. The communiqué from Vice-President Timmermans does however conclude by saying:  
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”I would like to stress that the Commission remains fully convinced of the need to 
combat and prevent corruption and is committed to continuing its work in this field, it is 
in the common interest to ensure that all Member States have effective anti-corruption 
policies and that the EU supports the Member States in pursuing this work. An effective 
fight against corruption within the EU remains essential - delivered, through the right 
vehicle.” (Timmermans, 2017) 
There are many possible reasons why the second report was scrapped; perhaps it will 
be resurrected given time. While waiting, the intention of this research is to provide not only 
the EU but all with a vested interest with the component parts to create ”the right vehicle” to 
combat corruption; one part being an increased understanding of corruption.  
Rationale for the research 
Increasing the understanding of corruption would arguably make it easier to combat. 
Although it may sometimes make sense to talk about corrupt countries, or organisations, it is 
important to remember that the smallest elements of analysis when it comes to corruption 
are individuals. Given that it does take at least two persons for corruption to have any 
significant meaning, it is still something that stems from the individual level. The individual may 
very well be influenced by context, but their actions still emanates from themselves. As 
discussed earlier, many of the measurements of corruption are perceptions-based. If those 
very individuals have a different understanding of corruption, their perceptions consequently 
vary as well. The end-result is an abstract picture of a very complex phenomenon not really 
lending itself to the development of effective countermeasures, at least not without a proper 
understanding of the behaviour of the individual decision-making process: its motivation, 
rationalisation and subsequent actions. Thus, this research starts and ends at the individual 
level in attempting to understand the behaviour connected with deviancy in general, and 
corruption in particular.  
It is instructive to look at some of the findings in the 2013 Global Corruption Barometer 
produced by Transparency International (Hardoon & Heinrich, 2013). First of all, it is 
acknowledged that corruption is regarded around the world as a serious, and in many cases 
very serious, problem for society. Using a scale of one to five, where one signifies that 
corruption is not a problem at all and five that corruption is a very serious problem, the 
average score was 4.1. The survey also found that over half of the people surveyed think that 
corruption has increased over the two last years. It is established that corruption can occur 
not only at any level in society, but also in any type of society. When comparing some of the 
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OECD countries, including some of the largest economies in the world which might be taken 
to exemplify good governance including anti-corruption, the perceptions of state capture is 
significant:  
”While only five per cent of Norwegians see their government captured by special 
interests, this goes up to more than two-thirds in countries where the economic crisis 
highlighted deep-rooted failures of governance, such as Greece, Italy and Spain (66%), but 
also includes Belgium and Israel. This suggests that there are important lessons to be 
learned within the group of OECD countries from Norway and other Scandinavian 
countries about how to run one’s government so that it is seen by most to serve the 
overall public good.” (Hardoon & Heinrich, 2013, p. 14) 
The question remains, however, what can be learned from Scandinavian countries if they 
themselves do not fully understand corruption, or at least to the level where a lack of 
comprehension may render the low perception of it problematic? Cultural contrasts aside, 
corruption is generally and quite universally considered reprehensible and at least some extent 
criminalised around the world. This applies despite the difficulties surrounding the lack of 
consensus in defining corruption, let alone corrupt behaviour. In other words, what may be 
considered deviant and corrupt behaviour in one country, culture or context may very well be 
acceptable in another. In an assessment of the relevance and efficacy of the United Nations 
Convention Against Corruption Brunelle-Quraishi (2011) builds on this line of argument 
concluding that in order to successfully create consensus among states, international treaties 
must consider the many possible definitions of corruption. Arguably, the same is true for 
corrupt behaviour and while most cultures seem to renounce corruption, context remains as a 
critical differential and opinions may vary on what falls within the borders of illegality and/or 
immorality.  
The final veil to be lifted then would be to go beyond context and see if there are truths 
to be found that would explain corrupt behaviour in Europe. Such work would need to be 
valid not only be for countries or contexts where corruption is perceived as high, like Spain or 
public procurement, but also in Scandinavian countries and possibly all of the world. In other 
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Scope and focus 
Limits in scope are a natural fact when conducting doctoral research. Being confined to 
the borders of the EU is a limitation in scope but there are still large enough variations of 
perceived corruption within the EU to warrant the analysis. Take for example the two 
countries Sweden and Spain. As mentioned earlier, the former comes out on top in terms of 
levels of perceived corruption almost regardless of which indicator is used. This is 
corroborated by the EU anti-corruption report, which confirms that low levels of corruption 
are perceived and experienced. According to the report, and others, Sweden is among the 
least corrupt countries in the EU. It has taken a leading role in combating corruption on a 
national and municipal level with several anti-corruption initiatives carried out or underway. In 
Spain, on the other hand, corruption in a broader sense is a serious concern. Even though an 
anti-corruption legal framework is largely in place, there are still a number of deficiencies, 
mostly pertaining to public procurement processes at both regional and local level. Corruption 
is perceived to be pervasive (COM(2014) 38). 
There is, however, more than meets the eye when comparing these two countries. This 
can be seen by studying the two extensive polls presented as integral parts of the EU anti-
corruption report (Eurobarometer, 2013a, 2013b). Here a rather small percentage of 
Europeans, around 4%, claimed that they had been asked or expected to pay a bribe in the 
past year, whereas in Sweden, the corresponding percentage was significantly lower - less than 
1%. This, however, appears somewhat contradictory to other figures, saying that 18% of 
Swedes say that they personally know someone who takes or has taken a bribe, well above 
the EU average of 12%. Similarly, in Spain 95% of Spanish citizens agree that corruption is 
widespread in their home country and 63 consider that they are affected by corruption in 
their everyday life. Yet counter-intuitively only 2% report that they have been asked or 
expected to pay a bribe in the past year. Contradictions like these lead to the focus of this 
research in understanding individual behaviour.  
A typology developed by Rusch (2016) in his work on the psychology of corruption 
identifies at least six types of faulty intuition that influence corrupt behaviour. The first type is 
the overconfidence effect where a person's subjective confidence in their judgment is greater 
than the objective accuracy of those judgments (Pallier et al., 2002). This can create a gap 
between how people believe they would behave and how they actually behave (Nohria, 
2015). Bribery prosecutions highlight some key factors here, such as the intense business 
negotiations involved in high-value contracts, licenses, or concessions (Rusch, 2016) - all 
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inherent parts of the procurement process. The second type is reciprocation, where people 
try to repay in-kind, what another person has provided for them (Cialdini, 1993). This not only 
increases susceptibility to corruption but also may sustain a corrupt relationship. The third type 
is scarcity, where the perceived opportunity to freely choose something of value is threatened 
through some type of scarcity, e.g. limited time or resource availability. Research shows that 
when under extreme time pressure, unethical behaviour is more likely (Nohria, 2015), and 
possibly exacerbated by “loss aversion” - an unconscious bias that makes people weigh losses 
more heavily than gains (Kahneman, 2011). The fourth type is commitment and consistency 
with past behaviour, i.e. once a decision is made it creates an internal pressure to behave 
consistently with that commitment (Cialdini, 1993). This can sustain long-term commitments 
to corrupt behaviour through ’ethical fading’ - the ability to behave unethically or overlook the 
unethical behaviour of others ’while maintaining a positive self-image’ (Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 
2011). In short, if a positive image of oneself as ethical is maintained, one may infer that one's 
actions are consistent with that self-image. The fifth type is social proof, which is the tendency, 
in ambiguous or confusing situations, to take cues from others in the vicinity on how to act 
(Cialdini, 1993). This coupled with "pluralistic ignorance3” can lead to an unintended diffusion 
of responsibility where no action is taken against blatantly corrupt behaviour. The sixth and 
final type is confirmation bias, prompting an individual to look for confirming evidence of a 
decision before seeking conflicting evidence (Kahneman, 2011). This is important when 
observing ongoing corruption where confirmation bias is likely to affect the ability to process 
and act on that initial observation. Consistent with ethical fading, it does so by influencing the 
observer to seek out and accept less malign explanations for the observed corrupt behaviour 
enabling the reinforcement of an ethical self-image. 
This goes to show that corrupt behaviour is largely conditioned by an understanding of 
actions as being illegal or immoral. Far more prominent researchers than the author of this 
study, Nobel Prize economist Hebert Simon and Stanley Milgram to name a few, have 
asserted the effects that various forms of pressure can have on deviant behaviour. 
Consequently, any anti-corruption endeavour should acknowledge and put to use all the 
available tools, behavioural criminology included. It is the increased understanding of individual 
behaviour when it comes to corruption that is the focus of this research.  
                                               
3 Pluralistic ignorance means that an individual rather than realising that the other silent individuals are being silent 
for exactly the same reasons, the individual tends to conclude that these others think that the act is an acceptably 
moral one and are keeping silent for that reason. See Darley (2005).  
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Problem definition and research question 
In its most general formulation the aim of this research is, partly according to the 
teachings of Glaser (1992), to systematically collect data to produce a conceptual theory. 
Epistemologically, the research takes on Feldman’s (2003) ’standard view’ i.e. what ordinary 
people believe as common sense, with an initial slant towards the ’relativist view’. Note, that it 
is only a slant and the author take issue with the concept of the non-existence of a higher 
moral standard. Instead the problem is defined around the central tenet that there is 
behaviour belonging to some type of axiological supremacy - however hard to define. 
Consequently, not understanding the immorality of corrupt behaviour does not mean that 
there is no truth to the fact that there is an axiological high ground to be found. With values 
reduced to facts about the conscious experience, the axiological terrain can be visualised in 
what Harris (2011) refers to as a moral landscape, with peaks and valleys, where increased 
spatial elevation corresponds to a societal state of moral, non-corrupt, behaviour on both an 
individual and collective level. Decisions and subsequent actions determine movement over 
the moral landscape, with distinct right and wrong answers to how to behave in order to 
reach any of the peaks. It is this view that changes morality from something largely intangible 
to something quantifiable - with room for debate on the expectations of optimal behaviour.  
 The problem, in an equally generalised form, is that of corruption and the perception 
thereof. The definition commonly used for corruption, ”abuse of power for private gain”, an 
intentionally broad formulation to facilitate theoretical integration is amplified by the more 
complex formulation of van Duyne ”Corruption is an improbity or decay in the decision-
making process in which a decision-maker (in a private corporation or in a public service) 
consents or demands to deviate from the criterion, which should rule his decision making, in 
exchange for a reward, the promise or expectation of it” (van Duyne, 2001, p. 3). The scope 
is limited geographically to the European Union and conceptually to the individual level. The 
rationale is derived from inconsistencies shown most prominently in the perceptions-based 
indices that dominate the view on levels of corruption. A lack of understanding hampers the 
development of a coherent approach towards imposing minimum moral standards and raising 
awareness on corruption where both are fundamental to an effective anti-corruption 
framework. Further, although the EU Report on Anti-Corruption attempts to identify 
measures likely to give added value in addressing issues in regard to preventing and fighting 
corruption, it does not go into detail and is aimed at tangible changes on the ground 
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(COM(2014) 38) Those tangible changes on the ground must be underpinned by a greater 
understanding of the phenomenon itself.  
There are many qualitative surveys comprehensively covering this topic, but few 
qualitative analyses of in-depth interviews. Such interviews could shed light on the theory 
behind perceptions of corruption and whether that theory corresponds with the ‘reality’ found 
in the surveys. Similarly, to the EU report on Anti-Corruption, the purpose would be to 
stimulate a constructive forward-looking debate on the extent of corruption, as well as the 
best ways of addressing it. It is proposed to accomplish this specifically by providing a 
substantial theory as an answer to the question:  
How can the perception of corruption inform our understanding of the behaviour 
associated with corruption and how does this translate into effective anti-corruption? 
Aims and objectives 
• Develop a substantive theory around the behaviour associated with corruption 
within the Member States of the EU. 
- In depth interviews, complementing and contrasting previous surveys. 
• Create a foundation for further integration towards formal theory around the 
behaviour associated with corruption within the Member States of the EU. 
- Substantive grounded theory building from interviews 
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1.7  Chapter one summary 
This chapter has presented corruption as a phenomenon that most people have an 
intuitive idea and a subjective opinion about. Corruption is a substantial concept and when 
colloquially spoken about, the discussion often pertains to a smaller part, limited by any 
combination of concept, context or intellect. This work strives to increase our understanding 
of corruption., To do this, it will have to provide a simplified map of reality - a theory.  
The chapter has served as both an introduction and a literature review. Using a 
grounded theory approach partly informed by the early works of Barney Glaser, the review of 
literature is complicated to say the least. As described further in Chapter Three on 
methodology, this problem is solved by a system for reviewing literature. It has been 
established that corruption is a relatively new priority on the political agenda, but has over the 
last three decades gained attention. In spite of the fact that most people have their own idea 
of what corruption is, answers to the question ‘what is corruption?’ will probably differ. 
Corruption is therefore problematised not only due to its intrinsic qualities but also due to 
disagreement on what it actually is. 
Some of the classifications of corruption were examined. The upside with any 
classification is the possibility to sort and arrange the characteristics of a phenomenon in order 
to place a specific item within a certain bracket. The downside, consequently, particularly when 
dealing with phenomena whose characteristics are inherently fleeting and whose interpretation 
may be highly contextual, is the forced placement of things that do not easily fit into a single or 
particular bracket. The epistemic foundation of this research does not rely on corruption being 
classified at all. Nevertheless, there are still some benefits of exploring and explaining some of 
the existing classifications; one being that it provides a narrative background to a discussion on 
the adequate definition of corruption. 
There is no international consensus on the definition of corruption. This ambiguity has 
led to a number of difficulties for the anti-corruption agenda and community. The definition 
used is centred on the decision-making process. Corruption is an improbity or decay in the 
decision-making process in which a decision-maker (in a private corporation or in a public 
service) consents or demands to deviate from the criterion which should rule his decision 
making, in exchange for a reward, or the promise or expectation of it. This definition is 
suitable for this research for at least three reasons. Firstly, it is broad enough to facilitate an 
unrestricted development of theory that may or may not reside within that which is enshrined 
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by the traditional definitions. Secondly, it focuses on the behavioural aspect of corruption 
introducing a normative aspect rather than the static descriptive characteristics of those 
preceding it. Thirdly, by its formulation a higher level of abstraction is achieved, allowing the 
definition to supersede cultural differences in attitudes towards corruption. 
There is still no commonly accepted explanation of the root causes of corruption. 
Corruption impacts society on all levels, the Member States of the EU are not immune to this 
reality. The difficulty of establishing a root cause relationship for corruption is tied into the 
difficulty of establishing a common definition. Nevertheless, research identifies certain national 
attributes that correlate with greater amounts of perceived corruption in an attempt to 
explain why some nations suffer from more corruption than other. This chapter has explored 
the cost of corruption from the perspectives of money, power and trust. 
The intricacies of measuring corruption have also been explored. Given the clandestine 
nature of corruption, its lack of definition, and variance in interpretation and meaning, 
corruption is a variable that cannot be measured directly. Even so there are at least three 
reasons why corruption should be measured accurately. First, it is important to assess the scale 
of the issue; second, to determine patterns and; third, to identify variables that will aid 
understanding of why and where corruption occurs.  
The measurement of corruption is a means to an end: that of combatting corruption. 
The profound recognition of the threat that corruption poses to institutional integrity, 
economic development, and to the rule of law and democracy, not only in developing 
countries but also at the very heart of developed European democracies, has instilled a strong 
determination to create rules and mechanisms to fight against it. Just as the establishment of 
the idea of corruption being widespread and the subsequent consensus on the deeply 
detrimental effects on society is relatively new, so is the proliferation of conventions, 
normative declarations and other standardised frameworks and activities among the 
international community of states.  
Three international frameworks for combatting corruption have been examined: first, 
the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention; second, the United Nations Convention Against 
Corruption (UNCAC); and third, the Council of Europe’s Criminal and Civil Law Convention 
on Corruption. In addition, the chapter has identified the EU’s efforts to curb corruption 
within its Member States as stated in the 2014 EU anti-corruption report noting that the 
successor report was scrapped. 
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An increased understanding of corruption would arguably make it easier to combat. This 
research proposes to advance understanding focusing on the individual level.  
There are many qualitative surveys comprehensively covering this topic, but few 
qualitative analyses of in-depth interviews. Such interviews could shed light on the theory 
behind the perception on corruption and if that theory corresponds with the ‘reality’ found in 
the surveys. Similarly, to the EU report on Anti-Corruption, their purpose would, be to 
stimulate a constructive forward-looking debate on the extent of corruption., as well as the 
best ways of addressing it. This is achieved specifically by providing a substantial theory as an 
answer to the question:  
How can perceptions of corruption inform our understanding of the behaviour 
associated with corruption and how does this translate into effective anti-corruption? 
The generated theory stemming from this research is value added by its possibility to be 
effectively used for anti-corruption purposes. A possibility that is proposed and discussed in 
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2.   PHILOSOPHY AND METHODOLOGY 
What follows is a deep dive into the methodology used for this study. Primarily to give 
an understanding of the complex and in-depth nature of the methodology applied but also to 
lend validity to the findings presented.  
For a structured approach to research with a certainty of process and enough flexibility 
to let the research phenomenon speak for itself, the method used is a modified Grounded 
Theory. When a problem has been identified, the researcher must select a suitable tool or 
method to investigate it. Grounded Theory provides a set of procedures which are ways of 
putting into practice the requirement to actively engage in close and detailed analysis of data 
to stimulate and discipline the theoretical imagination (Pidgeon & Henwood, 1997, p. 255). 
The quantitative qualitative divide perpetually persists and any choice of method, pure or 
mixed must be justified. For the purpose of this research the following generalisation may 
illustrate the inclination for a qualitative method. Quantitative research is mainly concerned 
with the degree in which phenomena possess certain properties, in this case the phenomenon 
is corruption and the property is perception. Conversely, qualitative research on the other 
hand, is mainly concerned with the properties themselves emphasising the process and most 
importantly meaning. 
”Quantitative research methods are primarily intended to test theory; the researcher 
works deductively and is outcome orientated. Qualitative researchers, on the other hand, are 
concerned with the meaning of the phenomena and the lived experiences, which is not a readily 
observable process; there is attention to the social context in which events occur and have 
meaning, and there is an emphasis on understanding the social world from the point of view of 
the participants in it.” (Labuschagne, 2003 np.) 
Since the aim is to explain the phenomenon of perception of corruption the chosen 
method is a suitable choice because of the unique nature of Grounded Theory methods. 
Conveniently Birks and Mills (2011) indicates three instances as appropriate for Grounded 
Theory. The first instances being, when little of the area of study is known. As the literature 
revived in the introduction revealed, little has been investigated with regards to perceptions 
relation to reality (and behaviour) when measuring corruption. Note that the use of literature 
is perhaps one of the most contentious aspects of this approach to research. The position 
taken in this research suggests that a controlled preliminary literature review can be beneficial, 
promoting an early enhancement of theoretical sensitivity rather than researcher bias. This will 
be further explored in the chapter on the literature review dilemma when doing Grounded 
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Theory. The second instance is when the generation of theory with explanatory power is a 
desired outcome. It is this explanatory aspect this research aims to take advantage of in order 
to significantly promote the understanding the perception of corruption. The phenomenon has 
been previously described and explored; this is an attempt to explain. This reflects the desire 
to go beyond being merely a descriptive thematic analysis to reach a higher intelligible 
abstraction. The third instance is when an inherent process is embedded in the research 
situation that is likely to be explicated by Grounded Theory methods. The context to such 
process and the interrelationship there between is elaborated in a later section. 
Though, as a first flicker of reflexivity, being an accolade of Grounded Theory, all 
academic postulates for good research are strived for but there are arguably as many versions 
of Grounded Theory as there are grounded theorists (Dey, 1999) - this is one of them. 
This chapter will start by laying a philosophical foundation for the research and the move 
on to introduce the qualitative research method known as grounded theory. The next section 
is devoted to explaining and coming to terms with the literature review dilemma when doing 
grounded theory. Lastly the version of grounded theory used for this study is described in 
detail and discussed in terms of appropriateness and efficacy.  
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2.1   Philosophical nucleus 
”The unexamined life is not worth living.” (Socrates, cited in Woods & Pack, 2007, 
p. 16) 
The notion of a paradigm as an overarching framework which structures the approach 
to existing in the world is rather commonplace since Kuhn published ’The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions’ in 1962. Scholars and philosophers alike have entrenched themselves in 
more or less justifiable paradigms orbiting core philosophical questions. Guba and Lincoln 
(1994) argue that inquiry paradigms may be viewed as sets of basic beliefs about the nature of 
reality and how it may be known; and that these beliefs are thrown into relief by three 
fundamental and interrelated questions. Such questions can be formulated as: (1) the 
ontological question, 'What is the form and nature of reality and, therefore, what is there than 
can be known about it?'; (2) the epistemological question, 'What is the relationship between 
the knower or would-be knower and what can be known'; and (3) the methodological 
question, 'How can the inquirer... go about finding out whatever it is that he or she believes 
can be known about?'.  
Adding to the account of ontology, epistemology and methodology is axiology, which is 
an essential defining characteristic of an inquiry paradigm. The axiological question asks what 
sort of knowledge, if any, is intrinsically valuable. Consequently, the conceptual inquiry, ‘what 
exists?’, ‘how do we know?’ and ‘what is valuable?’ are the three questions that sensibly form 
the philosophical trinity of this research. All three pertain to distinct yet interwoven disciplines 
of philosophy, and each is a discipline in its own right.  
- The interrelation of ontology, epistemology and axiology is sometimes referred to as 
philosophical alignment. However, as this nomenclature implies a linear structure an alternate 
rendition is offered. A philosophical nucleus can be conceptually visualised by placing ontology, 
epistemology and axiology in an equilateral triangle individually expanding their realm 
spherically. The convergence in the centroid of the triangle is where the trinity combines. This 
is the epicentre from which this research draws its philosophical quintessence., Axiology as an 
intrinsic part of ethics, will only be briefly addressed in this section but is further explored in 
the chapter on the ethical dilemma. The meaning of ontology and epistemology are 
considered in the next section, both in general terms and from the specific position of this 
research. From this the philosophical properties will emerge and be described to clearly 
position both the research and the researcher, the later examined in a final section on 
reflexivity before moving on to methodology.  
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Ontological and epistemological orientation 
Ontology, the study of the nature of reality and epistemology, the nature of justifiable 
knowledge, are intrinsically linked. The ontological orientation provides an answer to what 
exists, the form and nature of reality and what can be known about it. Epistemology explores 
knowledge, the relationship between the knower and what can be known. To ensure a robust 
research design, the research must follow a paradigm that is congruent with the researcher’s 
beliefs about the nature of reality. Consciously subjecting those beliefs to an ontological 
interrogation will illuminate the epistemological and methodological possibilities that are 
available (Mills, Bonner, & Francis, 2006). Accordingly, the paradigm of this research is 
ontologically relativistic and epistemologically constructivist - a statement that requires further 
explanation.  
The fundamental ontological question is whether or not there is a ‘real’ world that is 
independent of our knowledge of it. As a manifestation of the researcher’s own philosophical 
orientation, this research is ontologically relativistic in so far as it claims reality and truth to be 
understood ”as relative to a specific conceptual scheme, theoretical framework, paradigm, 
form of life, society or culture. . . there is a non-reducible plurality of such conceptual 
schemes” (Bernstein, 1983, p. 8). Individuals who deny the existence of an objective reality 
assume a relativist ontological position (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). Although sharing some similar 
traits, this relativist position should not be confused with that of anti-fundamentalism. The idea 
behind anti-fundamentalism is that all social phenomena are socially constructed and as such 
must be appropriately positioned in time and space, taking into account the cultural contrasts 
these variables imply. Further, the social phenomena can be deconstructed into smaller 
components, all individually valid, presupposing particular space-time boundaries. So far 
notions are shared, but anti-fundamentalism also holds that a set of phenomena derived in an 
appropriate manner are acceptable at the time at which they are put forward. Since there is 
no prospect of ever completing our understanding of the natural world, we will later replace 
them with different ones. However, since there is no question of our transcending the 
situation we are in at any time, there is no perspective from which we can regard them as only 
relativistically valid. Here the relativist and anti-fundamentalist ontologies diverge, and this 
research subscribes to the proposition that reality consists of multiple individual truths 
influenced by context. This rather innocuous relativistic standpoint stems from ’the standard 
view’ as described by Feldman (2003), but contains certain important distinctions. Whereby, in 
line with the reasoning of Charmaz (2000), changing the conception of truth, from an 
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objectively real world waiting to be discovered, to a world made real in the minds and 
through the actions of its inhabitants. This position subsumes data being generated with the 
researcher as a subjective active participant. In the words of Heron (1996, p. 11), ”worlds and 
people are what we meet, but the meeting is shaped by our own terms of reference”. The 
sceptic might stand stumped before the conundrum of asserting what is known of meeting 
anything or anyone, if the meeting is always given our own shape. Presenting an alternative but 
supplemental paradigm, Heron and Reason (1997, p. 13) provides the following answer to the 
conundrum: ”When we open ourselves to meeting ‘the given’ we are arrested by the 
presence of ‘other’; or put another way, the ‘other’ declares itself to us so that we resonate 
with its presence in the world”.  
Any scientific endeavour can be conceived as an either knowledge-producing or 
knowledge-improving enterprise. By solidifying the free-flowing thought processes within such 
an enterprise into systems comprised by interrelated finite elements, many labels have been 
assigned. Positivism, feminism, idealism and symbolism are just a few of the labels used in 
sociology. These different perspectives can be identified, examined, discussed, but also in a 
sense assessed in terms of their effectiveness in accomplishing various social projects. There is 
however, no limit to the number of systems, which can be invented or proposed. Yet, Hill 
(1984) points out that it is dichotomising persiflage to suggest that only one epistemological 
conceptualisation of sociology is legitimate while all others are illegitimate. Hill continues saying 
that, to so suggest is a mistake that does not only eject charlatans, but also dismisses serious, 
creative thinkers in the same throw.  
It is understandable that those wholeheartedly subscribing to positivism are not disposed 
to especially wide interpretation. Given the propensity of positivism the point to be made is 
that there are alternative viewpoints in sociology with equal claims to be considered scientific. 
Developing this into an epistemological argument, each system of knowledge production or 
improvement, comprises of three basic components: meta-scientific world-views, 
methodologies and theories (Hill, 1984). The meta-scientific worldview provides the context 
in which specific methodologies and theories are developed and evaluated. This reasoning 
harmonises well with the ontologically relativist position and conditions the methodology. As 
the procedural rules set within this context, the methodology guides the researcher in the 
active exploration of theory. In this sense, a theory is a content-oriented concept formulated 
under the auspices of the context. It can be seen as a device that conceptually explains 
selected properties and dimensions of a phenomenon. Following the logic of these 
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components will condition and guide the philosophical orientation of this research to an 
epistemological anchor in a constructivist paradigm.  
Constructivism has a long and distinguished history, going back to seminal authors such 
as Dewey and Piaget, and over the years has come to accommodate the coexistence of many 
perspectives and interpretations. The common denominator and core of constructivist theory 
is that knowledge is not found, it is constructed (Boghossian, 2006). Constructivism shifts the 
focus from knowledge as a product to knowing as a process, an understanding of relevant 
structures of meaning derived from interactions in the world., Epistemologically, constructivism 
emphasises the subjective interrelationship between researcher and that which is researched - 
usually human participants- and the co-construction of meaning. The logic of such subjective 
co-construction is internal and cannot be constructively judged on external epistemological 
grounds. This position does not, however, argue for a state of intellectual anarchy in which 
anything is deemed valid. Nevertheless, this research is regarded as only being 
epistemologically accountable to its own rules of structure and logic.  
Constructivism as a research paradigm denies the existence of an objective reality, 
”asserting instead that realities are social constructions of the mind, and that there exist as 
many such constructions as there are individuals (although clearly many constructions will be 
shared)” (Guba & Lincoln, 1989, p. 43). Thus, there can be many such constructed realities; 
and they may be conflicting and incompatible. Constructions are not more or less 'true', but 
rather more or less sophisticated and informed. Further, Guba and Lincoln (1989) stressed the 
importance of not judging constructivist evaluations using positivistic criteria or standards. 
Consequently, they devised evaluation criteria derived from what they construed as central 
and critical features of a constructivist evaluation. This is sometimes referred to as fourth 
generation evaluation [FGE], where the three first generations pertain to a positivist scientific 
approach which posits that there is an objective truth or reality that can be measured. 
Notwithstanding, when exploring the applicability of FGE methods Lay and Papadopoulos 
comes to the following conclusion: 
”FGE methods bring many benefits and to a wider group of stakeholders compared to 
conventional positivist evaluation methods. We therefore recommend that managers and 
commissioners who have the power to support or reject its utilisation take a leap of faith in 
order to embrace it. Projects and programmes under highly autocratic, hierarchical management 
systems could benefit most from the empowering effect of FGE” (Lay & Papadopoulos, 2007, 
pp. 503-504) 
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This adopted paradigm and resulting methodological framework suggest adequate 
applicability when analysing the perception of corruption in the Member-States of the EU. To 
reiterate: fundamentally this research is ontologically relativistic and epistemologically 
constructivist. It seeks to establish and identify relationships between context and process and 
acknowledges that within the paradigm, there are conditions, interactions and consequences.  
The theory developed within this paradigm is aimed to have explanatory power with a 
high level of abstraction. The key to achieve this is well illustrated in the work of Guba and 
Lincoln (1994) in their contribution to describing and differentiating competing paradigms in 
qualitative research. They state that one of the fundamental qualities of the constructivist 
paradigm is that it is self-reflexive, a quality with which this research aligns. Treated as both 
central and vital to the understanding of the codes, categories and theory surrounding the 
phenomenon of the perception of corruption, reflexivity will be addressed.  
The methodology ultimately manifesting within these ontological and epistemological 
parameters aligns with the later work of Corbin and Strauss (2008) in their advancement of 
Grounded Theory. Their work not only acknowledges the existence of multiple realities and 
truths, recognising the importance thereof (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, 1994, 1998). As a 
chronological account, the work of Corbin and Strauss undoubtedly demonstrates a mixture 
of language that vacillates between post-positivism and constructivism, with a reliance on 
terms such as ‘recognising bias’ and ‘maintaining objectivity’ when describing the position of 
the researcher in relation to participants and data (Birks & Mills, 2011). Moreover, this 
research also draws epistemological influences from the constructivist Grounded Theory 
perspective as described by Charmaz (2000) revealing the researcher as a participating author 
in a co-construction of meaning. The Grounded Theory methodological framework that 
follows is therefore just that, a strategy for creating and interrogating the data, rather than a 
route to knowing an objective external reality (Charmaz, 2008). Within these parameters, it is 
the ambition of the researcher to uphold what Robson (2011) refers to as a scientific attitude: 
being systematic, sceptical and ethical.  
Methodological acknowledgements 
Reflecting on the ontological and epistemological orientation it must first be 
acknowledged that not all knowledge-producing or knowledge-improving systems are equally 
well-suited for every social project. As a method of inquiry Grounded Theory generates 
theory in part by an interpretive way of thinking with roots going back to the philosophy of 
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symbolic interactionism. Interpretations of a phenomenon are inevitably influenced by social 
interactions and the sociocultural environment. The intention of the previous section was to 
articulate ontology and epistemology in such way that made it inevitable that constructivism 
simply emerged in a similar fashion to that of the theory to come. However, as Charmaz 
(2008) succinctly points out, in actuality, few grounded theory studies build theory, though 
many provide an analytical handle on a specific phenomenon. This research, though aiming for 
theory, will most likely fall into the latter category. It is also possible that, even when adding 
the phenomenologically complex axiological considerations, another perspective would have 
been more suitable. However, a thorough examination of the entire philosophical nucleus for 
this research makes it unlikely.   
The researcher acknowledges his own bias and by thoughtful use of analytical tools as 
heuristic devices promoting interaction between researcher and data and assisting in 
understanding possible meaning, hopes to foster awareness of how that bias influences the 
research. There is the additional problem of accepting one’s own interpretation of what is 
being analysed; that is, assigning meaning without careful exploration of all possible meanings 
(Corbin & Strauss, 2008)). There is a need for the grounded theorist not only to acknowledge 
prior and tacit knowledge, but also to bring such knowledge into the open and discuss how it 
may have affected the development of theory; and to allow the researcher’s creativity to 
explore and articulate theoretical links (Cutcliffe, 2000). To establish a foundation for such a 
discussion, both externally and internally, it was decided that an early literature review was 
necessary: a decision to be further explained and justified in the following sections.  
Ultimately the entire research process encompasses an ever-present acknowledgment of 
the researchers’ bias and its influence on the selection of the data collection sites, the data 
collection process, the process of coding and analysis, and the compilation of results. This 
influence is however partly traceable and verifiable through the analytical memos.   
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2.2   Introduction to Grounded Theory 
Merton never reached the notion of the discovery of grounded theory in discussing 
the ”theoretic functions of research”. The closest he came was with ”serendipity”; that is, 
an unanticipated, anomalous, and strategic finding gives rise to a new hypothesis. This 
concept does not catch the idea of purposefully discovering theory through social 
research… Thus, he was concerned with grounded modifying of theory, not grounded 
generating of theory.” (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 2) 
Before elaborating further on the details of the methodological elements it is important 
to reiterate the underlying fundamentals of Grounded Theory and what it means to generate 
theory from data. What follows is a presentation of a methodology designed to produce 
theory, and on that note, it may be useful to clarify what is meant by theory. According to 
Strauss and Corbin (1994) a theory is a set of relationships that offer a plausible explanation of 
the phenomenon under study. Morse (cited in Goulding, 1999, p. 7) extends this 
interpretation proposing ”a theory provides the best comprehensive, coherent and simplest 
model for linking diverse and unrelated facts in a useful and pragmatic way. It is a way of 
revealing the obvious, the implicit, the unrecognised and the unknown. Theorising is the 
process of constructing alternative explanations unit a ’best fit’ is obtained that explains the 
data most simply. This involves asking questions of the data that will create links to established 
theory.”  
Essentially the methods elaborated on throughout this research are intended to go 
beyond simple description and exploration. Grounded Theory differs from other approaches 
to research in that it serves to explain the phenomenon being studied (Birks & Mills, 2011). 
The strategies used in data collection and analysis results in the generation of theory that 
explains a phenomenon from the context of the subjacent data. Directly abstracted from, or 
grounded in, the data. the aim is to produce theory by systematically collecting data (Glaser, 
2010). It is a comparative, iterative and interactive method that begins but does not end with 
inductive inquiry (Charmaz, 2012). Because Grounded Theory is initially inductive, existing 
ideas should be shaped, or even rejected, if not confirmed by the data. In short, the essence of 
Grounded Theory is the inductive-deductive interplay, beginning with a research situation 
rather than a hypothesis.(McGhee, Marland, & Atkinson, 2007). This inductive-deductive 
method may confuse many PhD committees who are more comfortable with induction, 
specifically when it comes the rather peculiar relationship to extant literature. Extant literature 
certainly holds the potential to mislead novice grounded theorists since even respected 
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leaders in any discipline can be mistaken (Nathanial, 2006). To avoid being misled, a large part 
of this chapter is devoted to explaining the strategy used for using extant literature in a 
beneficial way. 
A Grounded Theory researcher is oriented to discover the basic social processes and 
the interactive layers of context that people use to deal with situations in which they find 
themselves and that are not necessarily understood by them at the conscious level (Hinds, 
Chaves, & Cypess, 1992; Benoliel, 1996). However, basic social processes changes over time 
and a major concern is determining how contextual features of the environment influence the 
direction and form of the identified social process. Grounded theory has certain distinctive 
features that distinguish it from other forms of qualitative analysis (Weitz et al., 2011). 
Charmaz (2012) characterises these features as providing explicit tools for studying processes 
while promoting an openness to all possible theoretical understandings. This foster developing 
tentative interpretations about the data through coding and categorising, as well as building 
systematic checks and refinements of the researcher’s major theoretical categories. These 
features make Grounded Theory an almost perfect fit for the purposes of this research.  
The methods used both for data collection and analysis, have been somewhat modified 
to suit the practicalities dictated by the research as well as the philosophical orientation of the 
researcher. Modifications are also made in order to avoid an overly dichotomous position with 
regards to the Glaser and Strauss divide in Grounded Theory. The aim is rather, a balanced 
view, as few things are black and white, especially when it comes to research with an overtly 
interpretative component (Birks & Mills, 2011). Throughout the development of this 
methodology, the seven essential attributes for a sound methodology as laid out by Hitchins 
(1992) have permeated both the theoretical and practical aspects. The attributes for a good 
methodology are that it applies to any system, is simple, comprehensive, creative and 
innovative, supported by tools and methods and is proven in practice. The last of these 
attributes is perhaps the only one that arguably is not fulfilled in this work, at least not at the 
development stage, but a section in a later chapter covers an extended discussion on post hoc 
method appropriateness.  
  
 
Page 81 of 278 
Historical account of Grounded Theory 
Grounded Theory was originally developed by the two sociologists Barney Glaser and 
Anselm Strauss as a method that allowed them to move from data to theory (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967). The theory would be grounded in the data from which it had emerged rather 
than rely on analytical constructs from pre-existing theories. Hence, in contrast to theory 
obtained by logico-deductive methods, it is theory grounded in data which has been 
systematically obtained through ’social’ research (Goulding, 1999). Glaser & Strauss (1967) 
initially sought to correct an imbalance, as they described it, created by an over-emphasis on 
verification of theory in sociological research. They recognised the primacy of the quantitative 
paradigm in sociology research at that time and highlighted the need to achieve a more 
equitable balance for those researchers who wished to focus on the generation of theory.  
Since the publication of ’The discovery of Grounded Theory’ by Glaser and Strauss in 
1967, the Grounded Theory method has undergone a number of revisions. Most significantly, 
Glaser and Strauss themselves parted ways and each proposed his own interpretation of what 
it is to do Grounded Theory. This mainly related to the treatment of extant literature and the 
early review thereof; a notion that is thoroughly examined and addressed in the section on the 
literature review dilemma in Grounded Theory. After the split from Glaser, Strauss teamed up 
with Corbin to develop a new slightly different strand of Grounded Theory.  
Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures for Developing Grounded 
Theory by Strauss and Corbin was first published in 1990 with a second edition published in 
1998. In essence, the book presents numerous tools that researchers can use. However, the 
structure of the book, with great detail in some areas and less in other, sometimes makes it 
difficult to understand how some of the techniques should be employed. Nevertheless, many 
reviewers contend that the most useful aspects of the book is its functionality (Allen, 2010), 
which also includes criteria for judging Grounded Theory research.  
Although the original work of Glaser and Strauss (1967) assumed a social constructionist 
approach to the empirical world although it did not attend to how they themselves affected 
the research process, produced the data, represented the research participants and positioned 
there analysis (Charmaz, 2008). Glaser and Strauss laid the foundation for constructing sound 
grounded theory methods as well as analyses but they did tend to emphasise generality rather 
than relativity and objectivity rather than reflexivity. As a response to this Constructing 
Grounded Theory by Kathy Charmaz, was first published in 2006 and a second edition 
published in 2014. The approach advocated by Charmaz offers an interpretative portrayal of 
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the studied world, not an exact picture of it (Charmaz, 2006). Philosophically, this resonates 
with the paradigm of this research, where the researcher is not considered to be separate 
from the developed theory but constructs it through interaction with data.  
Where the objectivist Grounded Theory of Glaser (1978) seeks explanations and 
prediction at a general level, separated and abstracted from the specific research locale and 
process, the constructionist Grounded Theory of Charmaz (2006) emphasises abstract 
understanding of empirical phenomena and contend that this understanding must be located 
in the specific circumstances of the research process. The two however, are not entirely 
mutually exclusive. Even from a constructivist perspective, as taken in this research, the 
understanding and explanation offered by the Grounded Theory can move from local worlds 
to a more general conceptual level. The next section will describe the fundamentals of 
Grounded Theory that aims to build a foundation for a generic statement by qualifying the 
research according to particular temporal, social and situational conditions.  
   
 
Page 83 of 278 
2.3  Fundamental principles of Grounded Theory 
”Nothing is more fundamental in setting our research agenda and informing our 
research methods than our view of the nature of the human beings whose behaviour we 
are studying.” (Simon, 1985, p. 303) 
Figure 2: The six key components of Grounded Theory+ 
Grounded Theory is the practice of identifying, refining and integrating categories of 
meaning stemming from data. It provides an explanatory framework, - a theory, by which to 
understand the phenomenon under investigation. Category identification in Grounded Theory 
is very different from content analysis, with which it should never be confused. Content 
analysis makes use of categories that are defined before data analysis commences and which 
often are designed to be mutually exclusive. This is to say, the same data cannot be allocated 
to more than one category, thus static by both definition and procedure. By contrast, 
categories in Grounded Theory emerge from the data, and consequently evolve throughout 
the research process.  
The process of category and ultimately theory development is facilitated by a number of 
key strategies or perhaps more appropriately, analytical constructs. These are the writing of 
reflexive memos, theoretical sampling, constant comparative analysis, coding for an increasing 
level of abstraction, data saturation, and the treatment of literature. as illustrated in Figure 2. 
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Writing reflexive memos 
Memos are created as written records of the thought process during the entire 
undertaking of the research. Essentially memos are thoughts and ideas, which have been noted 
during the data collection process. Analytical ideas in the pertinent memos are sorted and 
ordered in line with the present direction of the emerging theory. By explaining decisions, the 
researcher can gain control over the subject matter and the next analytical or methodological 
move (Charmaz, 2008). In addition, summary memos are used to synthesise individual 
resource memos. Thus, throughout the process of data generation and analysis, a written 
record of theory development is maintained. This can include writing definitions of categories 
and justifying the label chosen, tracing the emergent relationships amongst categories and 
keeping a record of the reflexive process of progressive integration towards an increasing level 
of theory abstraction. Memos provide information not only about the substantive findings of 
the study but also about the research process itself. 
Reflexivity is an important tool for the researcher to be able to identify the effect of the 
researcher him/herself, as they will affect what is researched and subsequently the eventual 
grounded theory developed. Carefully recorded in memos this information can inform 
theoretical sensitivity and can itself be checked against data in a process of constant 
comparative analysis. This allows the researcher to remain focused on the data and the 
development of the theory rather than in self-analysis or allowing analysis to be derailed by 
preconceived ideas. It thus addresses Glaser’s concerns about reflexivity potentially distracting 
the focus away from the data. The challenge of at what point or level of detail reflexivity stops 
being helpful and becomes destructive can easily be managed by including reflective memos in 
the constant comparative analysis.  
Data collection through unstructured, or even semi-structured, interviews is heavily 
dependent on the researcher-participant relationship (Neill, 2006). Reflections on this 
relationship recorded in memos provide a way of identifying and monitoring the effect. 
Therefore, memos are written immediately after, or even simultaneously with, data collection 
as a means of documenting the impressions of the researcher and describing the situation. 
Memos provide a bank of ideas which can be revisited in order to map out the emerging 
theory (Goulding, 1999).  
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Theoretical sampling 
In Grounded Theory, the process of data collection is controlled by the emerging theory 
(Glaser, 1978). Theoretical sampling denotes a process of data collection where the 
researcher simultaneously collects, codes and analyses the data in order to decide what data 
to collect next. This means collecting further data in light of the categories that have emerged 
thus checking the emerging theory against reality by sampling that which may challenge or 
elaborate its development.  
”The general procedure of theoretical sampling is to elicit codes from the raw data from the start of 
data collection through constant comparative analysis as the data pour in. Then one uses the codes to direct 
further data collection, from which the codes are further developed theoretically with properties and 
theoretically coded connections with other categories until, each category is saturated. Theoretical sampling 
on any category ceases when it is saturated, elaborated and integrated into the emerging theory.” (Glaser, 
1992, p. 102).  
Theoretical sampling is essential to remain attached to the epistemological underpinnings 
postulated in this research. As Becker (1993) comments on common pitfalls in published 
Grounded Theory research, using selective sampling rather than theoretical sampling yields 
description instead of discovery. Selective sampling involves a calculated decision about not 
only the initial, but also succeeding, data sources prior to the onset of data collection. Similar 
but not identical to selective sampling is purposeful sampling, although it is sometimes 
erroneously used interchangeably with  selective or theoretical sampling (Coyne, 1997). The 
logic behind purposeful sampling is to choose information rich sources to learn about issues of 
central importance to the purpose of the research, (Patton, 1990). Then, as the study 
progresses, new categories may be discovered which would lead the researcher to more 
sampling in that particular dimension (Schatzman & Strauss, 1973). Some may argue that this is 
not completely different from that which happens in theoretical sampling, and that all sampling 
in qualitative research is purposeful (Patton, 1990; Sandelowski, 1995). However, Coyne 
(1997) concludes that theoretical and purposeful sampling are different types of sampling and 
that purposeful sampling is not always theoretical sampling. She goes on to say that theoretical 
sampling is purposeful selection of a sample according to the developing categories and 
emerging theory. Theoretical sampling may therefore be seen as a variation within purposeful 
sampling. Chenitz & Swanson (1986) state that in theoretical sampling, the sample is not 
selected from the population based on certain variables prior to the study, rather the initial 
sample is determined to examine the phenomena where it is found to exist. Then, data 
 
Page 86 of 278 
collection is guided by a sampling strategy called theoretical sampling, fundamentally different 
from selective sampling. 
As might also be expected when doing Grounded Theory, the researcher is forced to 
determine the initial sample by means of purposeful sampling. Therefore when a grounded 
theorist is commencing data collection the process is entered by purposeful or sometimes 
selective sampling which is then superseded by theoretical sampling as the data highlight the 
direction which subsequent sampling needs to follow (Cutcliffe, 2000). Thus, the initial sample 
is determined by purposeful sampling, primarily guided by the early literature review, a 
concept to be further elaborated later in the thesis, and subsequent samples by theoretical 
sampling. This makes for an ongoing process of data collection where sampling is determined 
by the emerging theory and therefore cannot, or at least should not, be predetermined. 
Integral to theoretical sampling is theoretical sensitivity, the ability to generate concepts 
from data, where the researcher moves from a descriptive level to an analytical level by 
interacting with the data. The researcher asks questions of the data,; questions that then 
themselves are modified by the emerging answers (including the original research question)., . 
As Grounded Theory involves an emergence of theory from data, the problem must also 
emerge from the data, and is subject to a similar type of development as the theory itself. 
Consequently, even if the problem is well-defined at the onset of data collection, it must be 
allowed to evolve to not lose that precious theoretical sensitivity and openness to the 
emerging theory. The process is about using personal attributes consciously to facilitate the 
analytical process (Neill, 2006). 
Theoretical sampling is essential to the inductive-deductive process characteristic of 
Grounded Theory. The inductive process involves the theory emerging from the data and the 
deductive process involves the purposeful selection of samples to check out the emerging 
theory (Becker, 1993). Theoretical sampling encourages asking increasingly focused questions 
and seeking answers as the inquiry progresses. It builds systematic checks into the analysis, 
hence putting emerging theory to the empirical test. Further, theoretical sampling also allows 
for flexibility during the research process (Glaser, 1978; Strauss & Corbin, 1990) where a 
tracing of the theoretical sampling decisions acknowledges theory refinement (Cutcliffe, 2000), 
a process largely facilitated by the use of memos. 
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Constant comparative analysis 
Fundamental to Grounded Theory, unlike most other research methods, is that it 
merges the process of data collection and analysis. This means that the search for meaning 
through the interrogation of data commences at the very onset of data collection (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967; Glaser, 1978; Strauss & Corbin, 1990; Charmaz, 2006; Corbin & Strauss, 2008; 
Birks & Mills, 2011). Concurrent data generation and analysis ensures that the coding process 
maintains its momentum by moving back and forth between the identification of similarities 
among and differences between emerging categories. Codes are compared to codes and 
categories, categories to categories and both to the emerging Theory. Constant comparative 
analysis ensures that categories are not merely built up but also broken down into smaller 
units of meaning. This process diversifies the data and counteracts homogenisation. The 
ultimate objective of constant comparative analysis is to link and integrate categories in such a 
way that all instances of relevant variation are captured by the emerging theory.  
”The main intellectual tool is comparison. The method of comparing and contrasting is used for 
practically all intellectual tasks during analysis: forming categories, establishing the boundaries of the categories, 
assigning the segments to categories, summarizing the content of each category, finding negative evidence, etc. 
The goal is to discern conceptual similarities, to refine the discriminative power of categories, and to discover 
patterns.” (Tesch, 1990, p. 96) 
Thus, the quality of data analysis depends on the process of systematic and repeated 
comparison of the data. It is, however, important to subject the process of comparison itself to 
thorough analysis and to consider how the data will be treated within it. This ensures that the 
analytical procedures applied are in keeping with the overall philosophy of the study and fall 
within both its conceptual and practical scope. As Hewitt-Taylor (2001) +-outlines the use of 
constant comparative analysis in qualitative research, successful analysis and presentation of 
qualitative data requires a systematic and ordered approach so that complex data emerging 
from a variety of sources can be collated and presented in a manageable form. 
The issues addressed here are firstly, the subject of the comparison in an attempt to 
identify exactly what it is that is compared; and secondly, when this comparison occurs and 
how it is chronologically structured. A purposeful approach used by researchers will not only 
systematise their work, but will also increase traceability when they describe how they used 
and implemented the approach in their research practice (Boeije, 2002). Adopting a 
systematic approach will ultimately help to make the unclear process of constant comparative 
analysis more transparent. 
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Having established that by comparing facilitates theory development through coding, 
categorising and connecting codes and categories, it is now time to describe in more detail 
how. Some state that each data snippet much be compared with every other relevant snippet 
of data (e.g. Morse & Field, 1996). Although this is true for most Grounded Theory studies, it 
is not completely clear on how to apply this rule. The exact level of comparison is obviously a 
question at each Grounded Theorist’s discretion and thus subjective as it may be the main rule 
remains: everything has to be compared to everything.  
In this study the comparisons are done on three levels, where the first is, comparison 
within a single interview; the second, comparison between previous interviews individually; and 
the third, comparison between all previous groups of interviews. The first level is probably the 
easiest to understand and involves a process of coding the interviews by labelling snippets of 
data. This process is called open coding, described in further detail in the following section. 
Then, by comparing the different codes from the interview, the interview as a whole is 
examined in terms of context, coherence and consistency. This internal comparison aims to 
interpret the parts of the interview in the context of the entire story as the interviewee has 
told it. At their inception all new interviews are first treated like this. The second step occurs 
when more than one interview has been conducted, allowing for interviews to be compared. 
All new interviews are compared with all previous interviews individually. Here codes from the 
different interviews are compared and sometimes combined, into what are referred to as 
categories. As categories emerge all codes are compared to all categories in an effort to 
indicate any relationships between them. Establishing these relationships is known as axial 
coding., where the goal is to further conceptualise the emerging theory. This process is 
explained more in the next section, 
For the third and final level of comparison the analysis becomes somewhat more 
demanding, not necessarily in complexity but certainly in time. This is where all new codes 
must be compared not only to the previous interviews but also the previous groups of 
interviews created at the second level of comparison. To exemplify this, let’s use the case of 
the fourth interview. The first level of comparison involves the internally comparison of the 
codes of the fourth interview in isolation. Then, a second level follows, where the fourth 
interview is compared to the first, second and third interviews individually. At the third and 
final stage the fourth interview is also compared to the group of first and second interviews, as 
well as the group of the first, second and third. The time required for any number of 
 
Page 89 of 278 
interviews analysed this way, given a set time for each analytical step is therefore ever-
increasing as illustrated by figure 3. 
The figure uses the approximate value of one day required for the analysis of each level. 
This could obviously vary throughout the study but does serve as a good enough 
approximation. Particularly if the point is to show that regardless of unit of time the 15th 
interview will require 28 times as much time to analyse as the first. Thus, as this research 
encompassed 21 interviews, the last took about two months to analyse with analysis making 
up roughly 50% of the workday. 
Figure 3: Increase in time required per interview using constant comparison.  
Note that the third level of comparison does not necessarily provide new codes but is 
rather aimed at deepening insights and adding to gaps in the information about the emerging 
theory. As a consequence, it is unlikely, but not impossible, that saturation will be determined 
as a result of the third level of comparison. But it does add to the sensitivity of the emerging 
theory which in turn is severely restricted if the researcher does not undertake analysis 
throughout so it can guide the process of data collection (Becker, 1993). Thus, even though 
the word ’constant’ may be considered an exaggeration if interpreted in absolute terms, the 
comparative and interactive nature of Grounded Theory at every stage of analysis, even if in 
discrete level and numbers, makes the method explicitly emergent.  
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Coding for an increasing level of abstraction 
Less dichotomising than the literature dilemma there are also discrepancies between the 
different schools of Grounded Theory when it comes to coding, where some of it appears to 
be more semantic than anything else. Informed by the literature, particularly Walker and 
Myrick’s  (2006) exploration of process and procedure in Grounded Theory, this research 
employs three levels of coding, labelled as; open, axial and theoretical. Coding in grounded 
theory is the process of analysing the data involving the researcher as an integral part of that 
process. As succinctly expressed by Glaser (1978), codes represent the essential relationship 
between data and the theory. As data is collected it is immediately analysed for all possible 
interpretations in the search for meaning and ultimately theory. This involves utilising particular 
coding processes, which begins with open coding. Open coding is the process of breaking 
down the data into distinct units of meaning. As the name implies, the idea of open coding is 
to analyse and code the data in as many ways as possible keeping an open mind to any 
emerging concepts.  
As data collection and analysis simultaneously continues, concepts are identified. 
Concepts are progressions from merely describing what is happening in the data - the key 
feature of the open coding process - to explaining relationships between and across data units. 
It is from these concepts that categories are later formed. This requires a different, more 
sophisticated, coding technique referred to as axial coding, involving an incremental level of 
abstraction. Axial coding is the appreciation of concepts in terms of their dynamic relationships 
(Goulding, 1999). These relationships are established by examining three aspects of the 
phenomenon: the conditions or station in which the phenomenon occurs; the actions and 
interactions of the people in relation to what is perceived to happen in the situations; and. the 
result and consequences of the actions or inactions (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). This level is axial 
because it delineates and extricates relationships on which the axis of the category is the 
focus. Note that this level of analysis is, like reality itself, inherently complex and as stated by 
Strauss and Corbin (1990). Nevertheless, the attention to context, conditions and 
consequences makes good heuristic sense (Dey, 1999).  
In the final level of coding, theoretical coding, the task is to organise and integrate the 
data around a core category to generate a theory. This process utilises theoretical codes to 
conceptualise how the codes and categories relate to each other as hypotheses to be 
integrated into a theory (Glaser, 1978, p. 72). In short, theoretical coding is the process of 
integrating and refining theory (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 143). Strauss and Corbin (1990) 
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note that theoretical coding is similar to axial coding, except that the integration occurs at a 
more abstract level of analysis. While theoretical coding is focused around a core concept, the 
key is that the researcher is coding for a higher level of abstraction. Admittedly, as the research 
progress and the amount of data grows the lines of the three phases are somewhat blurred 
and may even be carried out concurrently. Nonetheless, each phase requires a different form 
of intervention on part of the researcher. 
To exemplify the different levels of coding consider the following example adapted from 
Wolfswinkel, Furtmueller and Wilderom (2013). When applying open coding to a number of 
initial datasets (e.g. interviews) the codes ’car’ and ’truck’ appears. These codes represent 
information on transportation vehicles with at least four wheels. Based on this, the concept 
‘means of transportation’ is identified. The concept ‘means of transportation’ is a ’category’, i.e. 
a higher level of abstraction. Categories can have ‘properties’. In this case, ‘means of 
transportation’ has the property of having at least four wheels. The researcher then conducts 
another interview in which the code ’motor-bikes’ appear. Since the ‘motorbikes’ have less 
than four wheels, the researcher needs to change the properties of the category ‘means of 
transportation’. Enter constant comparison: and when revisiting earlier coding, this is easily 
adjusted. With the intention of both cars and motorbikes to transport people another 
category is developed ’person transportation’. This category can however be treated as a sub-
category to the higher order ’means of transportation’. It is when establishing these types of 
relationships that axial coding is in play. The higher-order categories will eventually themselves 
be consolidated and as key categories start to emerge, theoretical coding will allow the 
researcher to unify them all around a core category.   
Data saturation 
Data saturation or theoretical saturation is integral to naturalistic inquiry (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). However, as outlined by Bowen (2008) saturation 
remains conceptually unclear and the process lacks systematisation. Saturation is reached when 
the researcher gathers data to the point of diminishing returns: when nothing new is being 
added. Claims of saturation should and will be supported by an explanation of how saturation 
was achieved and substantiated by clear evidence of its occurrence. Saturation is essential to 
knowing when enough data has been collected and therefore has far-reaching implications for 
research designed to produce a theory grounded in the data.  
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Ideally, the process of data collection and data analysis continues until theoretical 
saturation has been achieved. However, theoretical saturation should be seen as a goal rather 
than a reality. This is because, even though the researcher strives for saturation of categories, 
modifications thereof, temporal or otherwise, that may change the perspective is always 
possible. This is especially the case from a constructivist perspective where data may be 
interpreted in new ways (Charmaz, 2006), and saturation most often refers to occurring only 
within the confines of the particular research. It is therefore important to note that data is 
gathered until no new properties of the categories emerge, which means that the properties 
of the category is saturated, not the data. Bowen (2008) also points out that this includes the 
researcher not trying to saturate the study participants. Returning to interview key participants 
for a second or third time is oriented toward eliciting data to expand the depth or address 
gaps in the emerging analysis while interviewing additional participants is for the purpose of 
increasing the scope, adequacy and appropriateness of the data (Morse, Barrett, Mayan, Olson, 
& Spiers, 2002). 
Charmaz (2012) claims that qualitative researchers often report that they stop data 
collection when the stories in the data became repetitive, and she explains in an earlier 
publication, saturation calls for fitting new data into categories already devised (Charmaz, 
2003). In accordance with the operationalization of saturation as suggested by Bowen (2008), 
this study contains some guidelines for saturation. A category is considered saturated if it is 
reflected in more than 70 % of the interviews, confirmed by member checks, resonate with 
key informants and research advisors, and made sense given prior research. Supporting data 
from the early and continuous review of literature will also be taken into account. Also, just as 
Bowen (2008) points out, caution must be taken against assuming that qualitative data, such as 
a certain percentage of interviews is necessary for determining saturation. Nonetheless, it 
stands to reason that, as stated by Morse (1995), saturation of all categories signifies the point 
at which to end the research. 
Literature review in Grounded Theory  
In their original publication, Glaser and Strauss (1967) explicitly advised against 
conducting an early literature review in the substantive area of research at an early stage off 
the research process.  Consistent with the original, purist Glaserian perspective, and unlike 
most approaches to research, still, Grounded Theory requires that literature is not reviewed 
before commencing the research. The rationale is that to do so could lead the researcher into 
making misconceived assumptions about what issues warrant further investigation. Normally 
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the literature review is perceived as a process that begins before any data is collected with the 
aim of  refining the research question, determining gaps in earlier research and identifying a 
suitable design and data collection method, and providing the rationale for further research 
(Hickey, 1997; Hallberg, 2010). Grounded Theory, as originally described by Glaser and 
Strauss, posits that by avoiding a literature review at the beginning of a study it is more likely 
that the emergent theory will be Grounded in the data, rather than to fit some preconceived 
theory. Hence, the risk of an early literature review, as pointed out by Hickey (1997), is that 
the researcher may focus the research process on assumptions highlighted by the literature 
rather than grounded in the data. However, Antoinette McCallin (2003), Cairán Dunne 
(2011), Robert Thornberg (2011), Kathy Charmaz (2012), and numerous others, including 
myself, have taken issue with Glaser’s (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Glaser, 1978, 1998; B. Glaser, 
2001) insistence on delaying the literature review to avoid preconceiving data analysis. 
Therefore, the next section is devoted to first describing the various issues associated with 
review of literature in Grounded Theory and then proposes a strategy to ameliorate the issue. 
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2.4   The literature review dilemma 
”The question continually arises when doing ground theory as to what is the best 
pacing for reading and using the related professional literature in the substantive area 
under study. We are all used to the normal, extensive literature review to ascertain gaps 
to fill in, hypotheses to test, and ideas to contribute to, in descriptive and verificational 
studies. In contrast the dictum in grounded theory research is: There is a need not to 
review any of the literature in the substantive area under study.” (Glaser, 1992, p. 31) 
The dictum of not reading literature in the substantive area until the final stages of 
analysis, as advised by Glaserian Grounded Theory, is problematic for at least six reasons 
outlined by Thornberg (2011). First, if this dictum is taken seriously, it makes it impossible for 
researchers to conduct studies in their own areas of expertise, which appears odd and 
counter-intuitive. Second, the dictum can easily be used as an excuse for lazy ignorance of the 
literature, which may lead to the belief and accusation that such research is “easy” and 
“atheoretical”. Third, if researchers avoid reading literature in the field but at the same time 
read literature in other unrelated fields, in accordance with Glaser’s (1978) recommendation 
for enhancing theoretical sensitivity, and then, at the end of the analysis, begin to review the 
field literature, they will soon drive themselves into a corner during their research career 
because of the cumulative reduction of possible research fields, which they still have not read 
literature about. And if the researchers want to do more studies in the same field, 
preconceptions are indeed inevitable. Fourth, as several grounded theorists have noticed, 
before the research begins, the researcher has to prepare proposals for the purpose of 
receiving funding for the project and undergo an ethical review. Hence, for pragmatic and 
strategic reasons, the researcher has to begin theorising and reading literature before starting 
any data collection and analysis, because, in these review processes, an overview or summary 
of related literature is normally required to acquire approvals. Fifth, ignoring established 
theories and research findings implies a loss of knowledge. Knowledge can help the researcher 
to formulate relevant research questions and make constant comparisons between data and 
literature to elaborate, revise or criticise pre-existing knowledge and extant theories. Sixth, the 
dictum of not reading literature early on in the research process as a solution to the fear of 
contamination and forcing is an extreme position that underestimates researchers’ ability to 
reflect upon the links between extant theories and their gathering and analysis of data, and to 
appreciate extant theories and concepts without imposing them on the data.  
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With the researcher an integral part of the research process and product this approach 
always reflects value positions. This underlines the importance of identifying these positions 
and weighing the effect on the research practise rather than denying their existence (Charmaz, 
2008). Consequently, the position of this research disavows the idea that researchers can or 
will begin a study without any prior knowledge and theories about the research topic. This 
study does not subscribe to the risk of an early literature review contaminating the research 
being anything other than manageable. Few, if any, grounded theorists can be thought so 
devoid of introspective capacity to be unable to critically and creatively exercise a level of 
control. The introspection does, however, require a certain amount of reflexivity, discussed in 
some depth in this chapter. Also, even if there is agreement between Glaserian and classic 
grounded theorists that a literature review should not be undertaken at the beginning of a 
study, there is disagreement about when it actually should begin. Hence, the crux of the 
matter is not whether a literature review should be conducted - there is actually a consensus 
that it should - but rather when it should be conducted and also how extensive it should be 
(Hickey, 1997; Cutcliffe, 2000; Andrew, 2006; McGhee et al., 2007). From the purists’ 
perspective, concerns relate specifically to conducting a literature review in the substantive 
area of study at an early stage of the research process, while openly acknowledging the 
important role of extant literature in later stages of a Grounded Theory study (Dunne, 2011). 
Glaser (1992) cautions against reviewing the literature until the emerging theory has 
developed sufficiently. Only then should a relevant literature review be conducted and 
interwoven into the emerging theory. That is when a hypothesis, model or theory that is 
grounded in a core variable and an emerging integration of categories and properties can be 
discerned in the data. It could be argued, however that this is impossible since most 
researchers are already working within their respective field of research and already are 
familiar with major theories. 
Glaser’s fundamental arguments stem from concerns that an early literature review can 
contaminate and impede the generation of theory. In contrast to Glaser, Strauss and Corbin 
(1990) advocate reviewing the literature as the study progresses arguing that since literature in 
Grounded Theory is a source of data it is possible to review literature relevant to the 
concepts emerging from the data. Glaser’s main objection to an early literature review is that 
the researcher may be side-tracked by received knowledge and interpretations that support 
assumptions already taken for granted and that are not necessarily relevant to the area of 
study. However, when the research goal is to explore the main concerns of participants and 
to find out how they continually resolve that concern, energy need not be wasted on overly 
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speculating on the problem (McCallin, 2003). In this particular case, the study does not focus 
upon the intricacies of the underlying problem of corruption but rather perceptions thereof.  
It has even been argued that the injunction that no literature that relates to the 
phenomena should be studied before coding the data is one of the most wide-spread reasons 
for the lack of use of Grounded Theory (Urquhart, 2007, p. 351). Accordingly, this research 
strives to push the temporal limits of the literature review even further to promote an early 
literature review, albeit modified to fit the purposes of this version of Grounded Theory.  This 
is not an entirely novel idea and has been advocated by Thornberg (2011). Several scholars 
have argued for the relevance and necessity of an early literature review to find out if the 
planned study, or something similar has been published before (Goulding, 1999; McCallin, 
2003; Hallberg, 2010; Dunne, 2011). 
Doing an early literature review does not absolve the researcher from using literature 
during the entirety of the research process, especially as theory begins to emerge. This 
expands horizons with Cutcliffe (2000), for example, arguing for a second stage of literature 
review, additional to that done prior to the research. The idea is rather for the literature to be 
the logical starting point of the study, for it to accompany the entire research process 
continually, and for it to be given more and more emphasis as the theory emerges. Reference 
to extant literature should thus be made wherever possible in an effort to identify 
comparisons or contradictions within the emerging codes and categories. As explained by 
Stern (2007), a literature review which ensues from the emergent Grounded Theory is 
essential not only for academic honesty, but in order to demonstrate how the study builds and 
contributes to extant knowledge in the field.  
For this research, a number of arguments about the timing and nature of literature 
review were critically analysed. This analysis is basically an expansion of a line of argument 
presented by Dunne (2011), and reaches the same conclusion; that the arguments in favour of 
undertaking a literature review in the substantive area before commencing data collection and 
analysis are compelling. The fundamental point is not whether previous knowledge should be 
used in data analysis; the important insight lies rather in how to make proper use of previous 
knowledge (McCallin, 2006; Strübing, 2007) and that sound preliminary work goes some way 
to demonstrate that the researcher knows what he or she is doing even if not knowing exactly 
what he or she is looking for (McCallin, 2003). 
The development of categories is conditioned by the early establishment of those 
preconceptions, identified and examined in the early literature review. This allows for the 
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literature to seamlessly take its place as part of the macro-context shaping a study, or to be 
woven into the micro-context if it is relevant to emerging concepts (McCallin, 2003). In a 
response to McCallin, Andrew (2006) states that central to Grounded Theory is the idea that 
the literature is not used as a source for concepts. This statement not only goes against 
Glaser’s fundamental principle that everything is data (see e.g. B. Glaser, 2001), but also 
although it is unlikely that the early literature review will spawn new concepts at least existing 
ones will be mapped and understood allowing their subsequent use to contextualise the new 
emerging ones. As Dunne (2011) suggests, perhaps there is a way to monitor and counteract 
the threat of contaminating the research which is less extreme than the initial abstinence from 
literature. 
Each researcher must make an informed and justifiable decision not only regarding when 
extant literature will be employed in a Grounded Theory study but also how. Dunne (2011) 
may have answered the question of when but the question of how remains largely 
unanswered, or is at least not equally structured. By thorough reading in the field of Grounded 
Theory methodology, with an emphasis on reviewing how other researchers have practically 
sought to address the issue, what follows is an attempt to answer how to do an early 
literature review in a Grounded Theory study.  This section does not necessarily provide new 
information but rather collates and rearranges existing material for a different perspective and 
ultimately practical usability. It outlines three building blocks creating a bridge over the rift of 
opinions on how literature review in Grounded Theory should be undertaken.  
The first building block is reflexivity, already an integral part of any Grounded Theory 
study and particularly those from a constructivist perspective, which is meticulously applied 
here to maintain scientific rigour. The second building block is memos, also already one of the 
most important features when conducting a scientifically sound Grounded Theory study. Thus, 
the first two building blocks are just adaptations of already existing tools within Grounded 
Theory. The third building block is somewhat novel, introducing an additional tool to the 
Grounded Theory researcher by presenting a structured resource selection system.  
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Reflexivity 
The first step to counteract the possible negative impact of early engagement with 
extant literature on the Grounded Theory research process is the idea of reflexivity (Dunne, 
2011). Reflexivity is defined by Robson (2011) as an awareness of the ways in which the 
researcher as an individual with a particular social identity and background has an impact on 
the research process. As Cutcliffe (2000) claims, few would dispute that qualitative methods 
invariably involve interaction between the researcher and the data. The potential impact of the 
researcher needs to become part of the research record in order to be explored through 
constant comparative analysis (Neill, 2006), allowing for the explicit treatment of 
preconceptions in the study.  Whilst the researcher’s own creativity is an integral part in the 
emergence of categories, these categories must be inductively derived from the data and not 
forced by preconceived notions held by the researcher (McGhee et al., 2007). An early 
literature review can help identify and examine such notions. Martin (2006) explains the read-
or-not-to-read quandary in Grounded Theory methodology as one of pacing, thinking of the 
initial phase as ’non-committal’ helps focus on the principle Glaser wants to convey: a 
distancing from  pre-defined problems and concerns. 
A methodological framework, however well-constructed is only an instrument to be 
used by the researcher whose capacity for thinking will lie at the heart of the process. 
Grounded Theory thinking goes beyond the practicalities of literature review and its timing 
(McCallin, 2006), shifting the focus from the methodology to the reflexively thinking 
researcher. Grounded Theory coding is inductive, comparative, interactive and iterative - and 
later - deductive. Does that coding process begin as a tabula rasa, encased in theoretical 
innocence and substantive ignorance? Charmaz (2012, p. 4) answer to that question is: not a 
chance. According to Thornberg (2011) this tabula rasa approach is dangerous because it 
leaves the analyst prone to all manner of prejudice and preconceptions, which are no less 
powerful for remaining subliminal. Instead, as suggested by Henwood and Pidgeon’s (2003) 
taking a stance of theoretical agnosticism is more appropriate. This approach does not 
advocate that the researcher ignore existing theories, but rather avoid the imposition of 
specific theoretical frameworks, as this may cause researcher to analyse the data through a 
specific theoretical lens. They argue further that grounded theorists should subject prior 
theories to rigorous critical analysis rather than denying them. The trick in theoretical 
agnosticism is to treat all extant theories and concepts that one already knows or might 
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encounter during the pre-study or on-going literature review as provisional, disputable and 
modifiable conceptual proposals (Thornberg, 2011). 
In the early literature review, where empirical findings and theoretical ideas are identified 
and accessed as deemed necessary constant reflection on how such data might impact the 
research is pragmatic. This is analogous to, and for this methodology identical with, the 
constant comparison method: a built-in mechanism forcing regular reflection and justification 
for decisions on how to progress the study, for drawing certain conclusions and propounding 
specific arguments, all captured in an analytical trail of memos. This mechanism also provides 
the researcher with flexible choices among different extant concepts and ideas, a theoretical 
pluralism. Inviting theoretical pluralism during the analysis is a way of initiating a critical, creative 
and sensitive conversation between different and even conflicting theoretical perspectives to 
explore and interpret data and at the same time avoiding a forcing of the data (Thornberg, 
2011).  
Although Glaser (2001) warns against reflexivity paralysis where the researcher 
becomes so reflexive as to stifle creativity and fail to produce a theoretical account, instead 
producing description only, it is clear that there is a need for the researcher to be self-aware. 
Rather, the self-destructive introspective compulsion to locate their work within a particular 
theoretical context (McGhee et al., 2007), is expanded to refer not only to the work but also 
the researcher within a philosophical paradigm as well as to the fundamental concepts and 
research processes. Arguably it is the reflexivity and the researcher’s creativity within this 
reflexivity that makes Grounded Theory valuable (Cutcliffe, 2000). Nevertheless, the 
researcher must be careful not to be too ambitious in developing the early literature review 
such that it causes too much reading and literature overload, stealing precious time from data 
gathering and analysis, which is and remains at the core of Grounded Theory.  
Memos 
Memos are fundamentally based on reflective thinking and register the internal dialogue 
between the researcher and the data at a certain point of time. The self- awareness captured 
in reflexivity is embodied through an honest memo writing, integral to the process of 
reflexivity, enabling a the researcher to turn back on initial reactions (McGhee et al., 2007). 
Memos thus form an integral component of an early literature review, whereby the researcher 
could reflect on the ideas while engaging with existing literature (Dunne, 2011). When 
analysing documents, as opposed to conducting interviews, the immediate feedback loop of 
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information sharing is closed, making the construction unilateral and putting an even larger 
emphasis on researcher reflexivity. This is addressed partly by maintaining an audit trail in the 
form of reflexive memos, which also acts as a mechanism for tracing and re-reflecting on 
interactions with data. 
Some insights recorded in memos may have been unreflectively jotted down but still 
harbour the potential to unexpectedly rise to more prominence (Wolfswinkel et al., 2013). As 
the study progresses and the memos are synthesised by constant comparison, these insights 
may contribute significantly to the richness and depth of the emerging theory. Effective 
qualitative inquiry in general, and the development of a Grounded Theory in particular, draws 
on critical thinking as well as creative thinking. Creativity is a vital component of the Grounded 
Theory method as it forces the researcher to break through assumptions (Strauss & Corbin, 
1990). Constructing theory is not a mechanical process and Charmaz (2006) advocates what 
she calls theoretical playfulness, where creative and imaginative thinking helps the researcher 
to move beyond descriptive cataloguing. As suggested by Thornberg (2011) this research 
expands Charmaz notion of theoretical playfulness by also inviting extant theories and 
concepts in this playfulness, i.e. playing with them in new, innovative, creative and unorthodox 
ways during the process of constant comparison. All of this is carefully captured and 
documented in the memos written during the early literature review.  
The memos contain substantive rationale for the item resource being reviewed as well 
as cogent grounds for subsequent theoretical selections. Memos also include insights and 
reflections on the definitions of key concepts in the area of research. Perhaps most 
importantly the memos can manifest and acknowledge prior knowledge and theoretical 
understanding: an important feature to discern when doing Grounded Theory. With the 
stance of this research acknowledging the need for constant reflexivity instead of denying prior 
knowledge and perspectives, and pretending to be without preconceptions and theoretical 
influences, the memos serve an invaluable role as a monitoring tool. The researcher must 
remember that the main focus is on data, not on literature, and that every code, concept or 
theoretical idea constructed must be grounded in the data. Prior knowledge must never be 
used as an excuse for poor analysis of data as it can never replace the work of constant 
comparison (Thornberg, 2011). Memos are an excellent way of keeping track of the focal 
point for the researcher’s attention as well as monitoring the direction and constant course 
adjustments of the entire research process. Further it allows the researcher, if losing their way, 
to back-track to a familiar point and restart the investigative journey. The key to doing a good 
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Grounded Theory study and overcoming the potential problem of reviewing the literature 
prior to data collection is to maintain theoretical sensitivity through constant comparison and 
memo writing particularly (Andrew, 2006).  
Hence, whenever reviewing literature, be it early or late in the research process, writing 
memos will serve the process well. Reflective moments combined with the aforementioned 
constant reflexivity will help the researcher to explicitly compare and contrast concepts when 
engaging with extant literature, both with each other and acquired data as well as emerging 
theory. Further it will uphold a theoretical agnosticism and help the researcher stay grounded 
all the while documenting all the ongoing processes, practical and theoretical alike. The 
traceability of memos allows for a reflective analysis during the research process as well as 
afterwards to make sure that pre-existing concepts are not used as forcing concepts, only as 
flexible, modifiable and sensitive ideas, creative associations and heuristic tools. Memos are 
therefore an integral part of reviewing literature in this version of Grounded Theory lending 
the existing literature for expanded, rich and grounded analysis and conceptualisation.  
Resource selection system/criteria 
Even classical Grounded Theory promotes reading but how does a researcher choose 
the resources to read in the literature review? Theoretical sampling will obviously allow the 
researcher to narrow the available resources but even so, given some research area variations, 
there will be plenty to choose from. The actual selection of relevant literature for the purpose 
of a literature review is a non-trivial task as many literature reviews do not offer clarity about 
how and why the specific literary resources were obtained (Wolfswinkel et al., 2013).  
Typically, sources other than peer-review journal and conferences papers, monographs 
and book chapters are not seen as acceptable data for scholarly purposes. Yet, as Glaser (see 
e.g. B. Glaser, 2001) accurately claims, in terms of Grounded Theory everything is data, and 
may thus contribute to the emerging Theory. The point of caution is naturally that the 
researcher needs to be aware of or at least able to analyse the limitations of obtained data. 
Therefore, when selecting documents, the four quality control criteria developed by Scott 
(1990) are used and intended as reference points for the reflective process. The criteria are:; 
authenticity, credibility, representativeness and meaning.  
 Authenticity is a fundamental criterion. Questionable sources of data can mislead the 
researcher, unless they are aware of their inauthenticity. Consideration of the authenticity of a 
document concerns to what extent it actually is or represents what it claims to be. Unless able 
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to come to a conclusion about the authenticity of the data, there is no possibility of an 
informed judgement about the quality of the Theory eventually constructed. When analysing 
official documents, the authenticity of the source may be easily established while the intricacies 
of its purported purpose might be more challenging.  
Credibility refers to the extent to which data is undistorted, sincere and free from error. 
From a constructivist perspective all documents containing an account of social events are to 
some degree distorted. There is always an element of selective accentuation in the description 
of social reality. Therefore, it must be established to what extent the source and data content 
is an honest and objective account to be taken as prima facia credible.  
Representativeness refers to the assessment of the ‘typicality’ of sources and data. 
Although assuming typical data is not always to be desired, it is important to gauge how typical 
a source is in order to discern the limits of its implications and any subsequent conclusions 
drawn from it. This heuristic task will generally form part of any strategy of documentary 
sampling, as it is seldom possible to consult all existing documents of relevance.  
Meaning is the extent to which the data is comprehensible to the researcher, who is 
limited to only being able to assess that which is understood. The predicament to elicit 
meaning arises on two levels, the literal and the interpretative. In short, the literal meaning of 
the words in a document gives only its face-value meaning: the raw material from which real 
significance must be reconstructed. Interpretative understanding is the end-product of a 
hermeneutic process in which the literal meaning is related to the context in which it resides. 
This ties in closely with the previously mentioned emphasis on researcher expertise as well as 
the succeeding discussion on reviewing literature.  
Selected documents should also, though perhaps to a lesser extent, be assessed for 
completeness, in the sense of being comprehensive - covering the topic completely -, or 
selective, covering only some aspects of the topic. Another consideration to assess is  whether 
the documents are even - balanced, or uneven - containing great detail on some aspects and 
less or none on other aspects (Bowen, 2009). The reason why completeness does not qualify 
as a fully-fledged selection criteria is that there may be some rather useful data in documents 
that are considered anything but complete. 
The selection of resources, be it interviewees or documents, is conducted according to 
the overarching Grounded Theory methodology allowing theoretical sampling to encompass 
literary resources. This goes on until the collated corpus of research literature represents a 
saturated sample of applicable knowledge of the substantive area. Selected documents are not 
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treated as necessarily precise, accurate or complete accounts. The research method does not 
simply lift words, phrases and passages from the documents, but rather establishes meaning 
and the contribution to the explored topic. Throughout this process, the researcher should be 
well-aware of the fact that if the literature is inaccurate it will be constantly corrected, put in 
perspective and weighed in relevance by the constant comparative method (Glaser, 1998).  
This is an argument as good as any for not tip-toeing around the literature: everything is data 
and with careful application of theoretical sensitivity and reflexivity the researcher must be 
confident that constant comparison will bring out the relevant theory.  
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2.5   Modified Grounded Theory - GT+ 
”…science is simply common sense at its best, that is, rigidly accurate in 
observation, and merciless to fallacy in logic.” (Huxley, 1880, p. 789)  
This section will describe the details of the methodological version of Grounded Theory 
applied in this study. There is no such thing as a single unified, tightly defined and clearly 
specified methodology called Grounded Theory (Dey, 2004). Therefore, it is imperative when 
employing this methodology to be well versed in the topic in order to take a, perhaps unique, 
position on how to apply Grounded Theory, that is both informed and defensible. Like most 
research methodologies, Grounded Theory has been refined since its inception. This is a 
natural development when introducing a methodology so leaving it open to be adapted and 
employed differently, even beyond the horizon envisaged by its originators. The nature of 
Grounded Theory is determined in part by the questions asked of the data. As Cutcliffe 
(2000) posits, provided that the researcher explains what has been done and how it was 
done, straying outside of the boundaries of one particular version of Grounded Theory is less 
of an issue than limiting the potential depth of understanding that strict adherence to one 
version would produce. As Morse (2009, p. 14) stated “Every application, every time 
Grounded Theory is used, it requires adaptation in particular ways as demanded by the 
research questions, situation, and participants…”. Therefore, every researcher will need to 
tailor the approach to suit the specific research purpose creating a unique version of 
Grounded Theory methodology.  
The particular version of Grounded Theory used in this work is called GT+ with the ’+’ 
indicating the addition of not only an early literature review as previously formulated, but also 
a method of continuously treating and integrating extant literature. As the Grounded Theory 
approach to research will undoubtedly continue to evolve, it is important to maintain a close 
eye on that evolution for it may go so far as to develop an entirely new species of Grounded 
Theory application. The treatment of literature as proposed by this study does not constitute 
such a transgression of the boundaries of the contemporary methodology that is Grounded 
Theory. Maintaining the inductive and deductive interplay entered around the data, the analysis 
still claims to be grounded, as the defining feature is that the Theory still emerges inductively. 
For many, if not most, Grounded Theory researchers an initial theoretical sensitivity is 
inevitable regardless of if an early literature review has been conducted. It is therefore 
important to recognise, despite the controversy surrounding the place of the literature review, 
that the debate really concerns the need to stay open minded (McGhee et al., 2007).  
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From the ontological perspective of this research there was just no legitimate alternative 
to conducting an early literature review, albeit in a format fully compatible with the paradigms 
of constructivist Grounded Theory. Johnson, Long and White (2001) posit that merging 
distinct approaches, including Grounded Theory, does not compromise methodological purity 
but can actually enhance rigour. In short, a systematic review of the literature as described by 
this section is unlikely to contaminate the Grounded Theory study but will rather strengthen 
both research and researcher as a whole. The method is influenced by Thornberg’s (2011) 
Informed Grounded Theory described as in contrast to the classic GT tradition, but in 
accordance with the constructivist GT tradition. An informed grounded theorist sees the 
advantage of using pre-existing theories and research findings in the substantive field in a 
sensitive, creative and flexible way instead of seeing them as obstacles and threats. These are 
not uncritically adopted in the analysis but are judged in terms of relevance, fit and utility, nor 
is the literature used as forcing applications or deductions, but rather as a guide using a set of 
data sensitising principles.  
Figure 4: GT+ at the core of the three main strands of Grounded Theory.  
The inception of GT+, as with Informed Grounded Theory, springs from the 
epistemology and the intrinsic nature of the view of the researcher’s position, and is in many 
ways an elaboration of the constructivist Grounded Theory. There are however, several traits 
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from other versions of Grounded Theory and in other ways GT+ stays close to the classic 
version. The position of GT+ can be illustrated from the perspective of the currently three 
main versions of Grounded Theory. Firstly, the classical Glaserian version represents the 
fundamental idea of theory generated from and Grounded in data. Secondly Strauss and 
Corbin's more structured and systematic approach, presents a set of procedures for doing 
Grounded Theory. Although designed not to be followed dogmatically but rather to be used 
creatively and flexibly by researchers as they deem appropriate (Strauss & Corbin, 1998), the 
procedures in many ways make the approach more accessible but also run the risk of being 
too stringent and forcing data. Thirdly, the flexible constructivist approach of Charmaz (2006) 
with its epistemological foundation very close to that of GT+, emphasises researcher 
interaction with data.  
The assimilation of an early literature review pushes GT+ away from the purist Glaserian 
version of Grounded Theory and ends up in between Strauss and Corbin, and Charmaz. This 
position is justified and further explained by looking at the three other major issues around 
which the debate and evolution of Grounded Theory revolves. The issues are the role of 
induction, discovery versus construction and the focus on social process versus individual 
experience. On the role of induction, which is the analytical perspective from which GT+ 
primarily operates, Strauss and Corbin (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, 1998) introduced a deductive 
element in their coding paradigm. The intention is to ensure that the researcher is looking for 
the manifestation of particular patterns in the data and is sensitised to those aspects of the 
data that are considered to be essential to understanding. For example, Strauss and Corbin’s 
(1990) axial coding is by design specifically apt for the purpose of coding for process, 
something that otherwise can easily be omitted or done very arbitrarily. This is incorporated 
also in GT+ which, however, does not go as far as the application of the overly prescriptive 
Strauss and Corbin (1998, p. 181) conditional matrix. As for discovery versus construction the 
position of GT+ is highly influenced by the philosophical paradigm and moves towards the 
social constructivism presented by Charmaz (2000, 2006, 2008, 2014). The main argument is 
that categories and Theory are not discovered in data but emerge as a co-construction of 
researcher and data interaction. On the last issue of social process versus individual 
experience, the original aim of Grounded Theory was for the emerging theories to explain 
social process and its consequences. In order to explain the relevant process, the researcher 
engaged in a cyclical interpretative inquiry. More recently, researchers have used Grounded 
Theory as a method of data analysis only, with data being subject to Grounded Theory-
inspired coding in order to produce a systematic representation of a phenomenon. Such use 
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of Grounded Theory shares some features with phenomenology and since that is not the 
intent of GT+, its roots within the classical Glaserian approach remain. Having said that, the 
time frame for the study did not allow for the proffered line-by-line coding. The deviation is 
kept as small as possible and can be described as ‘phrase-by-phrase coding’, particularly useful 
when coding un-transcribed interviews from audio only. That way, many code labels are kept 
’in vivo’ - that is, the labelling utilises unaltered words and phrases as they occur in the data. 
Further, Coding favours the use of gerunds, the noun form of verbs, as these build action and 
meaning directly into the codes. Hence, coding in gerunds allows us to see processes that 
otherwise might remain invisible (Charmaz, 2012). 
Although being highly conditioned by its philosophical nucleus, it is the intention of GT+, 
even if largely stripped from its epistemological shroud, to deliver a flexible strategy for sound 
research practice that can be used to produce useful and innovative analyses. While effectively 
mixing three strands of Grounded Theory methodologies, it is not done without 
acknowledgement, which could contaminate the methodology (see Wimpenny & Gass, 2000). 
Rather the somewhat similar methodologies are explained and parts are selected and 
combined explicitly, avoiding method slurring (S. Baker & Edwards, 2012). The qualitative 
nature of the paradigm in GT+ focuses on the search for meaning and understanding to build 
innovative theory and not universal laws. It is important to recognise that enquiry is always 
context-bound and facts should be viewed as both theory-laden and value-laden. Therefore, 
the focus becomes one of how people behave within an individual and social context. 
Framework for initial sample and sample size 
Previously the concept of data saturation was explained and operationalized for the 
purposes of this study. Now the same will be done with the framework for both the initial 
sample and the sample size. The initial sample of participants, or interviewees will be a fairly 
small non-random set of individuals. The sample size will then successively grow as a result of 
theoretical sampling and the constant comparative method. In their work on trying to 
determine an adequate sample size, both in terms of initial sample size and total sample size 
[N], Francis et al. (2010) suggest two principles. The first is to specify a minimum sample size 
for the initial analysis, the initial analysis sample, and the second is to specify how many more 
interviews will be conducted without new ideas emerging. Fundamentally, the principles are 
based on arguments revolving around deciding when data saturation occurs in theory-based 
interview studies, the ‘stopping’ criterion. Although it is clearly acknowledged that this 
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approach was not specifically developed for Grounded Theory, , the principles may still be 
appropriate and the basic tenets with some adjustments are adopted in this study.    
Before discussing the initial analysis sample and the stopping criterion in more depth, let 
us recapitulate the idea of theoretical sampling and how it affects the sample size. Firstly, with 
the initial sample not being random, but instead purposefully selected and then expanded, the 
method of theoretical sampling addresses the problem of infinite regress. Where even if one 
has a random sample of a defined population, that population is almost certainly a non-
random subset of a more general population. Secondly, in the sampling strategy as proposed 
in this research, the researcher does not necessarily, and certainly not immediately, seek 
generalisability but rather representativeness and therefore focuses less on sample size and 
more on sampling adequacy. Sample size is important only as it relates to judging the extent to 
which issues of saturation have been carefully considered. During the coding process, the size 
of the sample may be increased in order to collect additional data until there is redundancy of 
information. However, increasing the sample size is not always necessary (Bowen, 2008). 
Thirdly, theoretical sampling means sampling for the development of a theoretical category, 
not sampling for population representation (Charmaz, 2012). Another argument may be 
constructed that reasons in favour of a more narrow or focused sample, rather than maximum 
variation. Since the researcher in Grounded Theory is concerned with uncovering the situated, 
contextual, core and subsidiary social processes, the social processes need to be shared and 
experienced by the individuals providing the data (Cutcliffe, 2000). The fourth and final note -  
yet another argument in favour of an early literature review - stems from Lincoln & Guba 
(1985). They claim that for optimal theoretical sampling a subsequent sample should only be 
selected once the current one has been analysed. Consequently, each prior sample acts as a 
gatekeeper for the next. If the first unit of a sample only has limited experience of the social 
process being studied, Cutcliffe (2000) argues that the subsequent theoretical sampling would 
also reflect the limited experience. This in turn is yet another argument for an early literature 
review, to facilitate the determination of a suitable initial sample and its size. 
For the initial analysis sample and stopping criterion, turning back to Francis et al. (2010), 
the specific numbers will depend on the complexity of the research questions, the interview 
topic guide, the diversity of the sample and the nature of the analysis. The suggestion, 
however, is an initial analysis sample of 10 interviews with a stopping criterion of three 
consecutive interviews without additional material. These numbers are derived from analysis of 
two studies of their own but also in large part from the work of Guest, Bunce & Johnson 
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(2006), where 92% of all codes were identified after 12 interviews and 97% of the ‘important’ 
codes were identified within these 12 interviews. In another Grounded Theory study by 
Furniss. Blindfold & Curzon (2011) a more modest initial analysis sample of four is used, 
subsequently expanded in accordance with methodological congruence. Bowen (2008) argues 
that if emphasis is on quality rather than quantity, the objective is not to maximise sample size 
but rather to become ’saturated’ with information on the topic. As suspected, finding the 
appropriate size for the initial analysis sample is a rather difficult task, which is confirmed by 
Baker and Edwards’ (2012) paper on how many qualitative interviews is enough. They 
gathered together a set of succinct ‘expert voice’ contributions from 14 prominent qualitative 
methodologists and five ‘early career reflections’ from those embarking on academic careers. 
The recurring answers to the question ’how many’ was ’it depends’. Nevertheless, the advice is 
to consider both philosophical as well as practical issues and to make an informed decision.  
For this study, such an informed decision includes taking into account Charmaz’ (2006) 
suggestion that a small study with ’modest claims’ might achieve saturation quicker than a 
study intended to describe a process that spans several disciplines. Cited in Mason’s (2010) 
insightful article on sample size and saturation in PhD studies, using qualitative interviews, Jette, 
Grover and Keck (2003) suggest that expertise in the chosen topic can reduce the number of 
participants needed in a study. In the same article Lee, Woo and Mackenzie (2002) suggest 
that studies using multiple interviews with the same participant requires fewer participants. 
The question of sample size is also important because the use of an N larger than needed may 
be nothing but a waste of research funds and participants and researchers’ time. On the other 
hand, an N smaller than needed may pose a scientific issue, that of not being informative due 
to a sample size so small that the results reflect idiosyncratic data. This study, although not 
lacking ambition, does however aim to describe a single discipline process. Further, all 
participants will more often than not, be well versed in terms of the chosen topic, corruption 
and subsequently the perception thereof. Lastly, the intention is after completing the initial 
analysis sample to revisit those participants as deemed necessary. Ergo, this speaks for 
achieving the theoretical outcome with fewer participants, permitting the discussion to 
proceed to establishing what this actually means in absolute numbers.  
Mason (2010) having studied 560 PhD studies using qualitative interviews found that a 
large portion of the samples, around 80%, adhered to Bertaux's (1981) guidelines of 15 being 
the smallest number of participants for a qualitative study irrespective of the methodology. 
While this guideline is not intended to be a faultless reference tool for selecting qualitative 
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sample size, there is support for saturation being achieved at a relatively low level (e.g. Guest 
et al., 2006). It is, however, important to point out that new data, especially when theoretically 
sampled, will always add something new, but there are diminishing returns, and the cut off 
between adding emerging findings and not, might be considered inevitably arbitrary (Mason, 
2010). In the end, one can even argue that the sample size becomes irrelevant as the quality 
of data is the measurement of its value.  
Taking this entire discussion into consideration for this particular study, the initial analysis 
sample is set to 2 interviews. The total sample size will be set by the methodological 
instruments, constant comparison and theoretical sampling and unfortunately conceivably 
restricted by time and resources limitations. If this is the case, perhaps the researcher will be 
left with no other choice than to settle for a theoretical scheme that is less developed than 
desired. The aim, however, for the entire study is to constitute excellence rather than 
adequacy and will strive to conduct as many interviews as needed to achieve it.  
Initial sample selection strategy  
The selection is conceptually driven by the theoretical framework as constructed by the 
methodology, hence by the evolving concepts that arise from the early literature review. This 
means that any and all inclusion, as well as exclusion, criteria will be defined and described in 
the analytical memos. The idea is not necessarily to create a homogenous sample universe but 
rather to focus on attributes contributing to the quality of data. This approach aligns with the 
variation sampling technique as described by Strauss and Corbin (1998).The rationale for using 
a more heterogeneous sample is that any commonality found across a diverse group of cases 
is more likely to be a generalisable phenomenon than a commonality found in a homogenous 
sample (Robinson, 2014). Cross-cultural qualitative research, with its similarity to this research, 
is another instance that calls for a demographically and geographically heterogeneous sample. 
There are, however, challenges inherent to using a heterogeneous sample with the sheer 
diversity of data lessening the likelihood of meaningful themes being found during analysis. 
Therefore, careful consideration is applied in delineating the boundaries of the sample universe 
to be coherent both with the theoretical aspects of the research aim, but also the practical 
limitations of finite resources. In the final stages of the research process, a meta-synthesis of 
the analytical memos, particularly for this purpose, will ultimately define the sample universe 
used in the study.  
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As previously discussed, this study will apply a purposive sampling strategy informed by 
the early literature review. It is not impossible that even the initial sample selection will change 
as a result of constant comparison and theoretical sampling, but it is not likely. There are three 
fundamental guidelines to the selection of the initial sample for this study. The first is that, 
since a rather small number of participants are to be studied intensively, it is important to 
carefully and purposefully choose those participants. Each choice should be informed, 
reflexively analysed, described and justified in a documented analytical memo. This point is 
emphasised by Cleary et al. (2014), to not only justify the sample size but also the sample 
content, i.e. the participants on the grounds of quality data - something that will be clearly 
reflected in the presentation of the study’s findings. Secondly, participant selection must be 
congruent with the conceptual framework of the research as a whole, such that participants 
are likely to generate rich and focused information on the research topic. This is largely 
facilitated by the early literature review, aligning participant selection with the emerging themes 
and allowing the researcher to provide a convincing account of the phenomenon studied.  
The search for participants in the research is also question of access. It may very well be 
that a suitable participant is identified but declines or is unable to participate. Because the 
emphasis was on quality rather than quantity, the objective is not to maximise participant 
numbers but rather for the research to become ‘saturated’ with information on the topic 
(Bowen, 2008). Thus, the research focuses on participants that are considered to be key 
informants. As Payne and Payne (2004) describe it:; key informants are those whose social 
positions in a research setting give them specialist knowledge about other people, processes 
or happenings that is more extensive, detailed or privileged than ordinary people; and who are 
therefore particularly valuable sources of information to a researcher, not least in the early 
stages of a project. 
Interview design, structure and execution 
Interviewing has long been a useful data-gathering method in various types of qualitative 
research. Intensive interviewing permits an in-depth exploration of a particular topic or 
experience and thus, is a useful method for interpretative inquiry. The in depth nature of an 
intensive interview fosters eliciting each participant’s interpretation of his or her experience. 
(Charmaz, 2006). Interviewing is a flexible, emergent technique where ideas and issues emerge 
during the interview and the interviewer can immediately pursue these leads. Also, greater 
reliability can be placed on the data gathered in an interview over self-completion questions in 
a survey (Allan, 2003). The interview strategy proposed is designed to help the researcher go 
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beyond common-sense tales and subsequent obviously, low-level categories that add little or 
nothing new. The goal is not to draw out facts about corruption but rather focus on the 
participant’s behaviour, beliefs and attitudes, i.e. their perception of the phenomenon.  
Interviewing fits grounded theory methods particularly well. Both grounded theory 
methods and intensive interviewing are open-ended yet direct, shaped yet emergent, and 
paced yet unrestricted. Mainly the format of the interviews will draw upon the Charmaz’, 
outline of how interview questions in a grounded theory study may be framed and ordered. 
This process includes setting the tone, seeking information in depth, feeling and reflection, 
searching for the narrative and ending on a positive note (Charmaz, 1994).The main rationale 
for using intensive interviews as outlined by Charmaz is that it allows the research participants 
to tell their stories and given them a coherent frame. It also allows them to reflect on earlier 
events and choose what to tell and how to tell it. The participants do not only share significant 
experience but also teach the interviewer how to interpret them. Perhaps most importantly to 
this research, is that they are allowed to be experts and express thoughts and feelings 
disallowed in other settings (Charmaz, 2006).  
Chenitz & Swanson (1986) examine two approaches to interviewing in grounded 
theory: the formal and the informal qualitative interview. In considering the formal interview 
two types are noted: structured and unstructured. Where the latter is seen as most 
commonly utilised in the collection of qualitative data and therefore considered as the formal 
interview of grounded theory. The informal interview is likened to an everyday conversation 
for the purpose of both collecting and validating data. These are unplanned encounters in a 
field, important to the area of inquiry. However, unlike an ordinary conversation, an 
interviewer can shift the conversation and follow hunches (Charmaz, 2006). Consequently, an 
interview, albeit informal, can go beneath the surface of an ordinary conversation. Another 
possible benefit of the informal interview is that in a formal interview professionals may recite 
public relations rhetoric rather than reveal personal views, much less a full account of their 
experiences: this arguably happens less in an informal setting conditioned by mutual trust 
(Charmaz, 2006). Thus both types will be used and as May (1991) indicates, more than one 
style of interviewing can be employed in a research study. Further, both the formal and 
informal interview constitute the approach taken at appropriate stages of theoretical sampling 
in the research process.  
Nevertheless, there has to be some agenda for research as time and resource 
constraints prohibits unfocused investigation. Therefore, the scope of the research has been 
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narrowed to a focal point where interviews can be focused by open stimuli, which are open-
ended questions within a defined confine. The predicate of open-ended questions, however, is 
not axiomatic but rather an initial entry point for the development of a more discursive style 
of interviewing. This interviewing style is suitable when having participants that are professional, 
articulate, and will defend their views as well as making their experience understood (Furniss 
et al., 2011). Naturally some interviews will be more open than others due to confidentiality 
issues, familiarity with the researcher and the way that different personalities interact. It is, 
however, quite clear that the participants in this research will be fairly well educated, 
opinionated and confident, all factors favouring a more discursive style of interviewing.  
”…an interview should not be conducted using a prescribed formal schedule of questions. This would 
defeat the objective, which is to attain first hand information from the point of view of the informant. 
Nonetheless, this is easier in theory than in practice. Informants usually want some guidance about the nature 
of the research and what information is sought. Totally unstructured interviews therefore cause confusion, 
incoherence, and result in meaningless data. Structured interviews, on the other hand, may be merely an 
extension of the researcher's expectations. The art lies therefore in finding a balance which allows the 
informant to feel comfortable enough to expand on their experiences, without telling them what to say.” 
(Goulding, 1999, p. 8) 
The interviews seek to elicit the genuine views and feelings of respondents. This may, 
however, be difficult to achieve if the process has a predetermined structure. With this said 
the interviews, particularly the formal ones do have an overarching structure. The interviews 
are structured according to a three-stage process, which begins by establishing the context of 
the interviewee’s experience, through to a construction of the experience and finally a 
reflection on the meaning it holds. Such an interview may be seen as formal. However, the 
progression of the interview will still be influenced by the nature of the relationship/interaction 
that occurs. This strategy, coupled with the possible need for flexibility with respect to 
interviewing as the research progresses, means that it is hard to outline a typical pattern for 
the interview process (Wimpenny & Gass, 2000). Therefore, on one hand, submitting a 
detailed description of the interview is inconsistent with the emergent nature of qualitative 
research in general and grounded theory in particular. On the other hand, given that an 
interview should not be conducted using a prescribed formal schedule of questions, as this 
would defeat the objective which is to attain first-hand information from the point of view of 
the informant. This, however, is easier in theory than in practice. Informants usually want some 
guidance about the nature of the research and what information is sought. Totally 
unstructured interviews therefore cause confusion, incoherence, and result in meaningless 
data. Structured interviews, on the other hand, may be merely an extension of the 
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researcher's expectations. The art lies therefore in finding a balance which allows the 
informant to feel comfortable enough to expand on their experiences, without telling them 
what to say (Goulding, 1999).  
Charmaz (2006) suggests that for a Grounded Theory study, a few broad, open-ended 
questions be devised. Interview questions should then be focused to invite detailed discussion 
of topic. Neutral questions do not necessarily mean a neutral interview. The sample questions 
below are proposed to outline the intrinsic nature of the interviews: adequately illustrating that 
the intention is that no harm will befall the participants. Still, questions are open enough to 
allow unanticipated material to emerge during the interview. Shortcomings in interviewing 
techniques can be refined and as for bias, a working awareness of bias is imperative in all 
interview-based research. Checking the recordings for context and content accuracy, possibly 
even before any coding begins, facilitates such awareness. 
Given the open structure of the interviews, all interviews are recorded, as the otherwise 
copious note taking might inhibit the flow of the interview (Payne & Payne, 2004). Glaser 
(1978, 1998) argues taking notes enables the researcher to record the essentials without 
becoming lost in details. Notwithstanding, as Charmaz (2014) points out, such notes can miss 
many situational details as well as the construction of the interview. The recordings also serve 
as a source for reflection on which questions worked and which did not, for the novice 
grounded theorist this is a very useful lesson. Nevertheless, heed is taken to Glaser’s caution 
and the researcher must be vigilant, avoiding forcing interview data into preconceived 
categories. There are, however, other benefits to record the interviews such as that when 
analysed, special attention can be directed to find questions that did not work as intended as 
well as data possibly being forced. Recording also lends attention to the participant’s language, 
allowing for questions in subsequent interviews to bridge their experience with the research 
questions. This is to learn about the participant’s meaning of words rather than making 
assumptions about what they mean. It is safe to assume that the research participants will not 
always describe themselves, their actions and situations in the same way as the researcher. 
Instead, recording permits the interview participants’ terms to be used and explored to elicit 
meaning. It is noted that lack of rigour due to careless interview techniques and the 
introduction of bias are common pitfalls to the validity of qualitative research. Both issues can 
be mitigated by careful and purposeful analysis of the recordings.  
This strategy, coupled with the possible need for flexibility with respect to interviewing 
as the research progresses, means that it is hard to outline a typical pattern for the interview in 
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qualitative research (Wimpenny & Gass, 2000). Nevertheless, each interview will be prepared 
with an interview guide with well-planned open-ended questions and ready probes 
conditioned by the emerging theory. As the research progresses, and the focus of the 
interviews increases by engaging in theoretical sampling, the researcher may assume a more 
active role in the interviews and ask more direct questions than in earlier interviews (Charmaz, 
2014). It is recognised that using an overly direct line of questioning with Grounded Theory 
objectives of studying process and of developing theoretical analysis raises a potential dilemma. 
The researcher concentrating on the emerging theory may not give sufficient concern for how 
this investigation affects the research participants. In this case, the problem is partly bridged by 
the collaborative elements of the constructivist position, fostering a more egalitarian exchange. 
That said, particularly regarding the possible discovery or probing of sensitive information, the 
researcher always strives to strike a balance between the participant’s comfort level and 
obtaining informative data. All interviews are also intended to always end on a positive note, 
and not abruptly - allowing the participants to feel that there is time to express and possibly 
even discuss any concerns.  
Theory integration 
When developing a theory that is grounded in the data, Goulding (1999) argues that 
there are three basic stages that need to be addressed. The first deals with the collection and 
interpretation of data and is primarily concerned with demonstrating how, why and from 
where early concepts and categories were derived. In accordance with one of the fundamental 
principles of the grounded theory method the use of memos through the research process 
allows any theory to be traceable back to the data. As analysis proceeds there will be specific 
memos particularly addressing the relationship between concepts, categories and the data. 
The second stage is the process of abstraction of the concepts in a search for theoretical 
meaning. This is the stage where the concepts are sufficiently developed- even in a purely 
Glaserian version of Grounded Theory - to warrant re-evaluation in conjunction with extant 
literature. The third and final stage should present the theory, uniting the concepts and 
integrating them into one, or a few, core categories, which have explanatory power within the 
specific context of the research. In addition to memos diagrams and other visual aids are used 
to illustrate the emergence of theory, and to point to critical junctures and breakthroughs in 
terms of theoretical insights, thus carefully documenting all stages of the process.  
Many Grounded Theorists are often deservedly criticised for moving too quickly from 
the specific study to a general level (Charmaz, 2008). This is an important point to bear in 
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mind when striving for theory integration. Any qualitative study without extensive data can 
make only limited claims. The small interview sample of this particular research precludes the 
making of too general claims. The idea is for the generality of the claims to be proportionate 
to the data in terms of sample size, thoroughness of collection, depth of analysis and 
consideration to time variables. Data analysis is like a discussion between the actual data, the 
created theory, the memos and the researcher (Backman & Kyngäs, 1999). As for the coding 
part, the data analysis is software supported insofar as it is organised, structured and visualised 
in NVivo., However, all actual analysis is made by the researcher and none of the query 
functions within the software is used to elicit meaning or generate Theory. The use of 
computers for data analysis in Grounded Theory studies can result in flat and oversimplified 
descriptive results (Becker, 1993). The possible role of computer assisted Grounded Theory 
analysis is nonetheless discussed in the final chapter of this thesis.  
The process of theory integration for this research is guided by four theoretical 
concerns; theoretical plausibility, direction, centrality, and adequacy. These concerns should be 
seen as overarching the interviewing process as an aid to abstract and construct theory. 
Theoretical plausibility is a construct closely related but not identical to the concept of 
accuracy in qualitative research. A quest for accurate statement is naturally merited, but only 
when the study indicates its necessity. This methodology, however, generally attends more to 
whether interview statements are theoretically plausible than to whether the research 
participants have constructed them with unassailable accuracy. Theoretical direction is the 
patterns that begin to emerge and shape the research as the interviews are conducted and 
analysed. These patterns inform the researcher as to what the study aims to accomplish in 
subsequent interviews and prompts thinking about how to accomplish those aims. Thus, the 
shape of data collection, and interviews evolve with the study.  Theoretical centrality relates to 
those ideas and areas of inquiry that merit pursuit through the research. Certain less 
compelling lines of inquiry may be dropped in favour of nascent analytical constructs showing 
more promise and theoretical relevance to the emerging theory. Theoretical adequacy is 
where the content of later interviews includes questions that get at the core of the emerging 
categories. In many ways this resembles theoretical sampling making the theoretical categories 
robust, perhaps even drawing out the core category or categories. As Charmaz (2014, pp. 87-
89) points out these four theoretical concerns are not delineated and expressed as a set of 
external criteria, but rather to offer a language for developing theory and drawing attention to 
the significance of reflexive and theoretical thinking.  
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From a constructivist perspective member checking or respondent validation is perhaps 
the most developed form of assessment as this enables the participants to check the rendering 
of data (Furniss et al., 2011). The investigator-as-expert relationship is reversed when the 
interpretation is presented to the participants. Inviting the participants to assess whether the 
analysis is an accurate representation of their accounts helps establish credibility. This is done 
before the interpretation is abstracted to a conceptual level and therefore becomes less 
meaningful to the individual. Ultimately, when using the grounded theory method, the 
researcher has an obligation to ‘abstract’ the data and to think ‘theoretically’ rather than 
descriptively (Goulding, 1999). This external validation of the output is especially particularly 
important as some of the analytical process is hidden within the complex and creative thought 
process of the researcher. Although captured to some, hopefully large, extent by the analytical 
and reflexive memos, the mechanics linking data to ideas transforming into theory may be 
hard to describe and thus hard to inspect.  
 
Page 118 of 278 
2.6   Method appropriateness 
”Grounded theory will not appeal to the researcher in search of absolute 
certainties, neatly defined categories and objectively measured explanations. Its appeal is 
more to those whose view of behaviour allows for process, change and ambiguities, and 
to those who hold a desire to explore meaning and experience and are willing to engage 
in a sometimes eclectic manner with complementary theories which often fall outside of 
the immediate field of study.” (Goulding, 1999, p. 19) 
There are several reasons for Grounded Theory to be the method of choice for this 
research where the main argument undoubtedly is the stark qualitative contrast against the 
already existing quantitative data. The clearly stated ambition is to discover an answer that 
goes beyond the descriptive question of what is going on to a higher level of abstraction 
answering the how and why. Outcomes from description and discovery differ, where the 
former is a narrative report of pertinent categories and sometimes their interlinkage. In the 
latter, however, a conceptualisation of tentative relationships among variables is constructed, 
and a core category that accounts for a major portion of the variation is identified (Becker, 
1993).  
Often Grounded Theory is recommended when little is known about a research 
phenomenon, but the approach may also be used when there is some knowledge about the 
research phenomenon but a new point of view is sought (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). This 
research aims to offer exactly such a new point of view, a new point of reference when 
dealing with the perception of corruption. Grounded Theory allows new theories to emerge 
from data through an inductive process. One problem associated with induction is the role of 
the researcher, especially if taking a purely positivist standpoint where the data should speak 
solely for itself. However, as critics of positivism have argued convincingly (Willig, 2013), all 
observations are made from a certain perspective and many of the truths we cling to depend 
greatly on our own point of view. 
”Even if we accept the (doubtful) proposition that categories are discovered, what 
we discover will depend in some degree on what we are looking for - just as Columbus 
could hardly have ’discovered’ America if he had not been looking for the ’Indies’ in the 
first place.” (Dey, 1999, p. 104) 
Grounded Theory is based on the belief that, as individuals within groups comprehend 
events from a personal perspective, common patterns of behaviour can be discovered (Glaser, 
1998). The methodology has the potential to explain what is actually happening in practical 
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life, rather than describing what should have been going on (McCallin, 2003). Thus, facilitating 
the move from description of what is happening to an understanding of the process by which 
it is happening (Strauss & Corbin, 1998; Corbin & Strauss, 2008). 
In terms of the methodology presented, a key tenet is that categories do not emerge 
from the data because they did not exist before the analysis but rather are constructed by the 
researcher interacting with the data during the research process. In other words, the research 
aims to explain constructs of social reality not in absolute terms but as inevitably shaped by 
the researcher’s knowledge, assumptions and expectations. This does not make the theory any 
less relevant as the researcher, by reflexivity, is as grounded in the data as the theory itself. 
Consequently, the methodology is appropriate for investigations of an uncharted area or to 
gain a fresh perspective on a familiar situation (Stern, 1995). 
Context and process 
As stated, this research is partly designed around the work of Corbin and Strauss, with 
one rationale being their view on context and process. Context is defined as the structural 
conditions that shape the nature of problems to which interactive responses are made. The 
flow of such interaction is referred to as process. It is assumed that interactions have an 
intrinsic sense of purpose and continuity. Context and process are related because 
interactions are made in response to an incident. This definition translates perfectly to the 
phenomenon at hand, the perception of corruption. When analysing data for process, there is, 
however, is an important distinction to be made between a phenomenon and a process. A 
phenomenon is the more or less abstract major idea or goal whereas the process is the way 
of getting there. In an example given by Corbin and Strauss (2008) involving Vietnam veterans, 
‘survival’ is described as a ‘phenomenon’ and ‘process’ as the strategies attempted to handle 
the problems standing in the way of survival. Both context and process are perception 
dependent and will vary accordingly, but this will be addressed more explicitly at a later stage. 
That is why one sees so much variation in interaction in similar situations: the definition and 
meaning of a problem will vary. Consequently, if more than one person representative of a 
certain perception is acting together to manage a problem, the interactions must be aligned, or 
the flow and continuity will be disrupted. 
To establish and identify relationships between context and process, one must first 
create an overarching framework that structures the research approach. This is often referred 
to as the research paradigm. A paradigm is a particular perspective, a set of questions to guide 
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the researcher to a level of abstraction from which data can be scientifically analysed. Corbin 
and Strauss (2008) explain the basic components of a paradigm with three postulates. Firstly, 
there are conditions. These allow a conceptual way of processing data in relation to the basic 
information-gathering questions about who, what, where, when, why, and how, revealing the 
conditions specific to the data. Secondly, there are interactions. These are the meetings 
between individuals or groups and the world, be it situations, problems, happenings, incidents 
or events. Thirdly, there are consequences. These are the outcomes of those meetings and 
answer questions about the result of interactions and emotional responses. Consequently, 
context does not determine experience nor set the course of action, but it does identify the 
set of conditions in which meetings arise, the following interaction and finally the 
consequences that in turn might go back to impact the conditions. The continual flow of 
interaction and emotion – ‘process’ - can now be analysed and explained using Grounded 
Theory methods. However, those methods themselves are grounded within the philosophical 
aspects of the paradigm and a solid understanding of the philosophical nucleus is indispensable. 
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 2.7   Chapter two summary 
For a structured approach to research with a certainty of process and enough flexibility 
to let the research phenomenon speak for itself, the method used is a modified Grounded 
Theory. Since the aim is to explain the phenomenon of perception of corruption, the chosen 
method is a suitable choice because of the unique nature of Grounded Theory methods. 
Somewhat unusual for a Grounded Theory study, the position taken in this research suggests 
that a controlled preliminary literature review can be beneficial, promoting an early 
enhancement of theoretical sensitivity rather than researcher bias. 
The paradigm of this research is ontologically relativistic and epistemologically 
constructivist. The research is ontologically relativistic in so far as it claims reality and truth to 
be understood ”as relative to a specific conceptual scheme, theoretical framework, paradigm, 
form of life, society or culture. . . there is a non-reducible plurality of such conceptual 
schemes” (Bernstein 1983). Added, the common denominator and core of constructivist 
theory is that knowledge is not found, it is constructed. 
Epistemologically constructivism emphasises the subjective interrelationship between 
researcher and that which is researched, usually human participants, and the co-construction 
of meaning. The logic of such subjective co-construction is internal and cannot be 
constructively judged on external epistemological grounds. This position does not, however, 
argue for a state of intellectual anarchy in which anything is deemed valid. Nevertheless, this 
research is regarded as only being epistemologically accountable to its own rules of structure 
and logic. 
The theory developed within this paradigm is aimed to have an explanatory power with 
a high level of abstraction. A theory, in the context of this research, provides the best 
comprehensive, coherent and simplest model for linking diverse and unrelated facts in a useful 
and pragmatic way. Thus, as a Grounded Theory researcher the endeavour is oriented to 
discover the basic social processes and the interactive layers of context that people use to 
deal with situations in which they find themselves and that are not necessarily understood by 
them at the conscious level. Grounded theory provides explicit tools for studying processes 
while promoting openness to all possible theoretical understandings. It fosters developing 
tentative interpretations about the data through coding and categorising, as well as building 
systematic checks and refinements of the researcher’s major theoretical categories. This makes 
Grounded Theory an almost perfect fit for the purposes of this research. Even so, the 
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methods used both for data collection and analysis have been somewhat modified to suit the 
practicalities dictated by the research as well as the philosophical orientation of the researcher. 
Grounded Theory is the practice of identifying, refining and integrating categories of 
meaning stemming from data. It provides an explanatory framework - a theory - through 
which to understand the phenomenon under investigation. The process of developing 
categories and ultimately theory is facilitated by a number of key strategies or perhaps more 
appropriately, analytical constructs. These are the writing of reflexive memos, theoretical 
sampling, constant comparative analysis, coding for an increasing level of abstraction, data 
saturation, and the treatment of literature. The dictum of not reading literature in the 
substantive area until the final stages of analysis, as advised by Glaserian Grounded Theory, is 
problematic. Each researcher must make an informed and justifiable decision not only 
regarding when extant literature will be employed in a Grounded Theory study but also how. 
Three building blocks are used in this work to create a bridge over the literature review divide 
in Grounded Theory. The first building block is reflexivity, - an integral part of any Grounded 
Theory study and particularly those from a constructivist perspective., In this work reflexivity is 
meticulously applied to maintain scientific rigour. The second building block is memos, also 
already one of the most important features when conducting a scientifically sound Grounded 
Theory study. Thus, the two first building blocks are just adaptations of already existing tools 
within Grounded Theory. The third building block is somewhat novel, introducing an 
additional tool to the Grounded Theory researcher in the form of the structured resource 
selection system. 
When selecting documents, the four quality control criteria developed by Scott (1990) 
are used, intended as reference points for the reflective process. The criteria are: authenticity, 
credibility, representativeness and meaning. This particular version of Grounded Theory is 
called GT+ with the ’+’ indicating the addition of not only an early literature review as 
previously formulated, but also a method of continuously treating and integrating extant 
literature. As the Grounded Theory approach to research will undoubtedly continue to 
evolve, it is important to maintain a close eye on that evolution for it may go so far as to 
develop an entirely new species of Grounded Theory application. The treatment of literature 
as proposed by this study does not constitute such a transgression of the boundaries of the 
contemporary methodology that is Grounded Theory. Maintaining the inductive and deductive 
interplay entered around the data, the analysis still claims to be grounded, as the defining 
feature is that the Theory emerges inductively. For many, if not most, Grounded Theory 
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researchers an initial theoretical sensitivity is inevitable regardless of if an early literature review 
has been conducted. It is therefore important to recognise, despite the controversy 
surrounding the place of the literature review, that the debate really concerns the need to stay 
open minded 
The inception of GT+, as with Informed Grounded Theory, springs from the 
epistemology and the intrinsic nature of the view of the researcher’s position, and is in many 
ways an elaboration of a, constructivist Grounded Theory. There are, however, several traits 
consistent with other versions of Grounded Theory and in other ways GT+ stays close to the 
classic version. The position of GT+ can be illustrated from the perspective of the currently 
three main versions of Grounded Theory. First the classical Glaserian version which represents 
the fundamental idea of theory generated from and grounded in data. Secondly Strauss and 
Corbin's more structured and systematic approach, which presents a set of procedures for 
undertaking Grounded Theory. These are designed not to be followed dogmatically but rather 
to be used creatively and flexibly by researchers as they deem appropriate (Strauss and 
Corbin 1998). The procedures in many ways make the approach more accessible but also run 
the risk of being too stringent and forcing data. Thirdly, the flexible constructivist approach of 
Charmaz (2006) with its epistemological foundation very close to that of GT+, emphasises 
researcher interaction with data. 
Although being highly conditioned by its philosophical nucleus, it is the intention of GT+, 
even if largely stripped from its epistemological shroud, to deliver a flexible strategy for sound 
research practice that can be used to produce useful and innovative analyses. While effectively 
mixing three strands of Grounded Theory methodology, it is done with acknowledgement, so 
as to avoid contaminating the methodology (see Wimpenny and Gass 2000). Rather the 
somewhat similar methodologies are explained, and parts selected and combined explicitly, 
avoiding method slurring (Baker and Edwards 2012). The qualitative nature of the paradigm in 
GT+ focuses on the search for meaning and understanding to build innovative theory and not 
universal laws. It is important to recognise that enquiry is always context-bound, and facts 
should be viewed as both theory-laden and value-laden. Therefore, the focus becomes one of 
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3.   FINDINGS 
This chapter will present the findings of the research in the form of a substantive (and 
perhaps also somewhat tentative) theory. The theory is appropriately named the Self-interest 
Utility Maximisation theory or SUM-theory for short. Key concepts pertaining to the theory 
are presented as a foundation, building up to the theory itself. It is by fusing these existing 
concepts and theories with the discoveries made in this research that the SUM-theory is born. 
Thus, it is possible to argue that in and by itself it is not a new theory but rather an extension 
of previous thinking from a different perspective. In any case, this stretch of the imagination 
based on the findings in this research is a contribution to knowledge and subsequently of value 
in the fight against corruption. 
The chapter will begin by building an argument based upon the research process 
covering the various steps that the resulting theory came to rest upon. This does not mean 
that this was the order in which they were initially conceived in the research process. The 
truth is quite the opposite, where the emerging theory took several turns until it settled 
around the core category and came into a more tangible form. This awkward journey, 
however, is for the author to bear alone and now having reached what seems to be a final 
destination, the reader is presented with a much more manageable map to follow. As 
discussed in the introduction, the map should not be mistaken for the territory. What is 
presented next should be viewed exactly like a map, a necessary simplification of reality that 
allows us to see where we are and understand how the choosing different routes will lead to 
different places.  
”Explicit or implicit theories are needed to: one, order and generalize about 
reality; two, understand causal relationships among phenomena; three, anticipate 
and predict future developments; four, distinguish what is important from what is 
unimportant; and five, show what paths that should be taken to achieve certain 
goals” (Huntington, 1997, p. 30). 
The final sections of this chapter will satisfy the curious minds of those more 
methodologically inclined with a detailed account of how the core category emerged from the 
data using Grounded Theory+. This is where the codes from the interviews converge. The 
reason why codes and categories are scarcely discussed throughout the thesis is a natural by-
product of the methodology. Thus, this section should be taken for what it is and one of the 
downsides of the methodology, as discussed in more detail later, proved to be the difficulty to 
effectively explain every single developmental step of the theory in the research process. Even 
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so, an attempt is made, and the reader intellectually strengthened by the preceding sections 
should be able to follow the development of the core category. It will also produce an 
exploration of some of the findings on the fringes of the study that, if corroborated by further 
research, would pin-point the theory in terms of where it resides in decision-making.  Also, 
and perhaps, more importantly it gives a snapshot of Grounded Theory+ at work and an idea 
of how the methodology was applied. Even in the hands of an early career researcher, it 
makes for a powerful tool.  
The first part of this chapter covers the analytical prerequisites for any highly theoretical 
discussion around behaviour and decision-making, consisting of a contextual outline of free 
will, self-interest and human nature. The chapter then moves on to the theoretical 
underpinnings more specific for the theory to come, which manifested itself around three 
other theories: rational choice, routine activities, and situational factors. From there it is 
necessary to reconcile some of the fundamental concepts of the theory namely motivation 
and self-interest. These concepts themselves are subject to scrutiny, debate and, by some, 
even rejection. That they are used as cornerstones for this research invites the sceptic to 
question the very fundamentals of the theory. Thus, an in-depth manifestation of 
interpretation and application is provided as justification. That in turn, provides the backdrop 
for the next section in which the general theory behind the specific theory developed by this 
research is developed. The concept of bounded rationality is outlined in order to explain 
some core propositions that are based in evolutionary biology. Returning to its criminological 
roots, the chapter then turns to two other concepts that probably are familiar to most 
criminologists. The concepts of rationalisation and neutralisation are discussed in the light of 
the theory. The chapter then concludes with sections discussing the core category, how it was 
developed and how the theory is influenced by findings on the fringe. The chapter ends with a 
short discussion around the implications of the theory, a discussion that is furthered in the 
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3.1   Analytical prerequisites 
“No man is just of his own free will, but only under compulsion, and no man 
thinks justice pays him personally, since he will always do wrong when he gets the 
chance” (Plato, 2007, p. 43). 
The quote above is uttered by Adeimantus in Plato’s ’The Republic’ and similarly, the 
core concept that came from the research is that everyone has the potential to be corrupt. 
Intrinsic to human nature there is a fundamental drive for self-preservation that sometimes 
takes the shape of self-optimisation by acts deemed as corrupt. This analysis will not address 
the normative aspects of corruption but rather acknowledge that in the pursuit of certain 
goals, agents are motivated -through more or less rational deliberation - to behave in ways 
that are corrupt. It can be useful to reiterate the working definition of corruption used for this 
analysis:  
”Corruption is an improbity or decay in the decision-making process in which 
a decision-maker (in a private corporation or in a public service) consents or 
demands to deviate from the criterion, which should rule his decision making, in 
exchange for a reward, the promise or expectation of it.” (Duyne, 2001, p. 3)  
The decision-making process as interpreted in this research, however, is based on two 
fundamental tenets. Firstly, agents have a free will or at least believe they do; and secondly, 
that there is a self-interested element involved in individual behaviour. Both assumptions 
deserve further justification despite the limitation of space and words.  
Free will 
About 150 years ago, Charles Darwin published On the Origins of Species (Darwin, 
1859) and set in motion an intellectual revolution., It did not take long before others began 
drawing upon its implications. One of those was Darwin's cousin, Sir Francis Galton who 
argued that, if humans have evolved then mental faculties like intelligence (and subsequently 
decision-making faculties) must be hereditary (Galton, 1869). The ’nature versus nurture’ term 
was coined, and a debate started that would ensue until the present day, splitting 
philosophers, scientists and theologists into at least two schools of thought. The question is 
important, because after all, morals are fundamentally based on the assumption that actions 
are subject to a decision-making process and that agents can freely choose between 
(subjective) right and wrong. The philosopher Immanuel Kant reaffirmed this connection 
between freedom of choice and goodness arguing that without free will it would make no 
 
Page 127 of 278 
sense to say that an agent ought to choose the path of righteousness (Scruton, 2001). 
Consequently, evidence has accrued for both sides and setting aside fatalism, an intellectual 
fallacy not developed further here, the only thing tying them together is an assumption that 
actions must be determined by something.  
The concept of free will in this research was something that did not appear from the 
very beginning. At least it was not identified or coded as ‘free will’ until the later stages. 
Somewhere in the axial and coding interplay, a picture started to emerge and once it did, 
several codes and categories just made more sense. Low level codes, like ”self-censorship” and 
”the will to be corrupt” became interconnected to codes belonging to a higher level of 
abstraction such as ”fear” and ”stigma”. There was already a code for ”decision-making”. The 
process can be described something like this: if there is a will to be corrupt then an agent may 
abstain from deviancy as the result of the fear of stigma through some sort of self-censorship. 
The choice for self-censorship may have a number of precipitators but it is nonetheless taken 
out of free-will.  
In contrast some argue that it has already been proven that there is no such thing as 
free will often referring to the Libet-experiment (Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983). The 
experiment concluded that the onset of cerebral activity clearly preceded by at least several 
hundred milliseconds the reported time of conscious intention to act. Thus, the conscious 
experience of actually deciding to act associated with free will appeared as retrospective 
reconstruction of events occurring after the brain has already set the act in motion. 
Nevertheless, for the confines of this research, both philosophically and practically, it does not 
actually matter if agents truly possess free will or not, as long as they act as if they do. As 
research by Vohs and Schooler (2008) on how moral behaviour draws on a belief in free will, 
it seems that belief in free will corresponds to an agent’s subjective perception of 
accountability for actions.  The list goes on: believing that free will is an illusion has been 
shown to make people less creative, more likely to conform, less willing to learn from their 
mistakes, and less grateful toward one another (Baumeister, 2008). In every regard, it seems, 
when we embrace determinism, we indulge our dark side, making it even more important in a 
corruption context. Even if the deterministic side ends up being scientifically or philosophically 
proven to be the ’be all and end all’ of the free will discussion, it may still be, as argued by 
Waller (1990), that free will and determinism are not opposites but rather describe behaviour 
at different levels. For the premise of the arguments presented here and to quote one of the 
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greatest thinkers of our time, the late Christopher Hitchens (2012), on belief in free will; ”I 
have free will; I have no choice but to have it”. 
Self-interest - part one 
The second assumption, that there is a self-interested element involved in individual 
behaviour, is an equally complex question particularly from a rational choice perspective. 
Taking a rational choice approach, the self-interest assumption is often a target of criticism and 
perhaps sometimes rightly so. It is thus important to clearly state what such an assumption 
entails and what it excludes. Most importantly, it does not say anything about motivation, only 
the structure of preferences. Consequently, this thesis will address the two concepts of 
motivation and rationality separately and independently before tying them both back together. 
The assumption here is one of instrumental rationality combined with calculative and strategic 
decision-making; where the extent of the latter two is a matter of degree ranging from fast 
and frugal heuristics (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999) to carefully 
weighing considerations (Bennis, Medin, & Bartels, 2010). 
Being self-interested agents with free will the question is; what are those interests and 
how is free will exercised in terms of achieving them? Within the confines of this research - to 
the (shifting) borders of the EU - the answer can be summed up in a self-interest based 
theory. Fundamentally, such a theory would be less concerned about the sources of 
motivation and more about the existence of motivation, and what causes readiness to commit 
a crime. Nonetheless, in true grounded theory tradition and to further ground the theory, an 
argument for how agents try to achieve that which is perceived as valuable (i.e. not only to 
value that which they happen to want) is presented.  
It is argued that stemming from the evolutionary pursuit of survival and reproduction, 
two primary facilitators to those ends in modern day Europe are often power and wealth. 
Striving for power and wealth does naturally not necessarily mean that an agent will act 
corruptly. The meaning of an agent maximising the utility of self-interest does, however, 
encompass a certain measure of rationality when weighing the benefits and costs of future 
actions before deciding on behaviour. Thus, knowingly or unknowingly, legally or illegally, 
morally or immorally, the behavioural traits are such that maximising utility in terms of 
resources, tangible and intangible, be it for the survival and reproduction or one of many 
intermediates, may involve decisions resulting in corrupt behaviour. This conclusion does not 
just make sense intuitively but is also supported by research. Extensive analyses of interviews 
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with key informants all over Europe point in the same direction. Every single one, without 
exception.  
One may question the significance of the opinions and thoughts of key informants, the 
so-called experts, recalling the extensive study by Tetlock (2006) on expert predictions. While 
clearly illustrating both the conceptual and practical limits of expert opinion and appealing to 
the development of standards for judging expert decision-making, no such standard has yet 
been adopted in the anti-corruption policy arena. European policy is still mainly the concern of 
think-tanks, policy analysts, political advisors and the like. This thesis does not intend to either 
evaluate or critique the qualities of that state but does acknowledge its existence as a 
justification to focus on the theoretical constructs that arose from the interviews with said 
experts.  
A prominent concern for the future of anti-corruption policy and subsequent 
instruments is the intrinsic nature of the behaviour causing acts of corruption. This is clearly 
illustrated by more and more codes falling into the category of ”corruption available to all”. 
More specifically, the source of motivation residing within individuals is apparently constant, 
resting latent awaiting the right triggers to drive urges of immorality to the surface. With 
everyone potentially corrupt, the amount, level, and complexity of control mechanisms 
designed to repress these urges increases. There is, however, another side to the repressive 
coin which is expressed as ‘prevention’. Some would even argue that prevention is more 
effective than repression: but the trick is naturally knowing how to prevent with equal or 
greater efficiency. If the conclusion that from a certain point of view motivation for corrupt 
behaviour is a constant grounded in human nature, then it would suggest something about 
how anti-corruption policy makers may capitalise on that fact.  
Human nature contextualised  
When the end-game is a theory on deviant behaviour designed to reduce corruption 
and improve the world, it is important to establish an understanding of the concept of ”human 
nature”. This is particularly true since the previous discussion may be mistaken for taking a step 
back to some sort of neo-classical economic view that is considered to be outdated. It is 
nothing of the sort and some of the possible critiques must be addressed and central issues 
expanded and understood. Only then can the concept of self-interest as defined in this 
research make sense. 
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The concept of a basic human nature has a long history in the social sciences with many 
researchers attempting to resolve the issues surrounding it: Joseph Henrich, Robert 
Boyd, Samuel Bowles, Colin Camerer, Ernst Fehr, Herbert Gintis, and Peter Richerson, to 
name a few. To summarise, the simplistic idea of humans as ”homo economicus” has largely 
been refuted. The results from survey-based fieldwork, and clinical research speaks clearly 
against humans as solely a utility maximising rational agent. Self-interest is still an important 
factor when it comes to decision-making: but less important than has generally been portrayed 
in neoclassical economics. Yet, the theory of this research is built upon exactly this self-
interested and utility maximising agent. The rationale is simple - the self-interest utility 
maximisation factor is still strong enough to significantly influence peoples’ behaviour and thus 
potentially reduce corruption. This is undeniably partly an argument of convenience as 
otherwise there would be no remedy for corruption to be found in human nature and that 
does not rhyme well with the findings of this research.  
”If all agents acted according to the template prescribed in neoclassic 
economic theory, they would sooner or later outsmart themselves into a suboptimal 
equilibrium. This is a “social trap” type of situation, where all agents would be worse 
off because even if they know they would all gain from cooperation, lacking trust in 
the others’ cooperation, they would themselves abstain from cooperating.” 
(Rothstein, 2013, p. 1022) 
As per this research, human behaviour seems to a large extent to be determined by a 
forward-looking strategically thinking agent - an advanced version of homo economicus. That 
is, an agent thinking and behaving also in relation to what other agents are thinking or doing. 
Thus, instead of looking inwards, and erroneously backwards, to variations in behaviour caused 
by historically- or culturally-induced factors, the important thing is to observe and understand 
how an agent’s perceptions about ”other people” are constructed. This insight is reinforced by 
research showing that people update their perceptions based on new information (Boyd, 
Gintis, & Bowles, 2010). Research also shows that people are willing to engage in what may 
look like altruistic cooperation for common goals even if they do not personally benefit from 
this materially (Levi, 1997). Corruption, however, is about so much more than material benefit 
and the narrow scope of looking at, for example, monetary benefits, is not only myopic in an 
intellectual sense but also counterproductive from a practical anti-corruption perspective. 
Human nature as self-interest utility maximisation is about the actions that are perceived as 
being advantageous to an agent in relation to other agents. Personal material gain may not be 
in the interest of a particular agent when put in relation to the interests of other agents and/or 
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the common good. The point, however, is that the agent still acts according to what is 
perceived as most advantageous in terms of maximising the utility of their own self-interest. 
How an agent in isolation, i.e. not in relation to other agents would behave is considered a 
highly theoretical case as it rarely or never occurs in reality.   
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 3.2   Theoretical underpinnings 
"Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.” (Lord Acton, 
1887) 
 Having established that all are susceptible to corruption given the opportunity, the next 
step is to create a theoretical foundation for how this knowledge can be utilised in a 
constructive way for the development of an anti-corruption framework. Given the premises 
that motivation is latent, and that corruption is the product of a degenerated decision-making 
process, a suitable starting point in terms of criminological models is routine activity theory. 
Not only does routine activity theory assume motivation to be ever-present but also has its 
roots in rational choice theory, where the intricacies of decision-making are at the forefront. 
To fully appreciate how these previous models build towards the Self-interest Utility 
Maximisation [SUM] theory - the end product presented in this thesis - the model must be 
explained and contextualised.  
Rational choice 
To reiterate, traditionally routine activities theory does not explain why an offender is 
motivated to commit a crime instead assuming that in various ways motivation is ever-present 
(Clarke, 1983). To fully understand this concept, it can be useful to revisit its origins in rational 
choice theory. Originally developed by economists4, rational choice theory grew out of 
utilitarian philosophy and was later expanded into the social sciences and criminology (Cornish 
& Clarke, 1986, 2003). It provides a perspective on why individual offenders decide to commit 
specific crimes with rationality as a central premise of the theory. Thus, in terms of offending, 
whether or not it is done knowingly or unknowingly, rational choice theory posits that 
offenders weigh the associated potential benefits and consequences of an action and then 
make a rational choice based on this evaluation. It is not that rational choice theory is without 
critique (see e.g. McCumber, 2011), but as an abstract philosophical theory rational choice 
makes sense. In their work on the limitations of rational choice theory de Haan and Vos 
(2003) correctly point out that any endeavour to empirically test the rational choice theory 
itself is impossible. This is because rational choice theory is not actually a theory in a strict 
scientific sense but rather a heuristic model, which, by definition, cannot be refuted but only 
evaluated in terms of its usefulness. For this context that is enough, as rational choice theory 
                                               
4 Topically covered to great extent by Nobel laureate Kahneman (2011). 
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focuses on the latent motivation and opportunity structured by situational variables, leading to 
routine activities theory where motivation and choices merge with opportunity. 
Routine activities 
Routine activities theory derives from Hawley’s (1950) theory of human ecology where 
the key principles of collective human activities are identified. Later Cohen and Felson (1979) 
adapted these principles to introduce routine activities theory into the study of criminal 
behaviour. The theory presumes that some individuals will be motivated towards deviant 
behaviour and act on these motivations when an opportunity, perceived or real, is presented. 
Aligned with arguments presented later in this thesis, the dimension of motivation is expanded 
by Cornish and Clarke (2003) to be situationally dependent. Thus, motivation itself is a 
dynamic variable changing throughout the entire process of deviant behaviour. This includes 
the early precipitating stage where motivation may either decline in such a way that the 
offender is dissuaded, or conversely increase to the point where the offender is not only 
readied but also actively seeking and possibly even taking measures to create opportunity for 
deviant behaviour.  
Routine activities theory differs from other criminological theories that focus on the 
characteristics of the offender as it examines the situational context in which the deviant 
behaviour is perpetrated. Thus, it is a theory of place, where different social agents intersect in 
space and time. Specifically, it focuses on the intersections of motivated offenders, suitable 
targets, and the absence of capable guardians. It is important to note that routine activities 
theory offers suggestions about the probability of criminal behaviour rather than making 
definite claims about when crime will occur. The presence of a motivated offender, a suitable 
target, and a lack of guardianship do not mean that crime is inevitable. Instead, the theory 
argues that the likelihood of crime increases or decreases based on the existence of these 
three elements. 
Situational factors 
Prevention techniques are consequently either aimed at increasing the level of 
guardianship, decreasing the influence of motivation or controlling the number of suitable 
targets, i.e. reducing opportunities. Following the assumption that motivation, though variable, 
is constantly present, which for this context is axiomatic, the logical outcome is a crime 
prevention model that address the situational parameters rather than the offender’s 
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disposition. This position is fuelled by codes pointing towards corrupt agents perceiving 
themselves ”above the law” and thus rendering the judicial system weak and the potential for 
situational cues for behavioural change as the last line of defence. The fundamental idea of 
introducing situational factors for crime is not new as the concept and can be traced back to 
Sutherland (1949).,. However it was another four decades until Clarke (1983) thoroughly 
defined the theory of situational crime prevention, where the focus resides with the event of 
the crime rather than the perpetrator. Hence, once an offender is ready to commit an act of 
deviancy, in this case corruption, the actual process of actualisation is determined by 
instrumental considerations and opportunity alone. Conceptually, situational crime prevention 
does not address how ’readiness’ is achieved, maintained or reduced. Simply put, it presumes a 
motivated offender and concentrates on disrupting the subsequent decisions made in 
conjunction with the act of deviance itself (Cornish & Clarke, 2003).  
It is argued that acts of deviance referred to as corruption fit well into this category for 
at least three reasons: first, the notion of a presupposed and ever-present motivation, a 
concept whose characteristics will be further explored; second, the case for acts of corruption 
being viewed as instrumentally rational, at least from a subjective perspective; and third, the 
susceptibility for acts of corruption to be rationalised by neutralisation.  
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 3.3   Reconciliation of motivation and self-interest 
   ”A just system must generate its own support. This means that it must be 
arranged so as to bring about in its members, the corresponding sense of justice, an 
effective desire to act in accordance with its rules for reasons and justice. Thus, the 
requirements of stability and the criterion of discouraging desires that conflict with the 
principles of justice put further constraints on institutions. They must not only be just but 
framed so as to encourage the virtue of justice in those who take part in them.” (Rawls, 
2005, p. 261) 
The following section will move through the central structure for the argument of 
corruption as an opportunity-based crime. Firstly, motivation, although variable, is considered 
as an ever-present, highly susceptible factor for deviant behaviour. Secondly, the concept of 
rational choice which is a wide applied and sometimes misunderstood and therefore critiqued 
behavioural theory but where properly defined and contextualised lends validity to the SUM-
theory. Thirdly, bridging motivation and opportunity lies the concept of ‘rationalisation through 
neutralisation’. Lastly, there is the element of opportunity, a somewhat overlooked, or at least 
not fully utilised, aspect of anti-corruption policy. This is where the gist of this research resides, 
and a policy focus shift is suggested to better balance anti-corruption efforts towards a 
comprehensive and more effective equilibrium. The following discussion is presented in a fairly 
linear format for the sake of intellectual accessibility but is not to be confused with the 
multidimensional nature of reality where other less probabilistically consequential factors can 
and will be of significance. Accordingly, this makes for a more complex stochastic system but 
which nevertheless, is bound to and largely operating along similar lines.  
Motivation 
The first premise of a rational choice approach is that deviant decision-making in acts of 
corruption is a multi-stage process. Once motivation is stimulated, offenders become ready to 
commit a particular act of deviancy if that act effectively can be rationalised in the context of 
the stimuli, i.e. the real or perceived opportunity. Motivation can arguably take two forms. The 
first form, positive motivation, where situational precursors drive an agent into deviant 
behaviour. And the second form, negative motivation, where there is an absence of situational 
precursors, appealing to the values and norms held by the agent that nominally would inhibit 
deviant behaviour (Agnew, 1995). Both cases presuppose an underlying latent motivation 
played upon by external, i.e. situational factors. As has been touched on earlier, , the concept 
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of motivation is something that is intrinsic to all human beings. It is an evolutionary by-product 
of our striving for survival and thus an inseparable part of human nature. The biological 
perspective of motivated behaviour, as (partly) separated from the social context, is an 
established field of research (see e.g. Wong, 2000).  
It is a great challenge within the confines of this research to adequately and convincingly 
establish this premise, but an attempt is made, as it is the conceptual foundation for the 
framework of situational prevention of corruption. Without getting overly eclectic, there is a 
surmised agreement on the role of motivation in causal explanations of purposive actions. 
Examining why a person engages in a specific action is equivalent to an examination of 
motivation (Mook, 1996). The underlying reasons for behaviour are what constitutes 
motivation. According to Wong (2000) these reasons can be analysed at least two levels, only 
one of which is relevant at this stage:. that is the explanation of behaviour in terms of 
motivational mechanisms, referred to as ultimate causation. The other - proximate causation -  
has to do more with how certain activities come about and is in this context dealt with 
vicariously through rationalisation and neutralisation. Claiming that ultimate causation is an 
evolutionary part of human nature does require some justification, as to what specific function 
was served by that specific behaviour? It is to say that behaving according to motivational cues 
led to some type of evolutionary advantage, with motivation loosely defined as being the need 
or desire to do something, to behave a certain way in order to achieve a goal. Such behaviour 
is guided by its consequences and is related to some end point linked with biological 
requirements (2000). Such biological requirements are in their purest form referred to as 
instincts - complex yet unlearnt behaviour with a fixed pattern throughout a species (Lawman, 
2005, p. 93).  
An outline to this affect is presented by Maslow (1943) in his hierarchy of needs. While 
one may argue that the modern human moves rather freely and not necessarily consecutively 
through some of the upper levels of the hierarchy, the jumping decreases as the 
fundamentality of needs increase. The hierarchy does, however, illustrate that there is a 
pattern, a structure to motivated behaviour. Ultimately it all boils down to survival and 
reproduction, and it is suggested that the way to get to any of those is through self-interest 
utility maximisation: that is, to achieve the greatest possible outcome from the least possible 
resource investment, creating an advantage for those behaviourally motivated to act 
accordingly. Now this does not imply that people always possess the cognitive resources nor 
the environmental context to actually maximise each decision (see e.g. Simon, 1957, 1982). 
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Nonetheless all active decisions (thus excluding instinct) for behaviour are based on choices 
perceived to be more or less rational. Motivated behavioural patterns, however, are always 
the products of an intimate interaction between the organism and its environment (Wong, 
2000). Therefore motivation for offending can be supplied by situational precipitators alone, 
rather than brought to a crime setting by a previously motivated offender (Cornish & Clarke, 
2003).  
Self-interest - part two 
The implication of this is that through the innate drive for self-interest utility 
maximisation, all humans harbour a default motivation to realise goals in this pursuit, and that 
situations influence the decision-making governing actual behavioural outcomes Situational 
factors can effectively distort the reasoning process, permitting individuals to engage in what 
would otherwise have been forbidden behaviour. The human mind is highly malleable and 
sensitive to both the physical and social context in which behaviour is realised (Cornish & 
Clarke, 2003). Hence, many features of situations that may precipitate or enhance motivation 
for acts of corruption are imaginable in the absence of a consciously pre-existing motivation 
on part of the offender (Cornish & Clarke, 2003). So, in a Humean adaptation (1739) reason 
is a slave of the passions and the objective of reasoning is to secure a need or desire. So, 
when, by chance or its own accord presented with an opportunity for deviant behaviour, the 
human mind will facilitate self-interest utility maximisation through rationalisation. 
It is acknowledged that there is no single self-interest assumption and it is therefore 
essential to establish a common understanding of the type and role the assumption plays here. 
Further, any self-interest assumption may be false as a universal description of human nature 
while still being sufficiently correct in a certain context. The certain context for this thesis is 
confined to the geographical boundaries of Europe and ideologically to a secular liberal 
democratic perspective. Within this context, rational choice comes down to something very 
basic, namely self-interest, usually in the form of wealth and power (Eriksson, 2011). 
  
 
Page 138 of 278 
Reconciliation 
It is possible that the striving for power and wealth is not something that has anything to 
do with natural selection, and instead is a by-product of something that in fact is selected for. 
Evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins (2006) provides a plausible explanation for a similar 
and in too some extent related phenomenon - that of religion (see also Rothstein & Broms, 
2017). The analogy used is that of a moth flying into a flame and perishing. Natural selection 
did not select suicidal moths, instead it selected for a form of navigation e.g. heeding for a 
fixed point of light such as the moon. The by-product of this selected behaviour is nonetheless 
that when moths navigate towards a lit candle they die. Dawkins goes on explaining that 
children need to acquire a lot of information very quickly if they are to have a good chance of 
survival. For several reasons, a child cannot carefully reason through every decision and has to 
develop a sense of trust in those in their vicinity who are older and obviously capable of some 
level of survival. Thus, as proven by research, humans have a propensity for trust (Rothstein, 
2000; Uslaner, 2004; Sean, 2009; Morris & Klesner, 2010; Rothstein, 2011, 2013). This feature 
can also have its downside: if humans are placed in contexts where corrupt behaviour is the 
norm, the propensity for trust may be a vulnerability. 
In this context it is not hard to imagine wealth and power as (perceived) vehicles to 
realise the most basic of human needs, even as fundamental as survival and reproduction. 
Indeed, it would be strange to imagine a human being with absolutely no regard for their own 
interests, particularly if those interests were survival and reproduction. Therefore, the self-
interest assumption is:(1) focused on the extent to which people are self-interested; and (2) 
clarifying the rather vague concept of self-interest. There is a stark distinction between being 
self-interested and being selfish. 
"We shall occasionally say that people who act in accord with their preferences are 
self-interested. As already noted, this does not require us to assume that people are 
selfish in the ordinary sense of that word. … We assume that people pursue the things 
that they regard as important, which may include empathy for family, friends, whales trees 
or random strangers. We believe that an individual’s conception of self is reflected in his 
or her preferences and priorities. Pursuit of those preferences and priorities is self-interest 
at work.” (Shepsle & Bonchek, 1997, p. 17) 
The central point is that people, here referred to as agents, are self-interested because 
they choose to maximise their own satisfaction, but that that satisfaction can stem from 
anything - including altruistic motives (Riker, 1990). Treating the satisfaction of needs and 
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desires as a utility, the end-product is an agent motivated to SUM-behaviour. Note that in 
spite of the deterministic phrasing in ’maximisation’, there are significant challenges to actually 
maximising the self-interest utility in absolute terms. Ultimately, notwithstanding limitations in 
the decision-making process discussed in the next section, what remains intact as the 
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 3.4   The theory behind SUM-behaviour 
 ”The apparent methodological difficulty with this [denial of responsibility] and 
several other techniques of neutralisation, both at the level of on-the-spot observation 
and in the analysis of survey data, is that they may appear only after the delinquent act(s) 
in question has been commit-ted. They may thus, be seen as after-the-fact rationalisations 
rather than before-the-fact neutralisations. The question boils down to this: Which came 
first, the delinquent act or the belief justifying it?" (Hirschi, 1969, pp. 207-208) 
To say that an agent is pursuing self-interest utility maximisation is not to say that 
everyone is completely self-interested in all contexts all the time. Rather the statement carries 
an assumption that agents are more self-interested in some context than others and that the 
ability to act rationally upon whatever level of self-interest there is may be significantly limited. 
It is thus of interest to see what type of decision-making process will dominate when? This 
helps to understand the governing mechanisms behind why in the pursuit of self-interest utility 
maximisation, agents sometimes act corruptly. When it comes to rationalisation or 
neutralisation, the sometimes contentious issue of timing is of less concern in this particular 
application. Whereas social learning theorists based on the theories of Akers  (Akers, 1985) 
may claim that deviancy must be neutralised before committing a crime, research by Minor 
(1984), Hamlin (1988) and Pogrebin, Poole and Martinez (1992) indicates that neutralisation 
follows rather than precedes deviancy.  
Further research by Cromwell and Thurman support Hirschi's claim that the assumption 
that delinquent acts come before justifying beliefs is the more plausible causal ordering. More 
importantly, the research of Cromwell and Thurman also suggests that rationalisation and 
neutralisation essentially are the same behaviour at different stages in the event of deviancy 
(Cromwell & Thurman, 2003, pp. 547-548). For the purposes of understanding corruption as 
the result of SUM-behaviour, however, the timing of rationalisation and neutralisation matters 
less. The important thing, to establish how it influences behaviour, is that they occur. From a 
rational choice perspective an act deemed as corrupt is one that is in contradiction with the 
values and norms held by the agent, a realisation that could occur pre- or post-hoc requiring a 
level of rationalisation by neutralisation. 
To fully understand rationalisation by neutralisation in this context it is convenient to first 
step back to the fundamentals of what it is to be rational. Given most of the books and articles 
on rational choice are based on some assumption similar to self-interest utility maximisation, 
some further exploration may be required. Rationality in decision-making is not as simple as it 
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would seem and is thus not without critique, where the limits of rationality may be significantly 
narrower than one would think. As Harding (1997) argues, it is rational to act for the sake of 
self-interest, extra-rational to act for the sake of one’s group interest, and irrational to act for 
neither self-interest nor group interest. There are numerous studies showing our propensity 
for irrationality, for example demonstrating that people make radically different choices about 
scenarios depending on whether it is described in terms of risk or gain (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979, 1992) and that anchoring bias is a highly significant and a determinative aspect5 
(Quattrone, 1982; Plous, 1989; T. D. Wilson, Houston, Etling, & Brekke, 1996). Critics may 
also say that the rational choice approach is significantly limited since much behaviour is driven 
by motives other than self-interest. Nonetheless, even if acknowledging the tenet of other 
undefined sources of motivation, it would be of little consequence to the construct of 
corruption as an opportunity-based crime. 
  
                                               
5 Sae also Chapman & Johnson (1994) and Brewer & Chapman (2002) for the limits of anchoring.   
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Bounded rationality 
Rationality is about intentional, or in the phrasing of Merton (1936), purposive action: 
behaviour is interpreted as action and is explained by referring to the underlying reasons for 
performing it (Elster, 2007). This is not a new idea: Weberian6 interpretive sociology also 
emphasises the rationality assumption as necessary for interpreting behaviour as action, and 
shares with the rational choice approach a commitment to methodological individualism 
(Eriksson, 2011). Thus, it is the individual within a situation that is central to how goals are 
deliberately pursued. Here situation is understood not as an absolute reality but as subjectively 
perceived. In terms of rationality that is, if deconstructed, it is rational for that individual in that 
situation, given that the individual a) possesses all the relevant information, b) the capacity to 
correctly process that information and, c) enough time for that process. This is naturally not 
the case in any real situation and the response to this was, most notably, developed by Simon 
(1997) in his work on bounded rationality. The concept builds upon the following proposition 
for a), b) and c).Decision-makers have to work under three unavoidable constraints: a) only 
limited, often unreliable information, is available regarding possible alternatives, their outcome 
and consequences; b) the human mind has limited capacity to evaluate and process the 
available information; and c) only a limited about of time is available to make a decision. 
Therefore, rational choice decision- making in a complex situation (i.e. with any combination of 
conditions a, b and c) and is confined to satisficing rather than maximising choices see figure 5.  
Figure 5: Decision-making reduced to satisficing through bounded rationality. 
                                               
6 For an excellent introduction to Weber, see Poggi (2006). 
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Note that, in figure 5, the bracket of sub-optimal division extends outside of the 
elliptically illustrated perceived rationality into what can be considered as absolute or actual 
rationality. This means that although the division is made to be ’good enough’, it may very well 
be optimal or closer to it than initially calculated within the confines of the bounded rationality. 
Furthering the concept of limited calculation capabilities, sometimes heuristic shortcuts are 
applied. This is well illustrated by Gigerenzer and his research team (1999) in their work on 
”fast and frugal heuristics”, where good decision-making is facilitated in spite of the bounded 
reality.   
This can be explained as follows:  
”…during evolutionary times, there has been selection for the ability to solve 
certain decision problems quickly and reliably, and we are thus equipped with 
heuristics for estimating things that it would take enormous information or 
calculating capability to decide in the traditionally rational way.” (Eriksson, 2011, p. 
47) 
Although it is infamously difficult to prove how anything in fact has evolved, it can be 
said that for a trait to be selected it must be beneficial to survival and reproduction. As 
discussed earlier, humans have always striven, by self-interest toward utility optimisation, 
survival and reproduction. Two traits that have persisted throughout modern history as 
vehicles in that pursuit are power and wealth. The research findings underpinning this thesis, 
point towards motivation for self-interest utility maximisation with both power and wealth as 
latent variables. That does not mean that an agent is constantly preoccupied with either of the 
two but much like survival and reproduction the underlying latent striving for power and 
wealth is always there, primarily influenced by situational precipitators, i.e. individual and 
contextual triggers that stimulate incentives. This position also indirectly addresses several 
points of critique: where to position calculated vs. un-calculated decision-making, and to what 
extent the latter is rational.  
Calculated decision-making involves more intricate reasoning, not necessarily including all 
cost and benefits but certainly including consequences where uncalculated decisions refer to 
emotional reactions, i.e. instinct which is often but not always irrational. However, emotionally 
motivated decision-making persists for the same reason that altruistic cooperation has: it 
provides an evolutionary advantage. How exactly is for evolutionary game theorists and 
biologists to discover but reduced to the simplistic prisoner’s dilemma, if defecting is often a 
better strategy than cooperating, over time, cooperation should have been selected against, i.e. 
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gone extinct. But as seen in the tit-for-tat experiment there is a strategy for cooperation that 
may supersede defection, particularly in the long run. And that is where we, in a sense, are, at 
the end of that long run, where some certainty can be placed in acknowledging that previous 
behaviour has been conducive to survival and reproduction - the ultimate self-interest utility 
maximisation of any species. Otherwise we would not be here. What remains is then to show 
how, from a self-interest utility maximisation perspective, it would be rational to pursue power 
and wealth; and how this may lead to acts of corruption.  
Expressions of survival and reproduction through power and wealth 
It is important to note that this research does not intend to make a causal connection 
between the striving for survival and reproduction to that of power and wealth. The discussion 
should by no means be seen as a conclusive account of the root causes of corruption but 
rather as a possible explanation that makes intuitive sense and, more importantly is grounded, 
in the data. What is drawn empirically from the research is a striving for power and wealth and 
unfortunately the achievement of power and wealth is often realised by corrupt behaviour. 
Although the nature of such behaviour varies, both from a normative as well as a descriptive 
perspective, the fundamentals tie in to the central tenet of this discussion. Individuals do not 
necessarily need to consciously try to maximise their chances of survival and reproduction, but 
if they behave in a way that does not, they will have fewer offspring on the whole and that 
behaviour will be selected against. The same goes for the pursuit of any goal. If the behavioural 
traits associated with that goal were not beneficial, they would be selected against, implying an 
evolutionary push for, in this case, the vehicles of power and wealth. It is however important 
to maintain focus on what this thesis sets outs out to do as well as what it does not: 
”One thing about which the rational choice approach has very little to say is about 
the deliberation of goals. A framework about instrumental rationality takes goals as given, 
and concerns deliberation about how to achieve those goals. How then can such a 
framework account for the search for what goals to have? The answer is simple: it 
cannot.” (Eriksson, 2011, p. 94) 
Now, one may not agree that power and wealth are effective instruments for either 
survival or reproduction., However the research indicates that the striving appears 
omnipresent in modern society. So, if the argument that power and wealth as contemporary 
vehicles to survival and reproduction create latent motivation for achieving goals in line with 
the associated needs and desires - then unethical behaviour could appear as a rational choice 
and corruption would be pervasive. Thus, corruption is pervasive and this is concluded by 
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several scholars (Erickson & Hills, 2006; Andersson & Heywood, 2009; Persson et al., 2013), 
officially stated by EU minsters (Malmström, 2014) and echoed by several of the interviewees 
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 3.5   Rationalisation and neutralisation 
  “One of the saddest lessons of history is this: If we’ve been bamboozled long 
enough, we tend to reject any evidence of the bamboozle. We’re no longer interested in 
finding out the truth. The bamboozle has captured us. It’s simply too painful to 
acknowledge, even to ourselves, that we’ve been taken. Once you give a charlatan power 
over you, you almost never get it back.” (Sagan, 1996, p. 237) 
With any afflicted system, recognising and admitting its deleterious state is always the 
first step to recovery. In this case that means acknowledging the pervasiveness of corruption in 
modern society. The second step differs., Sometimes the system requires immediate 
treatment of the symptoms, often in the shape of post-hoc repressive measures. 
Unfortunately, the resources invested in the search for root causes often seems to be 
inversely proportionate to the success of the treatment of symptoms. Thus, it is not 
uncommon to encounter little or no interest in finding out or understanding why corruption 
permeates the system as long as the symptoms are kept in check. Keeping the system alive is 
arguably the highest priority, so as a means to an end this is not all bad. Nonetheless, the 
argument presented here is that once the system is stable enough or if the symptoms of 
corruption do not threaten the existence of the system as a whole, then root causes must be 
understood and addressed. In the rational choice context presented here, the first part of that 
argument, understanding root causes, posits the question: what are the primary mechanisms 
by which unethical, i.e. corrupt behaviour, becomes a rational choice?  
The answer lies partly in the concepts of rationalisation and neutralisation. 
Rationalisation is the cognitive process whereby individuals maintain their perceptions of 
themselves as moral actors by constructing justifications for their deviancy (Cressey, 1953). 
The earliest writings about rationalisation were published over a century ago by psychoanalyst 
Ernest Jones (1908). Broadly, Jones described rationalisation as a (false) explanation of 
behaviour with a plausible ring of rationality that is in agreement with the individual’s 
normative ideas. In short, it is a cognitive distortion which bends the dominant normative 
structure (Hollin, 2007), i.e. a reconciliation between actions and norms. There are scholars 
that have criticised rationalisation theory (see e.g. Goldstraw-White, 2012, p. 28). The concept 
however, remains valid and as Cressey (1953) notes, rationalisations are verbalisations, and the 
interpretations thereof are the only means to gain an insight into the perceptions of the 
individual. These accounts are the explanations of deviant behaviour which bridge the gap 
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between actions and normative expectations (M. B. Scott & Lyman, 1968). The structural 
integrity of that bridge can be partly explained by neutralisation theory.  
The origins of the underpinning theory for neutralisation can be traced back to Sykes 
and Matza (1957) outlining five neutralisation techniques used for rationalising behaviour. 
Sykes and Matza’s theory is an elaboration of Edwin Sutherland’s (1947) proposition that 
individuals can learn criminal techniques. Since its original formulation, neutralisation theory has 
been frequently cited in sociology and criminology. Perhaps, Maruna and Copes (2005) 
provide the most comprehensive summary to date. Fritsche (2005) articulates some common 
misunderstandings around neutralisation theory. Overall, research has produced mixed results 
leading some to conclude that neutralisation theory may not be powerful enough to stand 
alone, notwithstanding that it is incorporated into a variety of other theories (Copes & 
Deitzer, 2015).  
Around the same time as Sykes and Matza (1957) presented their theory on 
delinquency introducing the concept of neutralisation, Festinger (1957) presented a very 
similar notion in his concept of cognitive dissonance. The theory behind cognitive dissonance 
may seem somewhat counterintuitive as it proposes that actions can influence subsequent 
beliefs and attitudes for example, toward corruption. This is counterintuitive because it would 
be logical to consider actions as the result of beliefs and attitudes rather than the cause of 
them. The theory does, however, have appeal in that it addresses the pervasive human 
tendency to neutralise.  
Cognitive dissonance is conceptually based in three fundamental assumptions. Firstly, 
humans are assumed to be sensitive to inconsistencies between actions and beliefs: secondly, 
recognition of this inconsistency will cause dissonance, and will motivate an agent to resolve 
the dissonance; and thirdly, this dissonance can be resolved in one of three basic ways. Those 
ways are: change beliefs, change behaviour; or change perception of the behaviour. Note that 
dissonance theory does not state that these modes of dissonance reduction will actually work; 
only that agents who are in a state of cognitive dissonance will take steps to reduce the extent 
of their dissonance. 
What follows is a brief overview of mechanisms that allows deviant behaviour to be 
aligned with rational choice theory, rationalisation and neutralisation. The concepts and their 
intricacies are not  of primary concern in this research and thus not subject to in-depth 
scrutiny, nor are they completely absolved from critique when adapted and applied to the 
context at hand.   
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The effect of neutralisation on moral judgment  
Nonetheless, there are ways to effectively apply neutralisation theory to the context of 
corrupt behaviour through a series of conceptual steps. First, one must accept the tenet that 
the need for neutralisation presumes that behaviour violates some type of norm. Second, 
empirical research points to the efficacy of neutralisation techniques as an inverse function of 
the absolute deviance from the norm. That means that the extent to which people effectively 
neutralise deviant behaviour is greater for relatively small breaches, rather than those clearly 
deviant (Bersoff, 2001; Fritsche, 2005). In several of the interviews conducted in this research 
the participants allude to notions abstracted as ’gradually corrupt’, indicating a succession of 
rather small normative breaches; and ’unknowingly corrupt’, as a lack of subsequent change in 
attitude towards the breach. Highlighting the usefulness of neutralisation, Chatzidakis et al. 
(2004) states that neutralisation represents a psychological process capable of restoring 
equilibrium without attitude change, more widely applicable in small ethical breaches than in 
clearly deviant activities. Third, the concept of neutralisation must be elevated to a higher level 
of abstraction, i.e. viewed as an underlying structure for ethical decision-making. To illustrate 
this in the context of corruption the research findings are applied to a four-stage model of 
Table 1: The four stages of moral judgement contextualised for corruption 
Component  Description Contextualised for 
corruption 
Recognising a moral issue The ability to neutralise will have a negative 
effect on moral judgments (attitudes) and 
allow unethical alternatives to be perceived as 
less problematic. 
When faced with a situation 
involving decisions that are 
recognised as being corrupt - i.e. 
paying a bribe. 
Moral judgment When a moral judgment is in favour of 
ethically superior choices, the ability to 
neutralise will increase the likelihood that an 
agent will form inconsistent moral intentions.  
Moving beyond recognising the 
moral issues to exploring what 
actions are morally justifiable - i.e. 
to pay or not to pay.  
Resolving concerns When moral intentions are in favour of 
ethically superior choices the ability to 
neutralise will increase the likelihood that an 
agent will submit to situational constraints or 
opportunities that inhibit him or her from 
acting upon those positive intentions. 
This is where a prioritisation of 
values occurs. Generally moral 
values are prioritised over other 
personal values, but neutralisation 
may lead to situational influence - 
e.g. here bribes are commonplace. 
Acting on moral concerns The use of neutralisation techniques following 
actual behaviour (if successfully internalised) 
will reduce the likelihood that an agent will 
recognise a moral dimension to a similar 
problem in the future. 
If the deviant actions are fully 
neutralised the likelihood that the 
agent will recognise the moral issues 
with paying a bribe in a similar 
situation in the future is reduced.  
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moral judgement, informed by the work of Rest (1979). The model outlined in table 1. should 
not be considered linear as components are interactive.   
Neutralisation techniques 
It is established that when it comes to ethical behaviour, social and personal norms play 
a crucial role (Janette, Gordon, & John, 2002; Davis, Riske-Morris, & Diaz, 2008). When those 
norms are insufficient to guide behaviour, an agent may apply coping strategies to soften or 
eliminate the impact of the norm violating behaviour (Grove, Vitell, & Strutton, 1989). This is 
something that, to an extent, challenges everyone all the time in everyday life where behaviour 
has to be rationalised as a result of various irrationalities of the human psyche. It only becomes 
a problem when the actions rationalised are either, by definition, illegal or immoral to an 
extent that is (subjectively or collectively) unacceptable. Immoral and illegal acts are more 
commonly a result of neutralising rationalisations rather than a fundamentally deviant 
psychology (Heath, 2008). Note that even if rationalisation is a common cause of deviant 
behaviour, it does not mean that it is the only cause. As discussed with reference to bounded 
rationality, the fact that an agent may know a lot about acceptable norms does not imply that 
everything is known. Thus, contrary to the viewpoint that deviant behaviour is solely based on 
deviant norms, it is suggested that an agent rationalises behaviour through a set of 
neutralisation justifications (Sykes & Matza, 1957).  
It is through neutralisation techniques, that an agent can reconcile deviant behaviour. 
Hence, the individual may remain committed to the value system of the particular situation 
while committing criminal acts without experiencing the cognitive dissonance that might be 
otherwise expected. This can be understood from the flexibility of the normative systems in 
contemporary societies where norms act as "qualified guides for action, limited in their 
applicability in terms of time, place, persons, and social circumstances" (Sykes & Matza, 1957, p. 
666), rather than being categorical imperatives. For example, taking lives may be justified in 
times of war, and in the context of corruption, adopting situationally conditioned behavioural 
patterns that facilitate corruption by qualifying those actions as acceptable thus conceptually, 
though not practically, remaining within the normative system. Sykes and Matza (1957) 
outlined five neutralisation techniques: denial of responsibility, denial of injury, denial of victims, 
appeal to higher loyalties, and condemnation of condemners. Similarly to other studies seeking 
to adapt these techniques to a particular context (e.g. Strutton, Vitell, & Pelton, 1994) the 
techniques here are contextualised specifically for corruption in table 2. 
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Table 2: The five neutralisation techniques contextualised for corruption 
Neutralisation technique Description Contextualised for corruption 
Denial of responsibility A circumstance in which an agent 
argues no personal accountability for 
norm-violating behaviour because 
factors beyond control were operating. 
”Here everyone is paying bribes and if 
you want to succeed you will have to 
do it too…”  
 Denial of Injury A circumstance in which one contends 
that personal misconduct is not really 
serious because no party directly 
suffered as a result of it. 
”What is wrong with hiring your 
nephew? He is a good guy and the job 
gets done.” 
Denial of Victim A circumstance in which one counters 
the blame for personal actions by 
arguing the violated party deserved 
whatever happened. 
”Due to us knowing the purchaser the 
other company didn’t stand a chance. 
They didn’t deserve it anyway since 
they shafted us on the previous deal”.  
Condemning the condemners A circumstance in which one deflects 
accusations of misconduct by pointing 
out that those who would condemn 
engage in similarly disapproved 
activities. 
”The top brass wouldn’t dare to 
launch an investigation into what we 
are doing since they then themselves 
could be subject of suspicion and we 
all know how they operate.” 
Appeal to higher loyalties  A circumstance in which one argues that 
the norm-violating behaviour is the result 
of an attempt to actualise some higher 
order ideal or value. 
”The reason we paid these bribes was 
for a good cause. Without us people 
would have starved, can you live with 
that?” 
Corruption made rational 
The logical conclusion of the arguments presented is that decisions, including those for 
deviant behaviour, are almost always perceived to be rational. Now, most work based on the 
rational choice approach is used to explain collective outcomes and aggregate phenomena. If 
the phenomenon examined is that of corruption it should arguably be possible to deconstruct 
the elements to better understand the individuals behind the corrupt behaviour. Through 
direct or vicarious interactions in everyday life, an individual is notified of a wide range of 
possible choices - some corrupt, most not - by the needs, desires and beliefs in the pursuit of 
self-interest utility maximisation. The choices of interest here are those potentially leading to 
acts constituting unethical behaviour and corruption. These choices are evaluated within a 
bounded rationality on the basis of whether an individual is willing and able to put them into 
practice. Where deviant behaviour is being contemplated, the choice structuring properties of 
the actions being evaluated are also relevant (Cornish & Clarke, 1987, 1989). That is, for 
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example, if normative values such as morals are an issue for the individual, they too will pertain 
to the process of choice evaluation. If the choice is made in favour of deviant behaviour as 
being the most suitable course of action for achieving the individual’s goals, then he or she is 
said to be ready - i.e. having achieved readiness (Cornish & Clarke, 2003).  
Figure 6. Neutralisation in the moral judgement process. 
Building upon that, illustrated by figure 6, it is by combining the content of the table 1 
and 2 that one can clearly see how rationalisation and neutralisation works to sustain and 
perpetuate corrupt behaviour feeding into the entirety of the moral judgment process leading 
to a decision. perceived to be rational, but which is deviant,  
Given the latent nature of motivation and how it is highly susceptible to rationalisation 
and neutralisation, the next element necessary for deviant behaviour in the form of corruption 
is opportunity. The logic is that regardless of motivation, and irrespective of rationalisation and 
neutralisation ability - an agent must be presented with an opportunity. Naturally, an agent can 
arguably be sufficiently motivated to create an opportunity: but the opportunity itself is 
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 3.6   Opportunity 
”Out of clutter, find simplicity; from discord make harmony; In the middle of 
difficulty lies opportunity.” (Einstein quoted by Wheeler, 2004) 
This is where the codes from the interviews converge, some more obviously than 
others. The reason why codes and categories are scarcely discussed throughout the thesis is a 
natural by-product of the methodology. To reiterate the fundamentals of Ground Theory it is 
the practice of identifying, refining and integrating categories of meaning stemming from data, 
to provide an explanatory framework - a theory. It is not intended to simply lift statements out 
of the verbatim accounts of the participants., The core category emerged from the data as the 
result of the inductive-deductive interplay that is Grounded Theory. Therefore, the theory is 
abstracted from the data and allowed to evolve throughout the entire research process. Thus, 
the ”theory”, halfway into the research process -to the extent that more or less embryonic 
formulations can be called a theory- may say very little about the phenomenon under 
investigation compared to the end result. Nonetheless, while the previous sections in this 
chapter have built a strong intellectual argument, building upon existing theories and research, 
this section will focus on the developmental stages of the core category from a strictly 
methodological perspective. This section will cover the core category ‘opportunity’ and how it 
emerged from the data. To conceal and protect their identities, participants have been 
codified by a number instead of names.  
The early codes 
Going through every single code that came about, was relabelled, or even discarded 
would not be feasible given the confines of this thesis, nor would it be helpful for the reader 
to understand the end result of the research process. Instead, by looking at a number of early 
codes and how they evolved through the reflexive process into the core category, the reader 
can hopefully appreciate both method and result. Hence, this section will first introduce a 
number of early codes, explain them and how some of them relate to each other. Then 
moving on to how and why categories were formed and finally how those categories in turn 
relate to the core category.  
Some of the early codes were; reciprocal corruption and economy of favours. Where 
reciprocal corruption was described as: “There is a reciprocity in corruption - both parties get 
(to a greater or lesser extent) something they want” (Participant 27). The economy of favours 
was similarly described as ”You are never independent as you must work the economy of 
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favours (at some level)” (Participant 26). These early codes pointed towards what came to 
one of the first categories - cronyism. The category appeared very prominently as a code in 
the second interview performed with Participant 819. A reflexive memo read: “Cronyism 
seems very important to Participant 819. Why? How important is this?”. The memo 
acknowledges a recognition of a phenomenon important to the participant but that the 
researcher at this point does not fully understand it. It is, however, through memos like this 
that the researcher is allowed to follow-up on this through subsequent interviews and extant 
literature. according to the resources selection system developed for Grounded Theory+.  
Other early codes were: market place of power and value laden results. The ‘market place 
of power’ meant that ”everything in the world in terms of exchange there is a marketplace. 
Corruption is the perverted marketplace of power (and money). A black market can only 
exist where the white market is seriously/fundamentally flawed” (Participant 26). With ‘value 
laden results’ indicating that ”the result/effect of corruption is value laden. It maybe a new 
phenomenon as the result of a more globalised world. Perhaps, nowadays we are compared 
abasing a different set of standards?” (Participant 819). This would point to corrupt norms and 
values somehow seeping into a particular social context and distorting it to the point where 
the decision-making processes degenerate. That social context later became a category that 
intrigued many memos, many of which posed questions about what was particular to the 
social context that lead to corruption becoming the rational choice.  
The answer to the particulars of a social context that endorses corruption came 
indirectly from a number of codes pertaining to the internalisation of deviancy, such as fear, 
stigma, and pride.  Fear has both pros and cons in terms of countering corruption. While “fear 
of allegations is a powerful counter agent, and the fear of being accused of being corrupt acts 
as self-defence, self-perseverance” (Participant 418), at the same time: ”the fear of going into 
clinch keeps us quiet” (Participant 819). The concept of fear also came back in conjunction 
with another code naivety and Participant 819 stated that: ”we are not always naive - 
sometimes we are afraid”. The memos after the coding obviously read: “fear of what?” The 
answer became clear through testimonies like: ”the foundation for self-censorship is fear and 
practically it is more often a question of passivity rather than activity.” The self-censorship 
being a form of self-preservation the next memo read: “What does the passivity that 
participant talks about refer to, mean? Passivity from what?”. Together with the code, ‘pride’ 
and “the desire to find not only things but also yourself the way you want it to be” (Participant 
1662) led to the conclusion that there was an element of integrity involved in the social 
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context. This integrity seemingly guided the decision-making process, but as memos reveal, the 
question then becomes where does the integrity and subsequently the decision-making 
process break down?  
The later categories 
Integrity being sorted under the category ‘social context’ led to one of the first higher 
order categories, one under which other categories started to align. Another category aligned 
with social context was awareness, which was made up of codes such as myopia and blinkers. 
The code for myopia is well illustrated by Participant 719 stating that ”if you believe all public 
servants to be clean you do not see when they are not - if you believe in clean your ability to 
see what is going on is impaired.” Also, blinkers were a testament to the effects of a ”weak 
culture that in spite of a relatively good ethical compass is naive to corruption” (Participant 
1013). Further, it is here where the codes of naivety and awareness of naivety reside. These 
were codes that featured prominently in early memos, perhaps partly as this has been and to 
some extent continues to be an explanation for corruption occurring in Sweden.  
Another category whose content played well with social context was normality, made 
up of only three codes - the first two ordinary life and forgetting criminality are possibly not the 
two best labels but remember that for many of the codes, in vivo labelling was used. That is, 
the words used by the respondents were mirrored in the labelling as a methodological tool so 
as not to lose meaning at an early stage. As codes and categories were abstracted, labels 
naturally evolved with the analysis, while remained rooted in the original in vivo labels. 
Ordinary life provided a ”perspective that is affected by the notion of business as usual and 
the strive for (profit) maximisation. This is fuelled by a lack of (political) commitment from the 
public sphere added with a ’not-in-my-back-yard’ perspective” (Participant 118). Another 
participant used the ‘frog in the pot’ analogy and went on to say that ”people become used to 
the evils they know and are familiar with” (Participant BF). This ”normality leads to forgetting 
the criminality of an act and you persuading yourself that you are not corrupt” (Participant 
418). The ensuing memos revolved around the concept of ’normality’ as being highly 
contextual depending on circumstances and the opportunity to be corrupt. This is the first 
time in the research process that the analysis alludes to the idea of opportunity playing a role. 
Normality is conditioned by a number of codes, some of them sorting under another 
higher order category influences. Influence is partly described as ”the large group influencing 
the small group” (Participant 1662). Categories under influences include political influences, 
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which in turn is formed of codes such as paying lip service and lack of commitment. ”There are 
different drivers at different levels. From desperation to desires to personal gain, to peace and 
quiet - where corruption is seen as long-term form of taking responsibility. In some ways there 
are good intentions. Politicians want to appear as decisive and gain a good reputation” 
(Participant 1211). It is when this political structure fails to serve the public good that people 
due to a sense of lack of inclusion, for different reasons may consider themselves above the law. 
"The people are as corrupt as the system allows them to be” (Participant 132). The word 
’allows’ was explored in a memo, where it was considered to have many possible meanings. It 
could mean allow as in ‘grant access’ for those willing to engage in corruption, but it also 
means that it allowed those forced into corruption as well as those unknowingly corrupt. The 
memo concluded that ’allow’ bore striking resemblances in contextual meaning with 
’opportunity’ and questioned the source(s) of motivation.  
When exploring motivation, at first the classic codes appeared such as greed over need 
and forced corruption, where the latter was mentioned to describe the type of corruption that 
did not exist to a great extent neither of the two were surprising to find within a European 
context of corruption. There was, however, also another aspect of forced corruption where 
an agent could be ”sucked into corruption and feel a pressure to keep up appearances” 
(Participant 26). The previous codes on self-preservation and self-censorship also reappear here 
as some sort of behavioural constraints on what otherwise appeared to be an underlying will 
to be corrupt. Motivation was obviously a function of the category attitude to corruption, made 
up from codes including expectations  “corruption is very common and there are no 
incentives to do anything preventative about that” (Participant 118) and expression of 
dissatisfaction strengthening the notion of lack of inclusion. There was also an expression of 
results over ethics where ”the focus on results overshadow morals and one turns the blind eye 
not daring to ask questions” (Participant 27). Elements of fear and self-preservation also 
present, it would seem that career ”longevity is not equal to responsibility” (Participant 26).  
The roots on motivation kept enticing the research process where on one hand there 
were codes sorted under the categories creeping corruption and unknowingly corrupt. A 
”succession of small decisions over time. Gradually becoming corrupt. Easier to be unaware, 
but also easier to rationalise the small steps” (Participant 4). There were, on the other hand, 
also indications of large transgressions also being available as viable choice. ”Institutionalised 
corruption vs. opportunistic - it is different in how it is perceived and how easy or hard it is to 
rationalise.” (Participant 1312). The concluding memo in the exploration of motivation simply 
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read ”while taking many forms motivation for corruption somehow always seem to be 
present”. In an attempt to shed some light on how this motivation was raised into actions the 
direction of the research process was towards ”opportunity”.  
The core category 
The core category in this research for understanding corruption is “opportunity”. This is 
rooted all the way back into the early codes such as unfair allocation of services and unique 
benefits. The idea of the process behind unfair allocation of services is ”if you have a system 
with a process that is supposed to be democratic - then the interests of the different parts of 
society would sort of be interested in deciding in the outcome, and the outcome would not 
be good for everyone because that is not possible but it is good for the majority” (Participant 
1923). Unique benefits, similarly implies ”you receiving something that no-one else does - 
unless they do the same” (Participant 27). The codes categorised under equality: but as the 
memos testify - equality of what? Is it equality of rights, or is it equality of outcomes? Constant 
comparison with an early stage interview provided the answer in ”opportunity is connected to 
motivation” (Participant 418), as it being about equality of opportunity. It is now that 
opportunity starts to rise in the level of abstraction with codes and categories neatly ordering 
beneath it.  
Several categories were directly linked to opportunity. The category attitudes towards 
corruption is conditioned about the perception of opportunity for corruption. The category 
creeping corruption needs opportunity to creep in the first place. All codes sorted under the 
complex decision-making process are dependent on an opportunity to realise any deviant 
decision. Some categories were more indirectly linked to opportunity: influences and 
awareness are examples where opportunity is more of an underlying than an overarching 
factor, nonetheless intrinsic to the process perpetuating deviancy in the form of corruption. 
”Willingness and unwillingness are dictated by circumstances. Those circumstances may refer 
to opportunity” (Participant 418). 
The literature 
Before discussing the literature on opportunity and corruption a note about the use of 
literature in Grounded Theory+ may serve as a useful reminder. All literature used has passed 
through the resource selection criteria presented in Chapter 2. Further, as pointed out by 
Glaser (see e.g. B. Glaser, 2001) everything is data, and therefore not only peer-reviewed 
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journals and monographs have been used to support and validate the findings presented in 
this research. Having said that, an omnipresent reflective process governs the entire data 
selection process, partly captured in the memos, to delineate the limits of data used.  
Looking at the literature of criminological theories of deviancy, there are a variety of 
assumptions around the role played by opportunity. Perhaps not as obvious as one would 
think, Gottfredson and Hirshi (1990) argue that opportunity is necessary for a crime, as do 
Schuchter and Levi (2015). Thus, ‘readiness’ does not in and by itself facilitate action as it also 
requires opportunity. Whether an agent enters a setting readied for deviancy or whether 
readiness is precipitated by the setting itself is generally an important aspect in criminal 
decision-making (see e.g. Cornish & Clarke, 2003; Wortley, 2010). In this context however, it 
is of less significance since according to Cornish and Clarke (2003), readying events prior to 
the rational choice process, although possibly affecting the process, do not necessarily 
determine the behavioural outcome. It is important to remember the central argument is that 
motivation for possibly deviant, i.e. corrupt SUM-behaviour, intrinsically remains ever-present 
though dynamic. Consequently, the common denominator of either a mundane agent being 
presented with an opportunity as opposed to a predatory agent purposefully creating an 
opportunity, is just that: opportunity.  
An agent more or less randomly presented with an opportunity for corruption would 
seek to commit actions that are easily rationalised. That is, in a view consistent with the 
rational choice approach, to suggest that the ability to rationalise would be an additional 
requirement to the basic decision-making task. In contrast, a predatory agent would engage in 
activities such as the conscious search, manipulation, or invention of opportunities for deviant 
SUM-behaviour. Nevertheless, both categories of agents would exist in a condition of 
’qualified readiness’, more-or-less susceptible to various precipitators. Wortley ((cited in 
Cornish & Clarke, 2003, p. 42) identifies four type of precipitators7 - prompts; pressures; 
permissions; and provocations. Each of these may provide situationally-generated motivation 
to the hitherto unmotivated. 
  
                                               
7 Moreover Wortley (2010) also argues for precipitators being equally important to control as opportunity.  
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The result 
Basically, any agent is continually sensitive to situational cues connected to the individual 
agent’s ability to rationalise deviant behaviour. Such cues may cause the agent perceive the 
rational choice to also be the legal and/or moral choice where the likely effectiveness of such 
situational cues will be determined both by the extent of the offender's readiness to offend, 
and by the strength of the techniques in question (Cornish & Clarke, 2003). 
Figure 7: The central position of opportunity in SUM-behaviour driven acts of deviancy. 
Although opportunity is partly grounded in objective facts (a bribe is either offered or it 
is not), perception of opportunities and their use or rejection is subjective and depends on the 
characteristics of the agent interwoven with a particular context. These will determine the 
extent to which cues of opportunity are desired, detected, sized, sought, manipulated, 
manufactured and otherwise related to the agent. The relationship between an agent and the 
opportunity cues is not only determined by the impact of a single situation but also prior 
experience of a particular behaviour (Cornish & Clarke, 2003). Imagine, private citizens finding 
themselves somehow excluded from opportunity, be it for common goods or business 
ventures, because of a cost in resources, be it time, money or another hurdle. In order to 
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facilitate access to a seemingly unachievable yet perceived fair opportunity, the citizens are 
faced with another option - to engage in corruption. If through bribes and other forms of 
corruption the opportunity is granted, it is not certain that the citizens would view the 
situation as anything but (subjectively) advantageous. 
As illustrated by figure 7, the latent motivation for SUM behaviour and the propensity 
for rationalisation by neutralisation taken together, opportunity control is left as the final 
frontier (or in a sense the first frontier) for effective prevention of deviant behaviour in the 
form of corruption. Coupled with the assumption a rational agent of free will, echoing 
Gottfredson and Hirshi’s (1990) seminal yet contested self-control theory, the underlying 
assumption is an agent rational in choice to perform an action. Where rationality is under 
heavy fire from externalities in interplay with the agent’s decision-making processes; the 
breakdown of society may effectively free an agent for deviant behaviour as described by 
control theory (Hirschi, 2001). Group dynamics may change perceptions of deviancy as 
describe by social learning theory (Akers, 1990)., As explained by general strain theory, deviant 
behaviour becomes an inevitable outcome of the toxic situational combination (Agnew, 1992). 
Thus, when the environment in which the agent resides does not provide a subjectively 
adequate means to achieve SUM goals and desires by moral means the opportunity for 
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 3.7   The ”At Least Level”-assumption 
“Making of rules and social symbolic order is a human industry matched only by the 
manipulation, circumvention, remaking, replacing, and unmaking of rules and symbols in 
which people seem almost equally engaged.” (Moore, 1978, p. 1) 
This section will further explore the source of motivation for deviant and corrupt 
behaviour. Regardless of rational choice theory and the idea of homo economics there must 
be something that drives decision-making, particularly when talking about conscious and 
contemplated decision-making, the type of thinking that generally precedes an act of deviancy 
that results in being corrupt. Given that on some occasions instinct and sub-conscious reaction 
may lead to corruption, it does not generally seem to be the case. The point is that it seems 
to matter less as there is something else at the core of motivation for corruption. ”People do 
not think about their opportunity for corruption” (Participant 214). Even though the analysis 
on this point is definitive, the discussion is nevertheless both interesting and relevant. As one 
participant expressed it, ”opportunity is central for rationalisation but hard to describe further 
than that”, alluding to the sources of motivation; and then went on to say ”in scientific articles 
about corruption people start with the idea that if you can you will be corrupt” (Participant 
1923). This does tie in with rational choice, but the ties seem weak; surely, not all share the 
will to be corrupt, yet many end up being it.  The assumption is therefore that there is a much 
smaller element of analysis available to explain the source of motivation and cause of 
corruption on an individual level.  
Given the pervasiveness and ubiquity of corruption in society, questions to where it all 
begins are appealing to those with a vested interest in fighting corruption. It is sometimes said 
that corruption is like cancer, a statement perhaps coined or at least made famous in 1996 by 
then President of the World Bank James D Wolfensohn (1996). The implicit assumption of 
the analogy that corruption can be cured is not supported by the findings in this research.   If 
the metaphor is to have any value, it is important understand where the corruption is located 
in the ”societal body”. As Rothstein (2017), insightfully and colourfully comments that just as a 
cancer patient asking her doctor for a possible cure is not helped by the advice that she 
should have chosen other parents, researchers often confuse the notion of statistical 
significance with policy significance. There are further problems with this analogy8. First: there is 
the question of choice and although several risk factors associated with cancer are known, all 
                                               
8 For an interesting in-depth account on the ”cancer is corruption” analogy fallacy see Heywood (2017).  
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are not. Although some of the known facts can be avoided, it is still hard to conceive an agent 
deliberately setting out to get cancer. The same cannot be said for corruption. Even if some 
corruption arguably occurs under what this research codes as ”unknowingly corrupt”, there is 
still a fairly conscious decision-making process involved in many cases. Thus, the analogy with 
cancer erroneously suggest that corruption has more to do with randomness than with 
purposive actions and omnipresent risk that some unfortunately fall victim to. Secondly, cancer 
is clearly defined and, in all cases, involves abnormal cell growth and reproduction within a 
body. There is no equivalent factual description of corruption, instead, as discussed in an 
earlier section - the definition remains disputed. Given the complex nature of corruption this is 
perhaps irresolvable. Further, cancer starts and ends with one single body and is not 
contagious in any way. Corruption on the other hand, can be seen as highly contagious as by 
definition it involves more than one person, Thus, when claiming that corruption is spreading 
like cancer throughout society, society is considered to be an individual ”body”. It is too easy 
to start talking about corrupt organisations, sectors or even countries, when in fact there can 
only be corrupt persons.  
Identifying the individual as the smallest common denominator of corruption does not 
answer the question of where in the decision-making process the deviancy begins. While the 
findings of this research clearly outline opportunity as a central driver for corruption the 
source of motivation to do so is less clear.  Even so, there are some indications that when put 
together offer a plausible explanation. Put simply, corruption is about gaining an advantage. To 
look for advantages in terms of survival and reproduction is obvious for the survival of any 
species, and thus consistently searching for disadvantages would inexorably lead to extinction. 
That is not to say that there has to be constant search for advantages but rather that the 
advantages obtained must outweigh the disadvantages. The previously established connection 
between survival and reproduction and its vehicles in modern society, money and power, thus 
suggests that the smallest element of analysis for corrupt behaviour is a perceived advantage. 
Note that the choice to pursue a perceived advantage under the constraints of bounded 
rationality may very well ultimately lead to a disadvantage. In an anti-corruption perspective, it 
would therefore be equally important to influence the perception of advantages and well as 
the actual access to undue advantages. The smallest element, however, remains as the smallest 
perceived advantage that an agent can rationalise (and neutralise). Thus, the decision-making 
process degenerates at the ‘at least level’ [ALL], where this refers to the smallest perceived 
advantage that can be rationalised.  
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It is easy to confuse the semantics of the concept of ALL with something that is very 
small and that develops gradually. That, however, is not necessarily the case for corruption. 
The peripheral findings of this research, confirmed by the research of Köbis, van Prooijen, 
Righetti & van Lange (2017), indicate that the evolutionary steps of corruption may be large. 
The starting point is the commonly used explanation for how corruption can emerge in 
society by the slippery-slope metaphor. The metaphor is designed to illustrate, for example, 
how those in power progressively neglect the interest of their office and charge, instead 
pursuing undue advantages driven by self-interest. The progressives of these actions make the 
decision-maker ”slide” deeper and deeper into deviancy and corruption. In explaining why 
people engage in corruption, this research suggests SUM-behaviour, which includes the 
importance of maintaining a positive self-image (see e.g. Leon Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959; 
Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008). As research shows, people can indulge in minor acts of deviancy 
while retaining a positive moral self-image (Ariely, 2012). On the other hand, more severe 
transgressions require some sort of adjustment to the self-concept (Mazar et al., 2008), 
embracing the previously discussed concept of cognitive dissonance. This is often explained as 
the result of a gradual process where in small increments the corrupt become more corrupt: a 
slippery slope (cf. Darley, 2005). While this explanation does have some intuitive appeal what 
Köbis et al. did was to test it empirically. Their experimental study revealed a higher likelihood 
of severe corruption when participants were given this opportunity compared to when 
previously having engaged in minor forms of corruption. Thus, the conclusion is that contrary 
to the persuasive nature of the slippery-slope metaphor corruptions leads over a steep cliff 
rather than a slipper-slope. This indicates that the least level of corruption may be a rather 




Page 163 of 278 
3.8   Implications of SUM-theory 
”…a theory must seem better than its competitors, but it need not, and in fact 
never does, explain all the facts with which it can be confronted.” (Kuhn, 1962, pp. 17-18) 
The arguments presented do generate some rather noteworthy questions such as: what 
does this potentially mean for anti-corruption work and where does the SUM-theory fit in 
related anti-corruption policy development? Before embarking on a discussion revolving 
around those question, the limits of the SUM-theory must be acknowledged. By the 
methodological decree of grounded theory, the theory presented should be regarded as 
substantive and if nothing else providing a theoretical framework in which a more formal 
theory can reside. Having said that, a substantive theory, one that is limited to specific area of, 
is not totally useless. Firstly, it does hold within its own context, in this case the EU: and is thus 
arguably relevant to EU anti-corruption policy, a rather significant policy area. Secondly, per 
definition, a substantive theory may not be generalisable but is on the other hand certainly 
transferable. This suggests that the central tenets of the theory within in its own context may 
be transferable to characteristically similar settings. The validity of this transferability is 
nevertheless something for a future project and the SUM-theory is presented as a foundation 
on which to build, a perspective from which to analyse, and a starting point from which to 
begin.  
The main point with the SUM-theory is to indicate that corruption is a crime for all 
preventatively regulated primarily by opportunity. Beginning with the conceptual problem of 
corruption and the perception thereof with a broad and rather vague definition used for 
corruption in ”abuse of power for private gain”. As pointed out by Fukuyama (2013) this 
conceptualisation lacks precision. Thus, an inevitable initial deliverable of this research was to 
lift another more suitable definition to the fore. The rationale was that there is a lack of a 
coherent approach towards imposing minimum standards and understanding of corruption, 
partly because of the lack of a commonly accepted and, more importantly, properly 
understood, definition of corruption. Further, although the EU Report on Anti-Corruption 
attempts to identify measures likely to give added value in addressing issues in regard to 
preventing and fighting corruption, it does not go into detail and is aimed at tangible changes 
on the ground (COM(2014) 38). Thus, it is by better understanding how corruption is 
perceived, understood and most importantly, acted upon, that effective strategies for anti-
corruption may be developed. This applies both on an academic level with theoretical crime 
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prevention models but also on a more practical level for national and supranational policy 
development. 
Given both the instrumentality of rational choice and the situational dependency of the 
SUM-theory, it is not a big step to suggest that the findings be applied to some sort of 
behavioural approach of situational crime prevention. In an adaptation of Clarke’s (1983) 
model for situational crime prevention, a strategy for a preventative framework could be 
developed. This is an illustration of the main message of adequately balancing prevention with 
repression as an optimal approach to anti-corruption building upon the principles of an 
underpinning motivation for SUM-behaviour. The inception of the idea for an application of 
situational crime prevention techniques as a preventive anti-corruption framework is an 
advancement of the underlying analytical process for the development of the SUM-theory.   
This process began with theoretical constructs arising from grounded analysis and can 
thus best be described as, at least initially, an inductive process. As the constructs became less 
and less abstract, a deductive step was necessary to reach a higher level of abstraction but not 
before the underpinnings were properly defined. The two main pillars supporting the 
conceptualisation of the situational anti-corruption framework are: firstly, the reconciliation of 
motivation and opportunity; and secondly the role of rationalisation and neutralisation. Such an 
applied adaptation would attempt to demonstrate that the theory accurately reflects the 
specific concept that it seeks to address, thus facilitating identification of anti-corruption 
priorities for a balanced and consequently more comprehensive approach. 
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3.9   Chapter three summary 
This chapter has presented the findings of the research in the form of a substantive 
theory. The theory is named the Self-interest Utility Maximisation theory or SUM-theory for 
short. It is by fusing existing concepts and theories with the discoveries in this research that the 
SUM-theory is born. Thus, it is possible to argue that in and by itself it is not a new theory but 
rather an extension of previous thinking from a different perspective. Nonetheless, the map 
should not be mistaken for the territory. What is presented should be viewed like a map, a 
necessary simplification of reality that allows us to see where we are and understand how 
deciding on different routes will lead to different places.  
The decision-making process was interpreted in this research is based on two 
fundamental tenets. These were: one, that agents have a free will or at least believe they do; 
and, two that there is a self-interest element involved in individual behaviour. The concept of 
free will is complex and even if the deterministic side end up being scientifically or 
philosophically proven, it may still be that free will and determinism are not opposites but 
rather describe behaviour at different levels. Given a self-interested agent with free will the 
question is: what are those interests and how is free will exercised in terms of achieving them? 
It is argued that stemming from the evolutionary pursuit of survival and reproduction, 
two primary facilitators to those ends in modern-day Europe are often power and wealth. 
Naturally, striving for power and wealth does not necessarily mean that an agent will act 
corruptly. The idea of an agent maximising the utility of self-interests does, however, 
encompass a certain measure of rationality when weighing benefits and costs of future actions 
before deciding on behaviour. Also, if the conclusion is that from a certain point of view 
motivation for corrupt behaviour is a constant grounded in human nature then it would 
suggest something about how anti-corruption policymakers may capitalise on that fact. The 
point, however, is that the agent still acts according to what is perceived as most advantageous 
in terms of maximising the utility of their own self-interest. 
Given the premise that motivation is latent, and that corruption is the product of a 
degenerated decision-making process, a suitable starting point in terms of criminological 
models is routine activity theory. Not only does this theory assume motivation to be ever-
present but also has its roots in rational choice theory, where the intricacies of decision-
making are at the forefront. Nevertheless, to say that an agent is pursuing self-interest utility 
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maximisation is not to say that everyone is completely self-interested in all contexts all of the 
time. 
Although it is infamously difficult to prove how any human trait has evolved, it can be 
said that for a trait to be selected it must be beneficial to survival and reproduction. As 
discussed earlier, humans have always striven to survive and reproduce, and two traits that 
have persisted throughout modern history as vehicles in that pursuit are power and wealth. 
The research findings underpinning this thesis point towards motivation for self-interest utility 
maximisation for both power and wealth as latent variables. That does not mean that an agent 
is constantly preoccupied with either of the two but much like survival and reproduction, the 
underlying latent striving for power and wealth is always there. It is important to note that this 
research does not intend to make a causal connection between the striving for survival and 
reproduction to that of power and wealth. The discussion should by no means be seen as a 
conclusive account of the root causes of corruption but rather as a possible explanation. 
If the argument that power and wealth as contemporary vehicles for survival and 
reproduction create latent motivation for achieving goals in line with the associated needs and 
desires - then unethical behaviour could appear as a rational choice and corruption would be 
pervasive. That this is the case is the conclusion of several scholars, officially stated by EU 
ministers and echoed by several of the interviewees for this research -. The logical conclusion 
then, is that decisions, including those for deviant behaviour, are almost always perceived to be 
rational. If the phenomenon examined is that of corruption, it should arguably be possible to 
deconstruct the elements to better understand the individuals behind the corrupt behaviour. 
Through direct or vicarious interactions in everyday life an individual is notified of a wide range 
of possible choices - some corrupt, most not - by the needs, desires and beliefs in the pursuit 
of self-interest utility maximisation. The choices of interest here are those potentially leading 
to unethical acts and corruption. These choices are evaluated within bounded rationality on 
the basis of whether an individual is willing and able to put them into practice. 
Given the latent nature of motivation and how it is highly susceptible to rationalisation 
and neutralisation, the next element necessary for deviant behaviour in the form of corruption 
is opportunity. The logic is that regardless of motivation, and irrespective of rationalisation and 
neutralisation ability - an agent must be presented with an opportunity. Naturally, an agent can 
arguably be sufficiently motivated to create an opportunity but the opportunity itself is 
nevertheless an essential necessity. Given the latent motivation for SUM behaviour and the 
propensity for rationalisation by neutralisation, opportunity control is left as the final frontier 
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(or in a sense the first frontier) for the effective prevention of deviant behaviour in the form of 
corruption. 
When the environment in which the agents resides does not provide a subjectively 
adequate means to achieve SUM goals and desires by moral means, the opportunity for 
immoral ones is more or less consciously sought (and contemplated). But identifying the 
individual as the smallest common denominator of corruption does not answer the question 
of where in the decision-making process the deviancy begins: what is it that is being sought? 
While the findings of this research clearly outline opportunity as a central driver for corruption 
to perpetuate, it does not with equal clarity point towards the source of motivation to do so. 
Even so, there are some indications that when put together offer a plausible explanation. Put 
simply, it is about gaining an advantage.  
In an anti-corruption perspective, it would therefore be equally important to influence 
the perception of advantages as well as the actual access to undue advantages. The smallest 
element, however, remains as the smallest perceived advantage that an agent can rationalise 
(and neutralise). Thus, the decision-making process degenerates to the at least level [ALL], 
where this refers to the smallest perceived advantage that can be rationalised. It is easy to 
confuse the semantics of the concept of ALL with something that is very small and that 
develops gradually. That however is not necessarily the case for corruption. The least level of 
corruption may be a rather high level - given the opportunity. The main point with the SUM-
theory is to indicate that corruption is a crime above all that may be prevented and regulated 
primarily by opportunity. Given both the instrumentality of rational choice and the situational 
dependency of the SUM-theory it is logical to suggest that the findings be applied to some 
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4.  APPLICATION 
The argument that prevention is better than a cure may be a worn one, but it remains 
true in many cases, and certainly as far as this analysis goes for corruption. As indicated by the 
previous chapter on SUM-behaviour, corruption truly is a crime affecting everyone, and 
prevention is regulated primarily by opportunity. If corruption is considered largely as an 
opportunity-based crime, the question is how to prevent the deviant behaviour, that creates 
corruption? This chapter will present an adaptation of traditional situational crime prevention 
to the particular phenomenon of corruption. Following Graycar and Prenzler (2013), this 
chapter sets out an approach to corruption prevention which is systematic and theoretically 
informed. Their application of regulatory theory to a situational crime prevention framework 
for preventing corruption is here supplemented with behavioural theory. This approach should 
be seen as complementary to any and all other practices and actors identified for anti-
corruption purposes, including anti-corruption institutions, legislation, the judiciary, audit 
functions, and the police to name but a few. As this chapter will elaborate, there should be an 
intricate balance between preventive and repressive measures, and this is but a theoretical 
exploration of the effective use of the former.  
The application of situational crime prevention techniques as a preventive anti-
corruption framework flows from the SUM-theory.  The chapter will highlight how preventive 
anti-corruption strategies based on criminological theory can be applied. The discussion also 
sheds light on how this potentially can influence and enhance the development of effective 
anti-corruption policy. This chapter will put the SUM-theory into theoretical context, a notion 
that may not sound necessarily contradictory, but it could certainly be questioned what good 
this type of theoretical exercise serves. First, one must understand the theoretical foundation 
of the SUM-theory itself; secondly it is about recognising the behavioural aspect of corruption 
as partly inescapable; and thirdly the significance of the situation in which corruption exists 
must be examined. It is through this latter that the criminological theory of Situational Crime 
Prevention [SCP] comes into the picture. Going back to the first requirement, the 
fundamentals of SUM-theory dictate human nature to be conducive to the search for 
advantages ‘at least level’., Through an array of psychological operations conceptually described 
by rationalisation and neutralisation (with room for more) that search sometimes results in 
immoral and corrupt behaviour. Critics may defer to issues raised around the prevalent focus 
on self-interested and rational actors, and the associated principal-agent approach in objection 
to this (see e.g. Persson et al., 2013). It is therefore important to stress that the basis of 
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behavioural science in conjunction with anti-corruption is built around the fact that agents are 
subject to bounded rationality, sometimes interpreted as nothing but irrationality. Consistent 
with the second requirement above, it would make sense to further investigate the role of 
behavioural mechanisms and their influence on corruption. Insights from behavioural science 
allow us to make suggestions for improved anti-corruption work through improved policies 
and instruments. This rather uncharted territory has been touched upon by Lambsdorff (2015) 
who looked at preventing corruption by promoting trust. .  
There is naturally a distinction to be made between preventive and repressive anti-
corruption measures. Preventive methods include rewarding ethical behaviour, seeking to 
advance positive values and norms, inducing people to behave honestly and contribute to 
corporate and social values (Heineman & Heimann, 2006). On the other hand, repressive 
methods, equally important for fighting corruption, rely on the perceived substantial risk of 
detection and punishment or the threat of being publicly shamed. The question of how 
policies should balance a trustful attitude towards the trustworthy many with the repression 
that is needed for disciplining the potentially corrupt few, is raised by Lambsdorff (2015) with 
the answer that ideally, preventive methods should deter the potentially corrupt while leaving 
the trustworthy unaffected. It is here that a situational prevention of crime becomes useful, as 
it effectively sidesteps the psychology of the offender while focusing on the situation for 
prevention. Thus, at a more-or-less conscious level, it promotes and nudges actors within a 
situation towards moral and non-corrupt behaviour.  
Situational crime prevention in its simplest form can be seen as synonymous with 
opportunity reduction. Where traditionally criminology primarily sought to understand 
offenders and the psycho-social underpinnings of criminal behaviour, situational crime 
prevention is concerned mainly with the situation, i.e. the immediate circumstances under 
which a criminal act is performed. This chapter will provide an introduction to situational crime 
prevention with a further discussion of the conceptual suitability of its being integrated within 
the SUM-theory. A classification within the five-by-five situational crime prevention matrix is 
briefly explored from an anti-corruption perspective. It is through this examination that the 
true scope of using situational crime prevention in an anti-corruption context becomes 
somewhat clearer. Finally, there is a discussion as to the implications for anti-corruption policy 
and instruments.  
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 4.1   Introduction to situational crime prevention 
"Corruption, embezzlement, fraud, these are all characteristics which exist 
everywhere. It is regrettably the way human nature functions, whether we like it or not. 
What successful economies do is keep it to a minimum. No one has ever eliminated any 
of that stuff.” Greenspan (2017, p. 147) 
Fundamentally, the prevention of deviant behaviour in the form of corruption can be 
achieved in two ways; either by changing the agent’s motivation or by removing the 
opportunity. Thus, if an agent is unmotivated to act deviantly even in the presence of the 
opportunity to do so, or conversely if a highly motivated agent is not presented with an 
opportunity, no corruption will occur. The core of situational crime prevention is a belief that 
deviant behaviour can be reduced by effectively altering the situation and subsequently 
reducing opportunity. This is in contrast with many other theories of crime prevention that 
instead focus on changing a potential offender’s personal disposition. There are those that 
claim situational crime prevention provides the most important framework internationally for 
developing effective crime-prevention strategies;, and that it can also be used for corruption 
prevention (see e.g. Graycar & Prenzler, 2013).  
Looking at the literature there are at least two reasons to at least consider opportunity 
as conducive to corruption. There is a large body of evaluated case studies showing substantial 
reductions in specific types of crime as the result of situational crime prevention (see e.g. 
Clarke, 1997). There are methodological issues to be raised around these studies in terms of  
transferability to the concept of corruption, but overall, they point towards opportunity as a 
control for criminal behaviour. Further, in experiments and interviews by and with researchers, 
offenders often testify to opportunity playing a large role in their behaviour (Wright & Decker, 
1994; Ariely, 2012). There is obviously a level of uncertainty regarding to what extent such 
accounts can be trusted, but it does provide strong presumptive evidence that opportunity 
incites immoral and corrupt behaviour. This notion is supported by the findings of this 
research where one participant somewhat humorously claimed that ”It has been said that 
’corruption is like adultery: ninety per cent of it is a matter of opportunity. If you eliminate the 
opportunities, you eliminate the crime” (Participant 26). In the situational crime prevention 
model, opportunity plays a determining role, both in terms of the time and place of criminal 
behaviour but also in eliciting that very behaviour in the first place. Adapting Clarke (Clarke, 
2005, p. 42) opportunity does so in four ways Firstly, immorally disposed agents will commit a 
greater number of corrupt acts if they encounter more opportunities. Secondly, regularly 
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encountering such opportunities could lead these actors to actively seek out even more 
opportunities. Thirdly, agents without pre-existing dispositions can be drawn into immoral and 
corrupt behaviour by a proliferation of opportunities (and temptations). Fourthly, agents who 
are generally moral can be drawn into committing specific forms of immoral acts if regularly 
exposed to easy opportunities for this type of behaviour. The central role of opportunity 
makes situational crime prevention a suitable theoretical framework for this research. But the 
framework as it looks today and the form in which it is applied to this research, had a 
somewhat different form at its conception. 
The development of SCP 
At its conception situational crime prevention struggled to gain acceptance within 
mainstream academic criminology and had a somewhat controversial development. The 
reason is that the approach of situational crime prevention clashes in significant ways with 
those of traditional criminological theory. The general search for understanding the offender is 
replaced with a concern only for the situation in which the offender acts. Neither social 
reforms nor offender rehabilitation, although central and important themes in general, are 
advanced by situational crime prevention. For these reasons, situational prevention is 
sometimes treated with scepticism and suspicion by other criminologists, and is somewhat 
disparagingly classified as ‘administrative criminology’ (Wortley, 2010). As explained by Clarke 
(2005), nobody familiar with criminology including advocates of situational crime prevention 
can deny the importance of root causes of crime, nor does this researcher. Nevertheless, this 
research does put opportunity at the forefront of the prevalence, pervasiveness and 
perpetuation of corruption. Corrupt acts are the outcome of an interaction between a rational 
yet deviant disposition and situational opportunities, and the actor’s decision-making is the 
medium through which these factors bring their unethical influence to bear. 
Situational crime prevention has its origins in research undertaken by the Home Office 
Research Unit in the 1970s. Little over a decade later, Clarke presented a crime prevention 
approach divided into three categories of measures; degree of surveillance, target hardening 
and environmental management (Clarke, 1983, p. 223). Then in 1992, Clarke published a basic 
list of twelve techniques designed to reduce the occurrence of a variety of offences. On the 
basis of further research together with Homel, the list was expanded from twelve to sixteen 
techniques (Clarke & Homel, 1997). This also meant including a fourth category - removing 
excuses - which increased the scope of situational crime prevention to include a broader 
range of crimes committed by ordinary people as much as career criminals. The inclusion of 
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ordinary people harmonises well with the ideas underpinning this research - that corruption is 
a crime available to all. In an answer to Wortley’s (2001) critique, yet another category was 
added by Cornish in collaboration with Clarke (2003). By adding the category of ‘reducing 
provocations’,  the number of techniques increased to twenty-five.  
When discussing the development of situational crime prevention it is worth having a 
closer look at the critique9 presented by Wortley (2001). On one hand, together with the 
response from Cornish and Clarke (2003), it illustrates the flexibility of the situational crime 
prevention framework and its ability to adapt. On the other hand, it also outlines a number of 
issues with situational crime prevention that needs to be addressed. This section concludes 
with a brief outline of Wortley’s critique and the response by Cornish and Clarke. This 
provides an example of how the framework adapted strengthening the argument for 
suggested future adaptation in relation to the prevention of corruption. Wortley’s critique 
mainly revolves around what is considered an undue (and potentially damaging) preoccupation 
with opportunity variables when discussing decision-making from a situational prevention 
perspective. The relative neglect of other situational forces termed ’precipitators’ is also 
highlighted. The types of precipitators identified are: prompts, pressures, permissions, and 
provocations - each argued as being able to provide situationally generated motivation for the 
hitherto unmotivated. The precipitation factors together with regulation factors form the basis 
of a two-stage model, where temporal priority is given to the influence of precipitators in 
motivation, followed by the influences of opportunities when regulating whether or not 
deviancy actually occurs. The point made by Wortley is that controlling precipitators is just as 
important as regulating opportunity. They conclude by offering an additional and 
complementary set of situational crime prevention techniques designed around controlling 
precipitators.  
By academic timescales the response from Cornish and Clarke was immediate, 
published only two years later, in which the gradual widening of the remit of situational crime 
prevention was welcomed. It is recognised that precipitators are useful and perhaps essential 
to adequately address the problem of reducing motivation for deviancy in some environments. 
The main purpose of the response is to explore how, if at all, Wortley’s suggestions can be 
placed within the context of the existing theory.  
                                               
9 A thorough review of the critiques against Situational crime prevention is found in Appendix VIII.  
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"Techniques of precipitator control offer an exciting new direction in both the 
theory and practice of situational prevention, and one that promises new ways of 
thinking about manipulating situational factors for crime control. The fact that the 
techniques are directed at the motivational side of the person-situation interaction 
rather than the opportunity side offers an expanded role for the field.” (Cornish & 
Clarke, 2003, p. 91) 
An increase in available techniques does not necessarily convey a similar increase in the 
effectiveness of situational crime prevention. That only follows if the additional techniques are: 
one, distinguishable from existing ones; and two, as effective or more effective than existing 
ones. With the susceptibility to deviancy also being a product of the theoretical orientation of 
the observer, the task of determining the efficacy of a particular technique is difficult. Cornish 
and Clarke do, however, embrace a better understanding of issues concerning the different 
available techniques that may offer a more nuanced use of situational prevention in relation to 
particular settings and types of agents. Precipitator control - not necessarily coterminous with 
opportunity control - does, however, provide for crime prevention, particularly for the 
unmotivated or unready agent in whom the drive for deviancy may yet be weak. Nonetheless, 
the concept of precipitators is included in the matrix under a new category. Thus, by 
examining the critique by Wortley and the ensuing response by Cornish and Clarke it does 
seem likely that with time and the development of research and technology, the matrix will 
keep growing. The current version, however, consists of five categories with five techniques 
each for a total of twenty-five techniques of situational crime prevention aimed to reduce 
opportunity. It is, nevertheless, this capability to adapt and grow that may invite research like 
this to be merged with situational crime prevention theory, not necessarily in an effort to 
expand the matrix itself by adding new categories or techniques, but rather to refine the 
measures for an effective anti-corruption framework.  
The principles of SCP 
Situational crime prevention can be characterised by the following three types of 
measures;, one, those directed at highly specific forms of crime; two, those that involve the 
management, design, or manipulation of the immediate environment in as systematic and 
permanent a way as possible; and three, those that reduce the opportunities for crime and 
increase its risks as perceived by a wide range of offenders (Clarke, 1983). The theoretical 
underpinnings of situational crime prevention stem from three main sources: rational choice 
theory (Cornish & Clarke, 1986; Clarke & Felson, 1993); crime pattern theory (Brantingham & 
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Brantingham, 1993), and routine activity theory (Cohen & Felson, 1979; Felson, 2000). Routine 
activity, as previously discussed, is a ’macro’ theory that seeks to outline how societal changes 
can influence opportunities which in turn are mediated through the availability of suitable 
targets and the supply of capable guardians. On a ‘meso’ level, crime pattern theory focuses 
on communities (or similar) and seeks to explain how actors either seek or stumble across 
opportunities for deviant behaviour in everyday life. Lastly, the rational choice perspective, as 
previously discussed, provides a ’micro’ level of detail, pertaining to the decision-making 
processes of an individual agent.  
The taxonomy of situational crime prevention varies between scholars and it is 
important to clearly outline the hierarchy before setting out to discuss various parts in detail. 
The entire matrix is what constitutes the framework and within it are 25 techniques organised 
under 5 categories. Each technique consists of a number of tentative measures, see figure 8.  
Figure 8: The taxonomy of the situational crime prevention matrix.  
In its current form, the situational crime prevention is modelled through a five by five 
matrix - the situational crime prevention framework, with the five rows categorised as: 
Increase the Effort, Increase the Risks, Reduce the Rewards, Reduce Provocations, and 
Remove Excuses. The subsequent 25 brackets represent specific classifications of techniques, 
where several are particularly relevant to preventing corruption. The categories are briefly 
outlined below, both from a classic situational crime prevention perspective coupled with a 
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conceptual adaptation for prevention of corruption opportunity. An important note, also 
stressed by Graycar and Prenzler (2013), in their book Understanding and Preventing 
Corruption, is that the matrix should be seen as a guide to thinking about solving crime 
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4.2   The SCP-matrix contextualised  
”When a man is denied the right to live the life he believes in, he has no 
choice but to become an outlaw.” (Mandela, 2008, p. 154)  
In this section, the 25 techniques of the Situational Crime prevention matrix will be 
contextualised for corruption from a SUM-theory perspective. The measures within each 
technique will be briefly discussed, taking into account the ’at least level’ assumption. Where 
appropriate, some techniques are discussed in more depth than others to better illustrate the 
possible effects of reducing situational opportunity on corruption. What is presented here is 
largely a theoretical discussion with little or no empirical evidence to support the adaptation or 
its potential efficacy. The idea is rather to explore how the situational crime prevention 
categories can be adapted for anti-corruption purposes by outlining some creative and hopeful 
inspirational ideas. This section should be considered more as an academic thought 
experiment than anything else. 
”What can be changed? Primarily your own behaviour. There are parameters 
inductive to corruption just as there are parameters that are not. It is even more 
important with these parameters when governance is weak and for example there is 
a lack in the political will. It is about keeping a clean house - to create long term 
confidence. To do that you have to begin in the right end, prioritise the risks and 
always start with yourself. This is because corruption is built upon human nature - 
Maslow’s hierarchy of needs against some type of self-realisation.” (Participant 1312) 
Table 3 is the classical five by five situational crime prevention matrix in its most recent 
form. Examples of classical measures are given for each of the techniques to contextualise the 
adaptation to anti-corruption measures. To further aid this contextualisation the following 
sections will describe the classical conceptualisation of each technique and its transition to an 
anti-corruption context. Then, before identifying and explaining anti-corruption measures for 
each technique, some of the critiques of situational crime prevention will be addressed.     
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Table 3: The twenty-five techniques of situational crime prevention with classical measures. 
Increase the Effort  Increase the Risks  Reduce the Rewards  Reduce Provocations  Remove Excuses 
1. Target hardening 









- Take routine 
precautions: 
go out in group at 





11. Conceal targets 




- Unmarked bullion 
trucks 
16. Reduce 
frustrations and stress 
- Efficient queues and 
polite service 
- Expanded seating 
- Soothing 
music/muted lights 
21. Set rules 
- Rental agreements 
- Harassment codes 
- Hotel registration 
2. Control access to 
facilities 
- Entry phones 
- Electronic card 
access 
- Baggage screening 
7. Assist natural 
surveillance 
- Improved street 
lighting 




12. Remove targets 
- Removable car radio 
- Women’s refuges 
- Pre-paid cards for 
pay phones 
17. Avoid disputes 
- Separate enclosures 
for rival soccer fans 
- Reduce crowding in 
pubs 
- Fixed cab fares 
22. Post instructions 
- “No Parking” 
- “Private Property” 
- “Extinguish camp 
fires” 
3. Screen exits 
- Ticket needed for 
exit 
- Export documents 
- Electronic 
merchandise tags 
8. Reduce anonymity 
- Taxi driver IDs 
- “How’s my driving?” 
decals 
- School uniforms 
13. Identify property 
- Property marking 
- Vehicle licensing and 
parts 
marking 
- Cattle branding 
18. Reduce 
emotional arousal 
- Controls on violent 
pornography 
- Enforce good 
behaviour on soccer 
field 
- Prohibit racial slurs 
23. Alert conscience 
- Roadside speed 
display boards 
- Signatures for 
customs declarations 
- “Shoplifting is 
stealing” 
4. Deflect offenders 
- Street closures 
- Separate bathrooms 
for women 
- Disperse pubs 
9. Utilise place 
managers 
- CCTV for double-
deck buses 
- Two clerks for 
convenience stores 
- Reward vigilance 
14. Disrupt markets 
- Monitor pawn shops 
- Controls on 
classified ads. 
- License street 
vendors 
19. Neutralize peer 
pressure 
- “Idiots drink and 
drive” 




24. Assist compliance 
- Easy library checkout 
- Public lavatories 
- Litter bins 
5. Control tools/ 
weapons 
- “Smart” guns 
- Disabling stolen cell 
phones 
- Restrict spray paint 
sales to juveniles 
10. Strengthen formal 
surveillance 
- Red light cameras 
- Burglar alarms 
- Security guards 
15. Deny benefits 
- Ink merchandise tags 
- Graffiti cleaning 
- Speed humps 
20. Discourage 
imitation 
- Rapid repair of 
vandalism 
- V-chips in TVs 
- Censor details of 
modus operandi 
25. Control drugs 
and alcohol 
- Breathalysers in pubs 
- Server intervention 
- Alcohol-free events 
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Increase the Effort 
From a classic situational crime prevention perspective these techniques are often 
considered the most basic. These include target hardening, deflection of offenders and control 
measures. Examples of such measures are physical: like locks, tamper-proofing and shatter 
proof glass; deflection of potential offenders through segregation from opportunity and 
temptation; and effort control measures, increasing the difficulty by which an offender can 
access vital instruments. The direct application of these measures to the concept of corruption 
may not appear immediately obvious, a common denominator with more of the classifications, 
but as will be shown there is scope for corruption to be included. The opportunity for corrupt 
behaviour can be influenced by classical target hardening measures, and deflection through the 
clear provision of moral alternatives is also possible. The same goes for control measures, 
popularly embodied through transparency, that arguably also increase the risk of getting 
caught. Increasing the effort is increasingly also a question of information and cyber security, as 
corrupt behaviour today is largely facilitated by digital things more so than locks and bolts.  
Hardening targets in terms of preventing corruption can be seen from two distinct 
perspectives, one incorporating hard measures and the other soft. The hard measures are 
those most commonly associated with situational crime prevention and target hardening in 
general. The equivalence of adding physical security measures can easily be envisaged in terms 
of digital locks and safeguarding the corruption context. The brute force required to break a 
lock is similar to that of cracking a password and may leave just as evident signs of a break-in. 
Digital footprints could be stored and used as evidence for investigating, identifying and 
prosecuting an offender. When it comes to soft measures, one must consider that the ’target’ 
of corruption is an individual, or a group of individuals. Therefore, it is arguably also possible to 
harden those targets in terms of preventing corruption. Target hardening in this sense could 
include traditional measures such as ethical training and communication of anti-corruption 
policy; but also, more unorthodox techniques like psychometric evaluations and aptitude tests. 
Such tools could guide those responsible for anti-corruption in the further design of training 
programs and policy development.  
When adapting the control of access to facilities it is important to remember that the 
agents of corruption are individuals. So, in a sense that would mean restricting the access to 
certain individuals, or at least the uncontrolled access. It is recognised that the lobbying 
industry is highly influential in policy making (Baumgartner, Berry, Hojnacki, Leech, & Kimball, 
2009), with its connection to both money and power also an area susceptible to corruption. 
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Some push to require lobbyists to declare certain information about themselves, their funding 
and agenda e.g. ALTER EU. The situational crime prevention technique possible here is 
restricting access of those lobbyists that do not comply with this request of information and 
thus restricting their access to policy- and decision-makers. Another way to prevent 
corruption is to regularly record discussions with decision-makers . While it would not imply a 
physical restriction of access to the decision-maker, it would mean a significant restriction in 
access to the opportunity of corruption. As one participant stated, ”people are as corrupt as 
they are allowed to be” (Participant 26). 
The mapping of where individuals that are engaged in businesses prone or susceptible to 
corruption could be another way to prevent corruption. If the proverbial exits were screened 
there would be a track-record of the movement of an agent. The spatial data could then be 
mapped against other agents in order to investigate with whom contact has been made. 
Contact does obviously not imply corruption but coupled with the required recording of any 
such meeting mentioned above there could at least be cause for concern. The possible 
repercussions thereof could be a disincentive to corruption. For obvious reasons it is easy to 
criticise such monitoring with a Big Brother type of argument. Perhaps, more realistic and 
viable would be the incorporation of a digital control system that would tag certain data, 
PDF:s, spread-sheets, etc. When a controlled environment is exited, an alert is triggered. This 
would reduce the opportunity to accidentally or intentionally divulge sensitive information: for 
example, in a procurement process.  
The deflection of potential offenders can be seen as both an exclusive and inclusive 
operator. From an exclusion standpoint one could consider those that have been convicted or 
suspected of corruption to be excluded from any discretionary function. Thus, for example, 
ruling out certain individuals involved in policymaking or certain sub-contractors in a public 
procurement process. Conversely, it can also be seen from an inclusive perspective where 
power or financial disparities are bridged by a ’benefit of the doubt’ approach. As a less 
invasive preventative method is to engage and encourage decision-makers to be partners in 
the fight against corruption. Then their subjective insights can be collated. This could in turn be 
the basis for excluding (or even sanctioning) corrupt behaviour.  
This is arguably a classification where situational crime prevention is somewhat more 
difficult to apply. The reason is simply because no particular tools or weapons are needed to 
be corrupt. The only requirement is free will, a concept previously discussed and considered 
to be under the command of any sane actor. Classic situational crime prevention talks about 
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disabling stolen cell phones where the cell phone is the tool controlled; it is obviously harder 
to disable free will. It is possible to imagine measures such as the four-eyes principle where a 
second actor must verify a decision before it is implemented. Intuitively it would seem more 
difficult to corrupt two persons than one, a belief which in its intuitive persuasiveness is widely 
held (Six, van der Veen, & Kruithof, 2012). The effects of the four-eyes principle are however 
questionable, particularly from a SUM-theory perspective. Motivated primarily by distrust, it 
may reduce intrinsic motivation for moral behaviour (Lambsdorf, 2015). Further, groups of 
people often express more immoral SUM-behaviour than individuals (Charness & Sutter, 
2012). Moreover, the resulting diffusion of responsibility feeds rationalisation and neutralisation 
of deviant behaviour. Indicative research actually points towards the four-eye principle often 
being ineffective and even increasing corruption (Schickora, 2011; Frank, Li, Bühren, & Qin, 
2015). It is quite possible that there is a place for the four-eyes principle in a comprehensive 
anti-corruption framework., However, it is important to acknowledge that distrusting 
employees and inventing methods for reducing their discretionary power can easily backfire 
(Lambsdorf, 2015).   
Increase the Risks 
Most offenders in general and those engaged in corruption in particular are more 
concerned about the risk of getting caught than about the potential consequences. From a 
classical perspective, this stems from the fact that once apprehended, consequences - given a 
functional judicial system - are inevitable. The offender can do little to prevent them, thus the 
focus is on not getting caught. This prompts for an increased guardianship and increased 
surveillance and community awareness. The case for corruption is perhaps somewhat 
different, where many of those clearly engaged in corruption are also under the dark embrace 
of impunity (Núñez, 2007),. rendering the concern about consequences after being caught less 
important. There is however a strong societal push, both locally, nationally and perhaps most 
strongly on supranational levels for these type of acts to be stigmatised (M. Johnston, 2005). 
Therefore, similar measures in terms of increased guardianship, natural as well as digital 
surveillance, and a deeper understanding of the detriments and perils of corruption, can be 
applied for preventative purposes. 
As discussed under the previous classification of controlling tools and weapons, it is not 
enough to simply extend the guardianship by dividing the decision-making capacity between 
two actors. One would be caught in a loop of infinite regression if saying that three decision-
makers would be better than two, making four better than three and so on. The argument is 
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not to include every possible decision-maker in every possible decision. If guardianship is 
interpreted as a common responsibility, then it should be extended to the point where it 
encompasses everyone involved. A shared understanding of norms, values and corruption 
would certainly go a long way, but perhaps not all the way. This is because it is also possible 
that the shared morals are not optimal. While there certainly are universal norms and values 
conducive to preventing corruption, they must be dealt with differently depending on context 
(Stiernstedt and Button, 2017) . Nonetheless, there is a valid argument for extending the 
moral guardianship, based on universal morals that are contextually adapted and shared by 
everyone involved.  
The assistance of natural surveillance making it obvious to those involved when acts of 
deviancy are conducted is another anti-corruption measure. A comparison with improved 
streetlighting to make behaviour clearly visible to others can be made. It does, however come 
with two important caveats. First, there must be observers and those observers must be able 
to act upon those observations. Also, even if there are observers present, they must not, for 
various reasons, choose to turn a blind eye. This again calls for an ethical culture where a 
shared understanding of the detriments of corruption create incentives for non-corrupt 
behaviour. Following the SUM-theory definition, the rationale is that it must be perceived as 
advantageous to refrain from acts of deviance. For the observers to be able to act on 
observations there must be an established routine of doing so, a reporting system that 
connects the observers with either an internal or external audit function. This function already 
exists to some extent and is generally referred to as a whistle-blower function. For a whistle-
blower function to work efficiently there has to be an audit function that has the mandate to 
investigate and the ability to control or even power to sanction those responsible for the 
deviancy. Furthermore, the actor blowing the whistle must be afforded adequate protection 
and remain anonymous. 
The other side of protecting the identity of whistle-blowers is clearly establishing the 
identity of the decision-makers. This connects with transparency, a concept that could prove 
effective in reducing corruption under certain circumstances. Lindstedt and Naurin (2010) 
found that just making information available will not prevent corruption if conditions for 
publicity and accountability, media circulation and free and fair elections are weak. Further, 
transparency measures implemented by the actor itself are less effective compared to 
independent transparency institutions, such as a free press. The implication of this is that 
transparency should be accompanied by measures also directed at strengthening the capacity 
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to act upon the information made available through transparency. Examining the limits of 
transparency, De Vries and Sobis (2016) concluded that while transparency plays a crucial role 
in explaining and reducing corruption, in practise it always occurs in combination with 
something else. This makes it difficult to ascertain the value of transparency as a standalone 
function, an assertion that may be of less interest as a comprehensive anti-corruption package 
seldom contains a single measure thought of as a panacea for the problem of corruption. 
There is, however, room for a reduction in anonymity, also at a lower level, by for example 
wearing uniforms to facilitate identification an actor. An example brought by Participant 921 is 
in the transgressions conducted by UN-soldiers in Africa, whose identity was easily established 
allowing for repression of the deviant behaviour.  
In classic situational crime prevention this includes measures such as CCTV, buddy work 
systems and rewarding vigilance. There is perhaps little evidence for the implementation of 
CCTV preventing corruption given the dubious evidence for the efficacy of CCTV of 
preventing crime in general (Gill & Spriggs, 2005). The place manager could instead be thought 
of as an external observer, but how this would be different from external audit in general has 
to be highly context dependent. In sensitive areas, such as certain stages of the procurement 
process, one could imagine an external auditor being required to approve the decisions being 
taken. The subject expertise of such an auditor could naturally come into question and it 
would be important that the auditor would only judge the decisions from previously 
established universal and easily interpreted and applied criteria. This may be a tall order and, in 
reality, very hard to implement. On the other hand, rewarding vigilance is easy. Rewards 
should, however, be kept proportional to avoid ambitious informers who by means of 
perceived advantages, overload the system creating an anti-corruption white noise that hides 
the actual corruption. The same goes for rogue or deviant informers setting up scenarios in 
which other actors are seduced to deviancy allowing for rewards by reporting them. There 
probably is a place for utilising place managers for preventing corruption, but it is probably not 
as evident as for classic situational crime prevention.  
The concept of formal surveillance differs from the natural surveillance in that it is not 
dependent on already present observers but the insertion of new observers for the specific 
purpose of surveillance. Classic situational crime prevention talks about speed cameras, 
intrusion detection systems and private security guards. Formal surveillance is perhaps best 
understood through already existing audit functions. These functions could, however, be 
further developed and tailor-made for anti-corruption purposes. Within the public 
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procurement process, an area identified as particularly susceptible to corruption (see e.g. 
Søreide, 2002), there are certain stages that could call for additional audits. Just as an intrusion 
detection system sends an alert when activated, so could digital systems, calling for special 
attention. The danger, with these types of measures that conceptually are part of a compliance 
system, is the creation of ’compliance fatigue’ where observations of corruption are 
inconvenient mostly because they increase compliance costs (Ernst & Young, 2008, 2014). In 
line with the SUM-theory, the longevity of a compliance system is naturally that the long-term 
benefits of compliance do match their costs, i.e. creating an advantage. As argued by 
Lambsdorff (2015, p. 5), a balance must be found between trusting the many intrinsically 
honest people and distrusting the corrupt few where intrinsic motivation is not crowded out 
by an extrinsic substitute. 
Reduce the Rewards 
An important part of the situational crime prevention focuses on decreasing the benefits 
crime offers. As established by the SUM-theory, actors are constantly seeking advantages - 
some sort of benefit from their actions, be it material, physical or emotional. There are five 
strategies under this heading: conceal targets, remove targets, identify property, disrupt 
markets, and deny benefits. ‘Concealing targets’ does not necessarily mean the concealment of 
the actual target, like parking an expensive car in the garage rather than leaving it on the street 
but can also include the concealment of the possible proceeds from exploiting the opportunity 
for deviancy. ‘Identifying property’, classically achieved by vehicle licensing and property 
marking, can be extended to tagging certain financial transactions, thus reducing incentives. 
‘Disrupt markets’ is the effort to effectively disrupt or destroy the market for illegally or 
immoral obtained advantages. This can be achieved through monitoring those generally in 
possession of illicit advantages and by promoting a strong ethical culture. ‘Deny benefits’ is a 
concept perhaps more difficult to translate to immorality, nonetheless, an argument will be 
made for some strides to be made also in this area. 
Concealing the targets in an effort to prevent corruption would imply either to conceal 
the giver or taker of an undue advantage. In well governed processes the actors are generally 
concealed, bids are submitted anonymously and the final decision-maker on the side of the 
tenderer remains unknown to the bidders. The reality is sometimes quite different and there 
are possibly more instances where this is not the case, than there are those in line with 
optimal concealment. The issue becomes even more complicated when looking at situations 
that are less governed, like nepotism or clientelism, not to mention the extremely opaque 
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corruption occurring in the Swedish ’friendship’ culture. According to Participant (214) 
”(Swedish) cronyism cannot be measured but should be called corruption even if it lies 
outside of what you can be convicted for”. It is probably very difficult to effectively conceal 
targets as a means of preventing corruption but that should not mean that no efforts are 
made to that end. Public procurement processes should be kept anonymous and any 
deviation from this should have consequences. When suggesting an intermediary that would 
act as an anonymiser for such a process there is nothing to say that such a function would not 
run the same risk of capture as the original process. For the even more clandestine friendship-
type corruption, no such intermediary would be feasible.  
In classic situational crime prevention, the targets are physically removed, such as 
removing the radio from the car. Removing the target renders impossible an offence involving 
that particular target. It has been argued that this leads to displacement: the search for another 
car radio to steal, thus just moving the offender from one target to another. Removing the 
targets in a SUM-theory based anti-corruption context would mean removing the decision-
makers, i.e. removing individuals. But that would also mean that you would remove the 
decision itself, obviously making any immoral decisions impossible but the same is true for any 
decision at all and the argument becomes moot. By removing one target, that for whatever 
reason is considered more prone to deviant behaviour, and replacing it with another, could 
possibly reduce corruption, at least temporarily. But replacing targets is not the same as 
removing them altogether.  
Regarding the identification of property, classic situational crime prevention defers 
mostly to physical assets, such as vehicle licensing and cattle branding. In an anti-corruption 
context this could be applied on two levels. The first one is to tag the decisions taken by an 
individual and the other would similarly apply to organisations. This already occurs to the 
extent that those with discretion are required to sign certain documents, thus verifying and 
simultaneously tagging the decision. The same would go for decisions taken more collectively 
as long as they would sort under an organisational brand that would effectively tag any 
decision made, collective or otherwise. The limits of tagging are, however, quite clear as many 
corrupt decisions are not done by acts of signing anything but rather secret agreements behind 
lock and key. Those type of decisions are hard if not impossible to somehow tag for future 
identification. Nonetheless, there is room for decisions to be categorised according to 
discretion, i.e. if a certain state function is responsible for one type of decisions and it is clear 
that its actions are corrupt, then there could be a public naming and shaming of that function, 
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forcing anti-corruption reforms through public opinion. By clearly identifying to whom a certain 
decision belongs, there is scope for anti-corruption incentives to be effective by establishing 
accountability.  
The market for corruption is wide, arguably encompassing the entire world. Having said 
that there are places, settings and individuals that are both more prone and susceptible to 
corruption than others. To disrupt those markets, i.e. where the corruption occurs, one would 
first have to identify and understand those markets. This is because even if there are universal 
norms and values to be found and that subsequently would be the bases from developing an 
ethical and non-corrupt policy framework, those universal morals have to be dealt with 
differently depending on context. Once identified and understood, however, there is room for 
an army of anti-corruption measures to be put in place in order to disrupt a corrupt market. 
Imagine a setting where corruption is pervasive through an abundance of opportunity for 
undue advantages through immoral behaviour, the very epitome of SUM-behaviour. That 
market could be disrupted by changing the perception of those undue advantages to appear 
less advantageous or even disadvantageous. Thus, possible anti-corruption measures are only 
limited by how well the problem is understood, the resources available (time included) and 
the creativity of those responsible for implementation.  
The denial of benefits resides under the heading of reducing the rewards and classic 
situational crime prevention includes measures such as speed bumps on roads and in tags on 
clothes. Speed bumps would undeniably reduce the rewards of speeding if it damaged the car 
in the process; the same goes for the theft of clothes that would be irrevocably stained with 
blue ink. The total denial of benefit is somewhat different. The benefit of speeding is not 
denied if it allows getting to the destination in time regardless of the condition of the car. Nor 
is the benefit of stealing clothes denied if it prevents hypothermia - albeit in an unfashionable 
manner. The denial of benefits can thus be seen as the end point of sliding scale of benefit 
reduction. For anti-corruption one way to deny the benefits is through effective repression. If 
deviant acts are associated with proportionate punishment expedited by an effective and fair 
judicial system, punishment could include the ability to repossess, revoke or, in short, reset any 
undue advantages. Accordingly, and in line with SUM-theory, while it may be harder to 
preventatively deny the advantages of corruption, the capacity to quickly and effectively reset 
those advantages could act as prevention in and by itself.  
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Reduce Provocations 
The ‘reduction of provocations’ focuses on the emotional side of deviancy. By reducing 
provocations, actors are less likely to engage in deviant acts. Here another five headings are 
presented: reduce frustrations and stress, avoid disputes, reduce emotional arousal, neutralise 
peer pressure, and discourage imitation. An underlying driver of the SUM-theory is undeniably 
emotional where these significantly influence our bounded rationality, and possibly also the 
source of what can be labelled as rational irrationality (Caplan, 2008). This is about controlling 
the availability of, access to and influence from provocations for undue advantages. Classic 
techniques like the immediate repair of vandalism to prevent further degradation also have 
significance in preventing corruption. 
Provocations and temptations are an integral part of behavioural theory, SUM-theory 
included. Frustration and stress are not uncommon in situations related to corruption. A 
decision-maker may be highly frustrated over the fact that things are not going as efficiently as 
they should and therefore decides to indulge a deviant behaviour in order to facilitate the 
process and  relieve some of the internal frustration. Another decision-maker is under a lot of 
stress and with deadlines fast approaching decides to clear some of the tasks in a less than 
optimal way succumbing to corrupt behaviour. Research has shown that people tend to act 
more unethically under pressure, from the external pressure illustrated by the famous Milgram 
experiment (1974), to time pressure (see e.g. Moberg, 2000; Andiappan & Dufour, 2016) or 
performance (see e.g. Mitchell, Baer, Ambrose, Folger, & Palmer, 2017). So, by reducing 
frustration and stress it is quite possible that  this would have an impact on levels of 
corruption. If this is achieved by the application of a classic situational crime prevention 
technique such as soothing music, requires more research - but it would be very interesting if 
it proved that it did.  
Classically ‘avoiding disputes’ includes the separation of for example soccer fans to 
reduce the opportunity for offending. In corruption it is more difficult to effectively separate 
the actors in a corrupt transaction. Disputes, on the other hand, could be avoided in a 
corruption context, particularly those arising from corruption as the end product of 
misunderstood values and norms and the lack of a shared culture. That ‘shared culture’ must 
be a culture that from a universally moral standpoint is conducive to prosperity and 
governance, both on an individual and collective level. Thus, the equivalence of a fixed cab fare 
to avoid disputes would be fixed channels for discretion. An example would be merit-based 
recruitment that follows pragmatic, rather than political, guidelines. This type of problem can 
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and has occurred in the highest of echelons like the UN. One example was where the head of 
OIOS, the internal audit of the UN, failed to appoint the most meritorious candidate for head 
of investigations, blocked by none other than the Secretary-General himself (Ahlenius & Ekdal, 
2011). This example points to the difficulties of addressing this problem, but it should be kept 
in mind that few if any organisations are as complex as the UN. It is therefore probably easier 
to avoid similar disputes in other situations, as long as one recognises, understands and adopts 
universal morals for, and contextually adapts them toward, the promotion of shared norms 
and values.  
Emotions are an integral part of behaviour and as explained earlier a source for primarily 
irrational behaviour. Whether or not corruption can be sorted under irrational behaviour is 
examined in more detail in the discussion around the critiques of situational crime prevention. 
In short, corruption is largely not the end- product of irrational behaviour, although it is as any 
other decision-making process, confined by the limits expressed by bounded rationality. 
Driven by SUM-behaviour to obtain advantages, both the chase and the advantage itself may 
cause emotional arousal fuelling deviancy. This could possibly be countered by an increased 
stigmatisation of the acts of corruption. Deviancy that is associated with heavy social stigma is 
naturally curbed, perhaps driven further into obscurity, but also away from any situation that 
has a degree of transparency and where the action runs the risk of being exposed. Such 
exposure reduces the emotional arousal obtained from gaining the advantage or at least make 
it short-lived and could possibly prevent the act in the first place.  
In line with increasing the social stigma of engaging in corruption, peer pressure can also 
be reduced by similar mechanisms. This concerns creating a culture that does not condone 
corruption by anyone, anywhere, at any time. Part of this culture could be to clearly negatively 
reinforce bad behaviour through campaigns analogous to ”Idiots drink and drive” where 
decision-makers are reminded of the perils of deviant behaviour. Important to this is that the 
alternative to the deviant behaviour must be clear as well. The peer pressure can also be 
positively reinforced similar to the ”It’s OK to say No” campaign whose equivalent could be 
something like ”it is OK to blow the whistle”. Behavioural research by the World Bank may 
serve as an example. The World Development Report sought to “enhance the understanding 
of how collective behaviours — such as widespread trust or widespread corruption — 
develop and become entrenched in a society” (World Bank, 2015, p. 2). Various mechanisms 
could promote a future with both push and pull effects on deviant behaviour, nudging 
decision-makers towards moral behaviour.  
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There are two sides to ‘discouraging imitation’. While there is behaviour that is deviant 
where imitation should be discouraged, there is also morally aligned behaviour that should be 
imitated. In classic situational crime prevention well know examples of discouraging imitation 
would be censoring details as to the modus operandi and the broken-windows theory. The 
former is directly applicable to anti-corruption for obvious reasons and the latter, developed 
by Wilson and Kellling (1982), advocates the immediate repair of damages caused by 
vandalism. It has proved effective in a classical sense and could have similar beneficial effects 
when applied to anti-corruption where the damage caused by corruption is immediately 
mended. There is also a strand of behavioural science, with roots in bounded rationality, that 
recognises the importance of trust (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995; Camerer, 2011). The 
fact that an actor is responsive to encouragement, praise, expressions of gratitude and criticism 
(Benabou & Tirole, 2003; Masclet, Noussair, Tucker, & Villeval, 2003; Grant & Gino, 2010), 
could be used to reinforce the tone at the top. A recent experiment by d’Adda, Darai, 
Pavanin and Weber (2017) on how leaders affect ethical conduct, proved to be of utmost 
importance for anti-corruption.   
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Remove Excuses 
The fifth and final classification also rhymes well with the theoretical underpinnings 
provided by the SUM-theory, focusing on the rationalisation and neutralisation in an actor’s 
psyche. Classic situational crime prevention lists efforts like setting rules, posting instructions, 
alerting conscience, assisting compliance, and controlling substance abuse. The establishment 
of agreements between parties can be as simple as a rental contract, but also between foreign 
aid donors and recipients regarding ethics and corruption. Making anti-corruption policy easily 
available is similar to posting a ”No parking” sign, and having a decision-maker sign a 
compliance statement similar to alerting drivers to the upcoming speed cameras. Assisting 
compliance is achieved through making policy and compliance documents understandable to 
the actors affected by them. The control of substance abuse hopefully requires little if any 
justification in terms of its detrimental effect on judgment.   
If there are no rules set then the behaviour has only to be rationalised according to an 
individual set of rules, i.e. morals, and those could obviously vary. Also, the neutralisation 
process becomes significantly easier if in lieu of rules, the benchmark against which actions 
conflict of is unclear according to the rules. The absence of rules thus facilitates deviant 
behaviour, for both the agent, who regardless of knowing that an action is immoral seizes an 
opportunity to gain an undue advantage as well as the agent unknowingly engaging in corrupt 
behaviour. It is therefore, important not only to set rules but also to communicate and if 
necessary, educate those affected by the rules. The prevention of corruption equivalent to 
rental agreements and hotel registration forms are most obviously policy documents. It is, 
however, vital to make sure that those operating under the rules are fully aware of the rules, 
something that can be achieved partly through the ’tone-at-the-top’ discussed earlier. Further, 
rules must be fully understood, which in many cases can be somewhat difficult given the 
complexity generated by variety in, for example, culture and history. Some policy documents 
themselves are very complex and not easily understood. Therefore, training and education in 
the rules may be required in many settings.  
”Corruption is very common and there are no incentives to do anything 
preventive about that over and above what other firms are doing.”(Participant 118) 
Building further on the concept of setting rules, if rules are set, practical or moral, then a 
prompt drawing attention to those rules can prevent deviant behaviour. As exemplified by 
experiments, described by Ariely (2012), the prompts can be very simple yet still effective. A 
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pair of eyes over a tray of doughnuts with a jar next to it, where one can voluntarily put 
money, can increase the amount of money in the jar. This obviously nudges people into taking 
less advantage of opportunity for an undue advantage. From a critical standpoint an argument 
can be made that it is important that nudging would only occur if the actor understood both 
the social norm of how to act and the implied meaning of the watching eyes. This is perhaps a 
somewhat unlikely scenario. but in the more complex real world and particularly in terms of 
corruption, there could certainly be situations where a lack of shared norms and values could 
lead to posted instructions being misunderstood and therefore having little effect. As one 
participant explained, ”To understand corruption one must understand motivation and there 
isn’t a full understanding of corruption because peoples’ motivation change” (Participant 418). 
Establishing the universal morals (less subject to change) according to which behaviour is 
expected and sometimes required could make the use of posting instructions useful in an anti-
corruption setting.  
Actors in corruption-prone situations are often requested, expected and sometimes 
required to sign compliance statements. ‘Reminding’ officials and employees of moral duties is 
a widespread method of diverting attention away from purely self-serving goals (Lambsdorf, 
2015). As mentioned earlier compliance statements can sometimes be very lengthy and hard 
to understand. The result is that the actors risking corruption have not read or understood 
well the statement. Thus, the message conveyed is that comprehension of the statement is 
not a prerequisite for signing. Rather, it can be interpreted as pointless formality, or a diffusion 
of responsibility diverted from the top to the decision-makers and thus not in line with the 
concept of the ‘tone at the top’. A SUM-theory based approach would instead provide very 
short, easily understood, moral reminders at a time when they are salient to decision-making. 
This approach has empirical grounding where alerting conscience in different ways has proven 
to improve ethical behaviour (see e.g. Mazar et al., 2008; Resnik & Curtis, 2011). This measure, 
adapted for anti-corruption purposes, would consequently be to let decision-makers sign a 
compliance statement at the time of the decision-making. 
It is important to remember that people are not intrinsically evil, and that this is not a 
claim supported by the SUM-theory. Instead people do behave in a way that gives them a 
perceived advantage of some sort, and the pursuit of such advantages can sometimes lead to 
corrupt behaviour. It is, however, not the unavoidable endpoint of SUM-behaviour. Instead the 
SUM-theory leaves room for ethical and non-corrupt behaviour where the search for 
advantages does not mean that all advantages sought are necessarily deviant. In fact, it would 
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arguably be the opposite, where most decisions take by an actor conform to universal norms 
and by all accounts would be considered non-corrupt. There are those that argue ardently for 
the fact that behaviour can be conditioned and thus lead people to better (less deviant) 
decisions (see e.g. Pink, 2011; Lambsdorf, 2015). From that perspective it is important to 
facilitate desired behaviour. From a SUM-theory perspective the fundamental idea would be to 
create an environment in which it would be, or at least perceived to be, as advantageous to 
be compliant with the established non-corrupt norms and values.  
This final classification requires little justification in almost any crime prevention 
endeavour. Behaviour may be difficult to predict in general, and certainly not simplified by 
being under the influence of drugs or alcohol. With room for the possible exception, 
judgment is impaired by using drugs and alcohol, and bounded rationality becomes even more 
constrained by the added effects of a toxic substance. Not only can this provide the decision-
maker with an expanded array of possible actions in pursuit of advantages, many of which are 
deviant and to the unaffected mind clearly corrupt, and some that are just plain irrational. As 
with most vital functions in society, things operate better in the absence of intoxicated agents. 
It is, however, acknowledged that in terms of corruption, drugs and alcohol probably play a 
less significant role than say, for example, in violence crime. Nonetheless, the message is: avoid 
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4.3   Application of the matrix 
”The concerns and approaches of situational prevention contrast in significant 
ways with those of traditional criminological theory. Where criminology generally 
seeks to understand offenders and the social and psychological forces that create 
them, situational prevention is concerned only with the immediate circumstances 
under which crime is performed. The situational approach promotes neither social 
reform nor offender rehabilitation, both central themes elsewhere in criminology. 
Instead, situational theorists and researchers actively engage with police and other 
governmental agencies to help tackle immediate crime problems. For these reasons, 
situational prevention is often treated with scepticism and suspicion by other 
criminologists.” Wortley (Wortley, 2010, p. 1). 
There is evidence for situational crime prevention reducing deviancy. In the book 
Situational Crime Prevention: Successful Case Studies, Clarke (1997) provides 23 examples of 
such reductions. Two of those case studies relate to corruption. The first, based on research 
by Knutsson & Kuhlhorn (1997) revolves around reduction of cheque fraud in Sweden. When 
identification became a requirement in the late 1970s for cashing cheques worth more than 
300 SEK, cheque fraud offences fell by 86%. The previous system, which relied on repression 
through complex police investigations and prosecutions - both expensive and ineffective - was 
largely superseded by a situational measure based on reducing anonymity. A second example 
is an evaluation of the impact of data matching on fraud in housing subsidies. Here the ability 
to cross-reference databases reduced the opportunity for deviancy by increasing formal 
surveillance and improving access control. These case studies have a number of implications 
for preventing corruption related to situational techniques such as increasing the effort, 
increasing formal surveillance, and reducing anonymity. 
Finding the most effective techniques, Clarke (1997) argues, is best achieved through an 
action research paradigm. Action research is a broad concept with a complex history because 
it is not a single academic discipline but an approach to research that has emerged over time 
from a wide range of fields (see Brydon-Miller, Greenwood, & Maguire, 2003). There are 
many definitions of action research, individually more or less appropriate for a certain context 
(see e.g. Gilmore, Krantz, & Ramirez, 1986; Reason & Bradbury, 2001). Put simply, action 
research involves ’learning by doing’. What separates this type of research from general 
professional practices, consulting, or daily problem-solving is the emphasis on scientific study, 
which is to say the researcher studies the problem systematically and ensures the intervention 
is informed by theoretical considerations (O’Brien, 2001). For the purposes of this research 
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and in line with its philosophical paradigm action research is interpreted as 
practitioner/researcher collaboration and the involvement of stakeholders in an applied 
research process. Clarke (Clarke, 1997, p. 15) sets out five stages analogous with action 
research for the implementation of a situational crime prevention project. Firstly, the collection 
of data about the nature and dimensions of the specific crime problem. Secondly, the analysis 
of the situational conditions that facilitate the committing of the crime in question. Thirdly, the 
systematic study of possible means of blocking opportunities for these particular crimes, 
Fourthly, the implementation of the most promising, feasible and economic measures. Fifthly, 
the monitoring of results and dissemination of experience. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the measurement of corruption required for this type of 
action research paradigm is problematic. While the intricacies of measuring corruption and 
developing adequate indicators are largely omitted from this project, there is much research 
and some progress in both areas. Consequently, there is hope for an ever-increasing reliability 
of estimates of corruption which would be beneficial when considering situational prevention 
techniques as part of an anti-corruption strategy. The application of SUM-theory to situational 
crime prevention theory at this point should thus be seen as a theoretical exercise, 
nonetheless an interesting one, perhaps inspiring and fundamental to future research projects.   
It deserves to be repeated that the exploration of the classifications should by no means 
be considered as a complete account. Under many of the classification headings there is much 
more to be done, and under some, the proposals feel somewhat forced. The matrix, however, 
should not be seen as a list of 25 unique techniques with measures that can be taken in 
isolation. The idea is to view the matrix as a mesh framework with an array of measures 
applied collectively, that interact and reinforce the total effect, in this case the prevention of 
corruption.  
It is recognised that an application of situational crime prevention for anti-corruption 
purposes require significant empirical research and real world testing before any solid 
conclusions can be drawn. The main point, however, is that since prevention is better than 
cure, it is worth considering fringe ideas like this to break out from silo thinking and being 
stuck in the same tracks. Note that when it comes to effectively fighting corruption there 
nonetheless has to be a balance between preventive and repressive measures. This idea is not 
to completely remove or make obsolete control mechanisms and repressive after-the-fact 
instruments in a utopian search for prevention by opportunity reduction while still preserving 
freedom of choice. While advancing prevention as important, there should be no doubt that 
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repression and punishment have to contribute to anti-corruption (see e.g. Lambsdorf, 2015). 
One can only hope that perhaps some a researcher, policy-maker or other anticorruption 
advocate looks at this and gets an idea that in fact will improve the corruption situation 
somewhere.   
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4.5   Chapter four summary  
This chapter has presented an adaptation of traditional situational crime prevention to 
the particular phenomenon of corruption. It highlighted how preventative anti-corruption 
strategies based upon criminological theory can be applied. Prevention of deviant behaviour in 
the form of corruption can be achieved in two ways: either by changing the agent’s motivation 
or by removing the opportunity. Situational crime prevention in its simplest form can be seen 
as synonymous with opportunity reduction. There are at least two reasons to at least consider 
opportunity as conducive to corruption. One is that there is a large body of evaluated case 
studies showing substantial reductions in specific forms of crime as the result of situational 
crime prevention. The other is that in experiments and interviews by and with researchers, 
offenders often testify to opportunity playing a large role in their behaviour. The approach of 
situational crime prevention clashes with those of traditional criminological theory. The general 
search for understanding of the offender is replaced with a concern only for the situation in 
which the offender acts. Situational crime prevention can be characterised by the following 
three measures; one, directed at highly specific forms of crime; two, that involve the 
management, design, or manipulation of the immediate environment in as systematic and 
permanent a way as possible; and three, so as to reduce the opportunities for crime and 
increase its risks as perceived by a wide range of offenders. In its current form, situational 
crime prevention is modelled through a five-by-five matrix, the situational crime prevention 
framework, with the five rows categorised as: increase the effort, increase the risks, reduce the 
rewards, reduce provocations, and remove excuses.  
From a classic situational crime prevention perspective, the techniques to increase the 
effort are often considered the most basic. These include target hardening, deflection of 
offenders and control measures. The opportunity for corrupt behaviour can be influenced by 
classical target hardening measures, and deflection through the clear provision of moral 
alternatives is also possible. The same goes for control measures, popularly embodied through 
transparency, but arguably that also increase the risk of getting caught. Increasing the effort is 
increasingly also a question of information and cyber security. Most offenders in general and 
those engaged in corruption, in particular, are more concerned about the risk of getting caught 
than about the potential consequences. If the offender can do little to prevent the 
consequences the focus is on not getting caught. The case with corruption is perhaps 
somewhat different, where many of those clearly engaged in corruption may also enjoy some 
degree of impunity (Núñez, 2007). There is however a strong societal push, both locally, 
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nationally and perhaps most strongly at the supranational level for these types of acts to be 
stigmatised (M. Johnston, 2005). Therefore, similar measures in terms of increased 
guardianship and natural as well as digital surveillance can be applied for preventive purposes. 
Furthermore, an important part of the situational crime prevention focuses on decreasing the 
benefit that criminal behaviour offers. As established by the SUM-theory actors are constantly 
seeking advantages from their actions: be it material, physical or emotional. This is closely 
connected to the ‘reduction of provocations’, which focuses on the emotional side of 
deviancy. By reducing provocations actors are less likely to engage in deviant acts.  Also, the 
fifth classification, ‘removing excuses’, rhymes well with the theoretical underpinnings provided 
by the SUM-theory, focusing on the rationalisation and neutralisation processes in an actor’s 
psyche. Classic situational crime prevention lists efforts like setting rules, posting instructions, 
alerting conscience, assisting compliance, and controlling substance abuse. These are converted 
to facilitating ethical decision-making and assisting compliance.  
There is evidence for situational crime prevention reducing deviancy. Finding the most 
effective techniques is best achieved through an action research paradigm. The application of 
SUM-theory to Situational crime prevention theory at this point should thus be seen as a 
theoretical exercise. Thus, the exploration of the classifications in a SUM-theory based 
theoretical framework should by no means be considered a complete account. It is recognised 
that an application of situational crime prevention for anti-corruption purposes require 
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5.   DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this research has been to generate a conceptual theory for how the 
perception of corruption influences behaviour.  There are many qualitative surveys 
comprehensively covering the topic of corruption, but few qualitative analyses of in-depth 
interviews. This research strives to close that gap by shedding some ’qualitative’ light on the 
‘reality’ found in the surveys. The primary aims are thus to develop a substantive theory 
around the behaviour associated with corruption; and to create a foundation for further 
integration towards formal theory around the behaviour associated with corruption. As a 
secondary objective, the research asks the following research questions: how can the 
perception of corruption inform our understanding of the behaviour associated with 
corruption; and how does this translate into effective anti-corruption strategies. . This chapter 
will provide a discussion around to what extent these aims, and objectives have been fulfilled.  
The research started with an intuitive idea of corruption and an ensuing discussion of 
the concept, its context and the understanding thereof. In an effort to increase our 
understanding of the phenomenon a grounded theory methodology was developed to 
establish a theory that would underpin human behaviour classified as ‘corrupt’. The theory is 
intended to, at least partially, supersede context, and while some things are omitted, others 
distorted or obscured it provides a mapping of behaviour and corruption. To effectively 
increase our understanding of corruption, it is necessary for the theory to represent a 
simplification of reality. The theory produced is therefore a formula for increased 
understanding of a particular behaviour. Herein, the discussion revolving around the 
development of that theory, from the design of the methodology to the application in 
situational crime prevention, is (just as the theory itself) presented from a higher level of 
abstraction.  
There are clear boundaries to the research in both space and time, as it was undertaken 
within the nation states of the EU over little over three years. Importantly there is, however, a 
degree of cultural homogeneity and an overarching political will to combat corruption 
expressed by the EU. Corruption, while a relatively new priority on the political agenda, has 
over the last three decades increasingly gained attention from citizens, politicians and 
academics alike. Given the specific nature of corruption it is arguably one of the most difficult 
issues to properly address. On the one hand, the citizens of Europe expect the EU to wage 
war against corruption. On the other, the EU Anti-corruption reports concludes that Member 
States have in place most of the necessary legal instruments and institutions to prevent and 
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fight corruption. The results they deliver, however, are not satisfactory across the EU. 
Essentially corruption is about money and power and through its continuation the EU and its 
constituents are being robbed of both. 
Increasing the understanding of corruption would arguably make it easier to combat. 
The understanding developed here occurs on an individual level. Although it may sometimes 
make sense to talk about corrupt countries, or organisations, it is important to remember that 
corruption stems from individuals. It is therefore not surprising that the SUM-theory has its 
roots in the fundamental motivational drivers of individuals. It is those individuals that in turn 
create cultures and although most cultures seem to renounce corruption, context remains as a 
critical differential as opinions may vary on what is illegal and/or immoral. Cultural contrasts 
aside, corruption is generally considered reprehensible and to some extent criminalised. Thus, 
the research goes beyond context and attempts an explanation of corrupt behaviour in 
Europe.  
This chapter will first provide a summary of the entire research with comments of a 
more discursive nature throughout. Then there is an overview of the contribution to 
knowledge provided by this research; a discussion of the utility of grounded theory for this 
type of project; a consideration of the contribution of the SUM-theory and the peripheral 
findings; as well as a proposal of an agenda for future research. Next, the implications and 
impact of the study is discussed, including a section on limitations and weaknesses. The 
penultimate section covers issues of validity and reliability from a purely qualitative perspective, 
covering truth value, consistency, applicability and conformability. The chapter is then closed 
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5.1   Summary of research 
”In qualitative data analysis, the main focus is not on quantification of facts, 
but rather on identifying the meanings and values attributed by individuals in real-life 
situations, with idiosyncratic and personal views forming an important part of the 
overall picture.” (Hewitt-Taylor, 2001, pp. 41-42) 
This section will summarise the research process while also containing comments and 
claims which serve as a holistic assessment of the whole research project., Including reflexive 
thoughts elevates the section beyond a mere descriptive summary. This summary does not 
however include the methodology as this is discussed in-depth in a following section.  
This research is about corruption with the research questions: how can the perception 
of corruption inform our understanding of the behaviour associated with corruption and how 
does this translate into effective anti-corruption? Of all the issues faced by society, corruption 
is one of the most difficult to properly address. Corruption is a substantial concept and when 
colloquially spoken about the discussion often pertains to a smaller part, limited by any 
combination of concept, context or intellect. This work strives to enlighten the reader on the 
last of those limitations, intellect, in an effort to increase understanding of corruption. By 
generating a grounded theory that would underpin human behaviour classified as corrupt, the 
idea is to supersede contextual restraints, at least partially. There is, however, no escape, from 
establishing conceptual limitations. In spite of the fact that most people have their own idea of 
what corruption is, the answer to the question ‘what is corruption?’ will probably differ from 
person to person, organisation to organisation, country to country and so on. 
Although it may sometimes make sense to talk about corrupt countries, or organisations, 
it is important to remember that the smallest elements of analysis when it comes to 
corruption are individuals. The individual may very well be influenced by context, but the 
actions still emanate from the individual. It is an increased understanding of individual 
behaviour when it comes to corruption that is the focus of this research. Further, corrupt 
behaviour is largely conditioned by an understanding of the actions as being illegal or immoral. 
Far more prominent researchers than the author of this study have asserted the effects that 
various forms of pressure can have on deviant behaviour. Arguably, increasing the 
understanding of corruption would make it easier to combat it. Consequently, when a 
problem has been identified, the researcher must select a suitable tool or method to 
investigate it. For a structured approach to research with a certainty of process and enough 
flexibility to let the research phenomenon speak for itself, the method used is a modified 
 
Page 200 of 278 
Grounded Theory. This also reflects a desire to go beyond a merely descriptive thematic 
analysis to reach a higher intelligible abstraction. In choosing to do Grounded Theory one of 
the biggest challenges to the entire research process revealed itself. Normally doctoral 
research commences with an early literature review. The early literature review, however, is 
perhaps one of the most contentious aspects of Grounded Theory. To ameliorate this a 
unique system of handling literature was developed and the position taken in this research 
suggests that a controlled preliminary literature review can be beneficial. 
Using Grounded Theory also required a research paradigm with a solid philosophical 
foundation. Enter ontology, epistemology and axiology. The interrelation of these fundamental 
building blocks is sometimes referred to as philosophical alignment. As this nomenclature 
implies a linear structure an alternate rendition has been offered. The genesis of a 
philosophical nucleus can be conceptually visualised by placing ontology, epistemology and 
axiology in an equilateral triangle individually expanding their realm spherically. The 
convergence in the centroid of the triangle is where the trinity combines forming an 
inseparable actuality. This strong interaction is the epicentre from which this research draws its 
philosophical quintessence as ontologically relativistic and epistemologically constructivist. The 
research is ontologically relativistic in so far as it claims reality and truth to be understood as 
relative to a specific conceptual scheme given that there is a non-reducible plurality of such 
conceptual schemes. Thus, this research subscribes to the notion that reality consists of 
multiple individual truths influenced by context. Changing the conception of truth, from an 
objectively real world waiting to be discovered, to a world made real in the minds and 
through the actions of its inhabitants, assumes data being generated with the researcher as a 
subjective active participant. The research is epistemologically anchored in a constructivist 
paradigm, shifting the focus from knowledge as a product to knowing as a process with 
meaning derived from interactions in the world. Linked to its ontological stance, 
epistemologically constructivism emphasises the subjective interrelationship between 
researcher and that which is being researched, usually human participants, and the co-
construction of meaning. The logic of such subjective co-construction is internal and cannot be 
constructively judged on external epistemological grounds. This position does not, however, 
argue for a state of intellectual anarchy in which anything is deemed valid. Nevertheless, this 
research is regarded as only being epistemologically accountable to its own rules of structure 
and logic. 
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The theory developed within this paradigm is aimed to have an explanatory power with 
a high level of abstraction. Few grounded theory studies build theory, but many provide an 
analytical handle on a specific phenomenon. As this discussion progress it is indicated that, and 
explained how, this research does produce both a theory, the SUM-theory, as well as an 
analytical handle on the phenomenon. The SUM-theory is based on the premise that 
motivation is latent, and that corruption is the product of a degenerated decision-making 
process. In contextualising the theory, a suitable starting point in terms of criminological 
models is routine activity theory. Not only does it assume motivation to be ever-present but 
also has its roots in rational choice theory, where the intricacies of decision-making are at the 
forefront. The first premise of a rational choice approach is that deviant decision-making in 
acts of corruption is a multi-stage process. Motivation can arguably take two forms. The first 
form, positive motivation, where situational precursors drive an agent into deviant behaviour. 
And the second form, negative motivation, where there is an absence of situational precursors, 
appealing to the values and norms held by the agent that nominally would inhibit deviant 
behaviour. Both cases presuppose an underlying latent motivation played upon by external, i.e. 
situational factors - embodying the foundational essence of the following assertion. The 
concept of motivation is something that is intrinsic to all human beings - it is an evolutionary 
by-product of our striving for survival and thus an inseparable part of human nature. The 
implication is that all humans through an innate drive for self-interest utility maximisation 
harbour a default motivation to realise goals in this pursuit, and that situations influence the 
decision-making governing the behavioural outcome thereof. The human mind is sensitive to 
both physical and social context, and situational factors can effectively distort the reasoning 
process permitting individuals to engage in what otherwise would have been forbidden 
behaviour.  
To say that an agent is pursuing self-interest utility maximisation is not to say that 
everyone is completely self-interested in all contexts all the time. Rather, the statement carries 
an assumption that agents are more self-interested in some contexts than others and that the 
ability to act rationally upon whatever level of self-interest there is, may be significantly limited. 
Even acknowledging the tenet of other more or less defined sources of motivation that may 
drive behaviour is of little consequence for the construct of corruption as an opportunity-
based crime. The notion of all being susceptible to corruption came as somewhat of a 
revelation to the author as it contradicted the common idea of ’bad apples’ and instead 
pointed to ’bad barrels’. The contextual seemed somehow to supersede the individual: the 
first seed of the SUM-theory. The SUM-theory stipulates that given an opportunity that is 
 
Page 202 of 278 
perceived as advantageous and that can be rationalised, corruption may be the rational choice. 
Rationality is about intention and purpose where behaviour is interpreted as action and it is 
explained by referring to the underlying reasons for performing it. This is not a new idea: 
Weberian interpretive sociology also emphasises that the rationality assumption is necessary 
for interpreting behaviour as action, and shares with the rational choice approach a 
commitment to methodological individualism. Thus, it is the individual within a situation that is 
central to how goals are deliberately pursued with ‘situation’ understood not as an absolute 
reality but as subjectively perceived. In terms of rationality that is, if deconstructed, it is rational 
for that individual in that situation. 
In an effort to explain the rationality behind SUM-behaviour attention was turned to 
evolution. Despite the difficulty of proving how anything in fact has evolved, it can be said that 
for a trait to selected it must be beneficial to survival and reproduction. As discussed earlier, 
humans have always striven by self-interested utility optimisation to survive and reproduce, 
and two traits that have persisted throughout modern history as vehicles in that pursuit are 
power and wealth. The research findings underpinning this thesis point towards motivation for 
self-interest utility maximisation for both power and wealth as latent variables. That does not 
mean that an agent is constantly preoccupied with either of the two but much like survival and 
reproduction the underlying latent striving for power and wealth is always there. It is important 
to note that this research does not intend to make a causal connection between the striving 
for survival and reproduction to that of power and wealth. The discussion should by no means 
be seen as a conclusive account of the root causes of corruption but rather as a possible 
explanation that makes intuitive sense and, more importantly is grounded, in the data. What is 
drawn empirically from the research is a striving for power and wealth; and unfortunately, the 
achievement of power and wealth is often realised by corrupt behaviour. One may not agree 
that power and wealth are effective instruments for either survival or reproduction. However, 
the research indicates that the striving appears omnipresent in modern society. So, if the 
argument that power and wealth as contemporary vehicles to survival and reproduction 
create latent motivation for achieving goals in line with associated needs and desires, then 
unethical behaviour could appear as a rational choice and corruption would be pervasive: and 
corruption is pervasive. 
The logical conclusion of the arguments presented is that decisions, including those for 
deviant behaviour, are almost always perceived to be rational. Through direct or vicarious 
interactions in everyday life an individual is aware of a wide range of possible choices in the 
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pursuit of self-interest utility maximisation. The choices of interest here are those potentially 
leading to actions of unethical behaviour and corruption. These choices are evaluated within 
the restriction of rationality on the basis of whether an individual is willing and able to put 
them into practice. The restrictions of rationality are that a) only limited, often unreliable 
information, is available regarding possible alternatives, their outcome and consequences; b) 
the human mind has limited capacity to evaluate and process the available information; and c) 
only a limited about of time is available to make a decision. This is referred to as bounded 
rationality and the suboptimal choices are thought of as satisficing rather than maximising. In 
turn, the governing mechanism turning corrupt behaviour into rational choice is rationalisation 
and neutralisation.  
Rationalisation is the cognitive process whereby individuals maintain their perceptions of 
themselves as moral actors by constructing justifications for their deviancy. The earliest writings 
about rationalisation were published over a century ago. In short, rationalisation is a 
reconciliation between actions and norms. The idea behind neutralisation theory is similar to 
that of cognitive dissonance based on three fundamental assumptions. Firstly, it is assumed that 
humans are sensitive to inconsistencies between actions and beliefs. Secondly it is assumed 
that recognition of this inconsistency will cause dissonance and will motivate an agent to 
resolve the dissonance. And thirdly, this dissonance can be resolved in one of three basic 
ways. Resolution may come through a change of beliefs, changing behaviour or change in the 
perception of the behaviour. Note that dissonance theory only states that agents who are in a 
state of cognitive dissonance will take steps to reduce the extent of their dissonance, not that 
these modes of dissonance reduction will actually work. This concept of resolving friction 
between actions and norms is key to the theoretical underpinnings for the findings in this 
research in that it addresses the inescapable human tendency to neutralise.  
Given the latent nature of motivation and how it is highly susceptible to rationalisation 
by neutralisation, the next element necessary for deviant behaviour in the form of corruption 
is opportunity. The logic is that regardless of motivation, and irrespective of rationalisation and 
neutralisation ability - an agent must be presented with an opportunity. Naturally an agent can 
arguably be sufficiently motivated to create an opportunity but the opportunity itself is 
nevertheless an essential necessity. An agent more or less randomly presented with an 
opportunity for corruption would seek to commit actions that are easily rationalised. Thia is 
consistent with the rational choice approach, suggesting that the ability to rationalise would be 
an additional requirement to the basic decision-making task. Consequently, the common 
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denominator of either a mundane agent being presented with an opportunity or a predatory 
agent purposefully creating an opportunity, is just that: opportunity. 
Although opportunity is partly grounded in objective facts (a bribe is either offered or it 
is not), perception of opportunities and their use or rejection is subjective and depends on the 
characteristics of the agent interwoven with a particular context. These will determine the 
extent which cues of opportunity are desired, detected, sized, sought, manipulated, 
manufactured and otherwise related to the agent. Thus, the first steps are taken towards an 
approach where the particular context is at the forefront. This will later be developed into the 
framework for the situational prevention of corruption. Where opportunity control is left as 
the final frontier for effective prevention of deviant behaviour in the form of corruption. 
Identifying the individual as the smallest common denominator of corruption, however, does 
not answer the question of where in the decision-making process the deviancy begins. While 
the findings of this research clearly outline opportunity as a central driver for corruption, it 
does not identify the source of motivation.   Even so, there are some indications that when 
put together offer a plausible explanation. Put simply: it is about gaining an advantage. 
That is not to say that there has to be constant search for advantages but rather that 
advantages obtained must outweigh disadvantages. The smallest element of analysis for 
corrupt behaviour is thus a perceived advantage. Note that, the choice to pursue a perceived 
advantage under the constraints of bounded rationality may very well ultimately lead to a 
disadvantage. In an anti-corruption perspective, it would therefore be equally important to 
influence the perception of advantages as well as the actual access to undue advantages. The 
smallest element, however, remains as the smallest perceived advantage that an agent can 
rationalise and neutralise. Accordingly, the decision-making process degenerates ‘at least level’, 
where the ‘at least level’ refers to the smallest perceived advantage that can be rationalised. 
The at least level of corruption may, nevertheless, be a rather high level - given the 
opportunity. 
Corruption is consequently a crime for all, where prevention is regulated primarily by 
opportunity. If corruption is considered largely being an opportunity-based crime, the question 
is how to prevent deviant behaviour, thus preventing corruption? The fundamentals of SUM-
theory dictate that human nature to at least level is conducive to the search for advantages. 
Through an array of psychological operations conceptually described by rationalisation and 
neutralisation (with room for more), that search sometimes results in immoral and corrupt 
behaviour. Given both the instrumentality of rational choice and situational dependency of the 
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SUM-theory it is not too far a step to suggest the findings be applied to some sort of 
behavioural approach of situational crime prevention. One such theoretical framework is 
embodied in situational crime prevention which could allow for adaptation into opportunity 
controlling preventative strategies for corruption.   
Situational crime prevention in its simplest form can be seen as synonymous with 
opportunity reduction. Where traditional criminology primarily sought to understand offenders 
and the psycho-social underpinnings of criminal behaviour, situational crime prevention is 
concerned mainly with the situation, i.e. the immediate circumstances under which a criminal 
act is performed. Fundamentally deviant behaviour in the form of corruption can be achieved 
in two ways: either by change the agent’s motivation or by removing the opportunity. The 
core of situational crime prevention is a belief that deviant behaviour can be reduced by 
effectively altering the situation and subsequently reducing opportunity. There are at least two 
reasons to at least consider opportunity as conducive to corruption. Firstly; there is a large 
body of evaluated case studies showing substantial reductions in specific types of crime as the 
result of situational crime prevention. Secondly, in experiments and interviews by and with 
researchers, offenders often testify to opportunity playing a large role in their behaviour. 
In its current form the situational crime prevention is modelled through a five-by-five 
matrix - the situational crime prevention framework, with the five rows categorised as: 
increase the Effort, Increase the Risks, Reduce the Rewards, Reduce Provocations, and 
Remove Excuses. The subsequent 25 brackets represent specific classifications of techniques, 
where several are particularly relevant to preventing corruption. An important note is that the 
matrix should be seen as a guide to thinking about solving crime problems - rather than 
providing off-the-shelf one-size-fits-all anti-corruption solutions and measures. Thus, the 
classifications should by no means be considered as a complete account. Under many of the 
classification headings there are much more to be done, and under some the proposals may 
even appear somewhat forced. The matrix, however, should not be considered in isolation. 
The idea is to view the matrix as a mesh framework with an array of measures applied 
collectively that interact to reinforce the total effect: in this case, the prevention of corruption. 
It is recognised that an application of the SUM-theory whether or not through 
situational crime prevention for anti-corruption purposes requires significant empirical research 
and real world testing before any further solid conclusions can be drawn. The main point, 
however, is that since prevention is better than cure, it is worth considering fringe ideas like 
this to break out from silo thinking and being stuck in the same tracks. Perhaps, policymakers 
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will look at this very thesis and gets an idea that in fact will improve the corruption situation 
somewhere. 
The answer to the research question 
The research question read: ”How can the perception of corruption inform our 
understanding of the behaviour associated with corruption and how does this translate into 
effective anti-corruption?” The answer, developed through qualitative analysis of a number of 
interviews with key anti-corruption policy participants, lies in an increased understanding of the 
motivation for corruption, the importance of opportunity for corruption and a situational 
crime prevention approach for corruption. The answer can be summed up under the 
following three headings: corruption is a rational choice, corruption is an opportunity-based 
crime, and corruption is situationally preventable. The choice, i.e. decision-making process is 
rooted in a bounded rationality perspective, where the SUM-theory states that an agent will 
act upon what is perceived to be the most advantageous of available choices. An analogy is 
offered between the striving for survival and reproduction and that for power and wealth, 
where the latter is highly conducive to corruption. This presupposes the tenets of free will and 
a self-interested agent, but not that these two tenets necessarily produce an optimal outcome. 
Instead, deviant behaviour is rationalised at least level, i.e. the most advantageous yet deviant 
behaviour that causes the least cognitive dissonance is neutralised and realised. Yet, it can only 
be realised given the opportunity, thus making the decision-making process susceptible to the 
situation in which actions are to be realised. This points towards corruption being preventable 
through situational design where measures are applied to either reduce the ability for an agent 
to rationalise the perceived opportunity for deviant behaviour or to physically prevent an 
agent from acting upon an opportunity to illicitly gain a perceived advantage. This insight is 
contextualised in a thought experiment where the SUM-theory is applied through the 
situational crime prevention matrix.   
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5.2   Contribution to knowledge 
”…an original contribution requires a certain amount of risk-taking in choosing a 
topic and approach…”  (Baptista et al., 2015, p. 56) 
Doctoral research, by definition, involves a contribution to knowledge. While considered 
an essential component, the contribution itself is difficult to define and quantify. Commonly 
found in literature on doctoral education are concepts of originality, creativity and innovation 
(Baptista et al., 2015). These concepts are often defined with reference to each other, 
indicating their interrelation. Originality can be defined as something that is new or novel, but 
not necessarily applicable or relevant. Herein lies the difference with creativity which according 
to Bennich-Björkman (1997) and Beghetto (2013) respectively has to be relevant and 
applicable. Such notions of relevance and applicability highlight a need for the research to be 
fit for purpose, which in turn is addressed by the concept of innovation. Involving the 
transformation of theoretical research findings into something practically applicable, innovation 
is linked to academic research ”to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century” (EUA, 
2007, p. 2). Together these concepts can be illustrated as in Figure 9.  Broadly, originality in 
this research can be interpreted through the SUM-theory, creativity through the ALL-
assumption and the SCP-matrix through innovation, the following sections will however 
provide far more detail than that.  
Figure 9: The relationship between originality, creativity and innovation for doctoral contribution.  
Adapted from (Baptista et al., 2015) 
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 In this section the outcome and the contribution to knowledge from different stages of 
this research are outlined and summarised. Moreover, the implications of this research for 
theory, practice and further research are discussed. In doing so, both the development of the 
methodology and the findings from the qualitative interviews are taken into account. The 
methodological development is particularly important for at least two reasons: first at the 
outset of the research project, the original interpretations of the methodology precluded an 
early literature review - uncommon to most research projects. When finally, a methodology 
was developed to allow for a limited literature review, the time available to do so was also 
limited. Added to this the exponential increase in time required to apply the constant 
comparison method made for further time related constraints. The literature review related to 
the particular topic under investigation normally establishes what is currently known as well as 
what counts as knowledge in that area of discourse - enabling the argument that the project in 
question constitutes a contribution to knowledge. In this case, as a result of the literature 
review dilemma, and in the time given also considering the existence of a vast published 
literature and that ’everything is data’, there is a significant possibility that the author has not 
read and reviewed everything that is theoretically available on the topic. Thus, as noted in the 
section on reviewing literature, the claim here is that in the literature reviewed and the data 
collected there is nothing to suggest that this is not an actual contribution to knowledge. The 
contribution to knowledge resulting from this research is therefore twofold. On one hand, 
there is the development of a methodology and on the other there are the findings. The first 
is primarily of academic interest for those about to use or already using grounded theory as a 
means of investigation. The second contribution to knowledge is also of interest to academics 
looking to further develop the theory but perhaps more importantly, it has possible 
implications for practitioners in anti-corruption. The breadth of the knowledge contribution 
thus encompasses both academia and industry, and if in time influenced policy involving 
governments, a triple helix10 would be complete.  
Utility of grounded theory for this type of research  
In designing their methodology, some research projects follow the prescription of other 
more or less similar projects. Sometimes following a previously established methodology to 
the letter is a requirement for reliability and comparability with other results, sometimes it is 
                                               
10 The concept of the 'triple helix’ of academia-industry-government relationships interprets the shift from a 
dominating industry-government dyad in the ’industrial society’ to a growing triadic relationship between 
academia-industry-government in the ’knowledge society'.  
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simply out of convenience. There are, nonetheless, another group of research projects, those 
that devise an entirely, or at least partly, new method for investigating a particular topic. It may 
also be the application of an existing methodology that has not been previously used for this 
purpose and requires some adaptation for application. Where there is a considerable field of 
knowledge and a broad body of literature about the topic, one way of approaching the 
investigation of a phenomenon within that topic is to propose a framework for reviewing that 
knowledge and literature. Further, as with GT+, the framework can also highlight an area, in 
which despite an abundance of research there is a relatively limited understanding of certain 
aspects of the topic. In such cases, the methodology and framework itself is a contribution to 
knowledge. This research is such a case.  
Even so, there is still something to be said about the utility of GT+ for this type of 
research. In an attempt to address the overly generic use of the term ’grounded theory’ and 
confusion regarding alternative epistemological approaches to qualitative research, Suddaby 
(2006) outlines six common misconceptions. These misconceptions about grounded theory 
are an excellent starting point to discuss the pros and cons of the methodology developed for 
this research. According to Suddaby, grounded theory is not: (1) an excuse to ignore the 
literature; (2) presentation of raw data; (3) theory testing, content analysis or word counts; (4) 
simply routine application of formulaic technique to data; (5) perfect; and (6) easy. To address 
the first issue, this research involved the development of a new framework as a tool for 
handling literature in grounded theory. Secondly, avoiding the presentation of raw data, the 
account of the analysis and subset net findings are largely devoid of the underpinning ’raw’ 
codes. Thirdly, while the theory is adapted and applied to a framework of situational crime 
prevention this cannot by any scientific degree be considered ’theory testing’, and is instead 
described and labelled as a thought experiment. The constructivist epistemology of the 
research naturally places the emphasis on the thoughts of researcher and participants., The 
fourth misconception is addressed by a constant attention to reflexivity through both abstract 
contemplation and physical memos. The answer to whether this has led to a perfect account 
of the phenomenon and behaviour under study is unequivocally no. This is an important 
lesson that may surprise the novice researcher and is a fact that one must be able make peace 
with for grounded theory to be a satisfactory choice. Sixth and lastly, using GT+ has not been 
easy, and the immense time consumed has led to a trade-off between breadth and depth. For 
a project where depth is more important than breadth, GT+ is a suitable candidate, although 
not the only one; and it is worth considering if a much simpler content analysis approach may 
suffice.  
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In addition to the issues above and as discovered in using this methodology, while 
grounded theory is highly focused on the discovery and construction of theory, it pays less 
attention to the deconstruction of theory. As stated in the opening section on findings, it is 
sometimes difficult to ascertain where relevant information has come from. Is this data snippet 
from an interview, the literature review (to the extent that this is being done) or is this an 
abstraction, elaborated in co-construction between data and researcher? While it is possible to 
argue that this is partly addressed by reflexive memos, in practical terms this would put an 
immense stress on the level of detail included in the memos. For them alone to bear the 
burden of guiding an evaluator through the reverse engineering and deconstruction of theory 
would require the memos to be very long, highly structured and formatted. Such requirements 
could in effect defeat the purpose of the reflexive memos in the first place. The memos, while 
providing an account of the thought process of the researcher’s analytically journey across the 
data towards theory is one thing, using this, as an exact map is another.   
Figure 10. A conceptual overview of the GT+ coding process. 
In Grounded Theory everything is data, but there is no clear distinction between the 
origins of that data. As illustrated by figure 10, data, regardless of origins is broken down into 
codes. In open coding, the codes are combined and compared to create concepts, in axial 
coding the concepts are combined and compared (to both themselves and the codes) to 
create categories, and in theoretical coding the categories are compared and combined (with 
all previous elements) to form a core category around which a hypothesis is formed. Figure 10 
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would indicate that abstraction only occurs at the end but in fact, abstraction occurs at each 
level of the various coding processes. The abstraction is what creates the depth of the analysis 
but does not lend itself well to being deconstructed. Grounded theory is about behaviour and 
designed to go deep, generating a theory at a high level of abstraction: For this it is useful but 
not for much else.  
The contribution of SUM-theory 
 The SUM-theory is the pinnacle of this research endeavour, offering an explanation of 
motivation, neutralisation and opportunity in relation to sought advantages resulting in corrupt 
behaviour. While there is room for improvement and refinement of the theory, discussed in 
the following section on the way forward, the theory as it stands still holds the potential to 
make a contribution that is both academic and theoretical as well as applicable and practical. 
Understanding the mechanisms behind deviant behaviour resulting in corruption is relevant 
both from a criminological and psychological perspective as well as that of providing an 
effective framework for anti-corruption. For the former, the SUM-theory breaks new ground 
in terms of in-depth qualitative analysis of a phenomenon commonly studied by quantitative 
means. As for the latter, the SUM-theory clearly indicates the centrality of opportunity in 
situationally dependent acts of corruption. As discussed in the section on impact, the SUM-
theory has the capacity to inform and significantly improve anti-corruption frameworks. 
Although actual policy changes may be a bit far-fetched at the moment, the shifting of focus 
from corruption as a by-product of ’bad apples’ to the situationally dependent ’bad barrels’ is 
an important one, particularly when dealing with the large global instruments like the ones 
discussed in the introduction. Because, as Rose-Ackerman and Palifka (2016, p. 38) states if 
incentives remain one set of ‘bad apples’ will be replaced by new – i.e. the very essence of 
‘bad barrels’.  
While the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, the United Nations Convention Against 
Corruption, and the Council of Europe’s Criminal and Civil Law Convention on Corruption, all 
set the tone for anti-corruption frameworks at the very top, the SUM-theory can aid in guiding 
effective implementation on the ground – at the level of the individual. The usefulness of 
adding qualitative elements as the result of research and thought experiments similar to this 
project can only be judged by results. Ironically, those results may probably be best measured 
by quantitative means. Nevertheless, the SUM-theory contributes value added to anti-
corruption practice and may also lead to other researchers and practitioners drawing new 
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ideas rooted from the orations of this research, for example developing some of the 
peripheral findings such as the ALL-assumption.  
  
 
Page 213 of 278 
Peripheral findings - the allure of the ALL-assumption 
The ALL-assumption is an exploration of what it is that drives decision-making leading to 
deviant behaviour in the form of corruption. In the grounded theory tradition, the appropriate 
approach is for such an assumption to have a high level of abstraction. Further, even if derived 
from a methodology designed to generate theory this is not a theory and is instead labelled as 
an assumption. This indicates that it is a ‘peripheral finding’, in need of further research to 
reach the level of ’theory’. Nevertheless, it was interesting to see how not only the SUM-
theory grew from the core category but also how there was something else hidden in the 
data. As discussed earlier, the conclusions drawn at this point are that in the search for 
advantages as dictated by the SUM-theory the decision-making process degenerates at least 
level, where the least level refers to the smallest perceived advantage that can be rationalised. 
It degenerates in the meaning that the advantages sought are considered undue, leading to 
deviant behaviour. So, while the SUM-theory arguably provides opportunity as an answer to 
the key element for corruption to occur, the ALL-assumption suggests an answer to the 
subsequent question: an opportunity for what? An opportunity to gain an advantage that is 
smaller than the agent is capable of neutralising. It would, however, be very interesting to 
explore this further. For example, what are the implications of several choices for undue 
advantages that all fall within an agent’s capability neutralise? It could also be interesting to see 
how the collective may influence the individual perception of the least level of an undue 
advantage; if the scope for altruism could increase and decrease with a strong sense of a 
collective direction. Note that, if so, this would not contradict the SUM-theory as the 
individual would still act in what is perceived as the most self-interest utility maximising 
manner, only that the self-interest would be an altruistic one. This somewhat counterintuitive 
notion is discussed in more depth in previous sections of the thesis and it may be worth 
revisiting if one would embark for an ALL-assumption exploration. There are, however, other 
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Way forward and future research 
This is a piece of research that stems largely from the anti-corruption work by the EU as 
embodied in the first EU-anticorruption report published in 2014. As such, a range of 
incentives can and have been proposed for increased effectiveness for the European anti-
corruption agenda. First and foremost, it is important for both the EU as a supranational 
institution as well as its constituent Member States to continually demonstrate political will and 
concrete action against corruption. The EU and national governments should speak and act 
against corruption to confirm a high-level political commitment. This includes positive 
incentives like ’naming and faming’ well-performing Member States, institutions or individuals 
and highlight whatever works in the fight against corruption. At the same time, politicians and 
key stakeholders should not shy away from also bringing up issues and systemic weaknesses 
where those occur, even within the own ranks. For democracy and transparency to prevail 
there may in some cases be a need for increased supranational governance and impartial 
mechanisms through which sanctions could be imposed. In other cases, support of national or 
local efforts may be the solution through established anti-corruption funds where, for example, 
resources can be drawn for awareness and education campaigns.   
Given this premise, where does this research come in and how can it be furthered to 
aid in the fight against corruption? There are several different elements of this research that 
could be envisaged in future and further research. The first of these is the methodology; the 
second is the main findings and improvement of the SUM-theory; the third, an exploration of 
the peripheral findings and the ALL-assumption; the fourth, a refinement of the applied 
situational crime prevention matrix for corruption; and the fifth, empirical research involving 
the application of the SUM-theory for anti-corruption purposes.  
The methodology used is uncommon, given its limitations perhaps rightly so, but as 
demonstrated not only by this research there are truths to be found also by qualitative means. 
Developing a similar methodology, based on, and most importantly still rooted in, grounded 
theory that somewhat could allow for large data sets could be highly interesting. Purists would 
conceivably claim that it would not be ’real’ grounded theory, but as long as the theories 
generated held their scientific ground and stood the test of time and scrutiny then it could still 
be useful. This, in turn, could allow for further research around the SUM-theory through 
additional and follow-up interviews as well as negative case analysis. Improving the theory in 
this way would be analogous with adding digits to pi. Calculating the circumference of a circle 
using 3,14 as an approximation of pi rather than 3 would give mathematically more accurate 
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results, and 3,1415 would be even better still. The SUM-theory as it stands could probably 
benefit from having some decimals added. The same goes for the ALL-assumption that with 
further research could be incorporated in the SUM-theory, or possibly established as a theory 
of its own. From there, the situational crime prevention matrix adapted for corruption could 
be improved as well. There is already a potential for the matrix to be used for effective 
prevention of corruption as will be discussed more in the section on impact. With the matrix 
applied to various contexts, it could be interesting to go back to the roots of SUM-theory and 
investigate the results and effectiveness of the different measures in different situations. Lastly, 
the application of the SUM-theory for anti-corruption purposes can be researched from an 
axiological perspective. Going deeper into the psychological, behavioural and even 
neuroscientific aspects of the SUM-theory may reveal discoveries for an even more effective 
instrumentalisation of anti-corruption efforts. Thus, future and further research based on this 
project may cover theoretical aspects, practical applications, implications and even suggest 
policy recommendations. A final note is that his research is based upon interviews with people 
about other peoples’ behaviour. It would be interesting to apply the same or similar 
methodology in interviewing those that actually have engaged in corruption. Getting to such 
individuals and convincing them to participate may obviously pose some rather significant 
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5.3   Impact and implications 
“For the want of a nail the shoe was lost, 
For the want of a shoe the horse was lost, 
For the want of a horse the rider was lost, 
For the want of a rider the battle was lost, 
For the want of a battle the kingdom was lost, 
And all for the want of a horseshoe-nail.” (Franklin, 1758) 
Impact in doctoral research is often as important as it is undefined, not so much as a 
concept but as a demonstrable metric. On the website of the Economic and Social Research 
Council [ESRC] guidance on research impact is offered. There it is stated that the Research 
Councils UK (RCUK) defines research impact as ”the demonstrable contribution that excellent 
research makes to society and the economy” (ESRC, 2018). This can involve academic or 
societal impact, or both. Academic impact is the demonstrable contribution that the research 
does in terms of scientific advancement, whereas societal impact refers to the benefits the 
research has on society and the economy therein. As with most doctoral research projects, 
dissemination is substantial; however, this does generally not count as impact. This project has 
been presented at numerous conferences and there have been several impact indicators (i.e. 
media coverage) mainly in Sweden where the SUM-theory and situational crime prevention 
approach to corruption has been initially tested. This is not to be confused with impact 
evidence (i.e. policy change) but given the complexity of the phenomenon of corruption as 
discussed in the introduction, policy change is something that moves slowly. Anyone involved 
in policymaking knows that these things do not change rapidly, and the life cycle of policy 
change often far exceeds that of a full-time PhD project. 
Nevertheless, this research has had an impact that is demonstrable, and in a sense is still 
in progress. The impact has been realised through the application of a situational crime 
prevention package for anti-corruption purposes based on the SUM-theory delivered to 
Swedish municipalities. As outlined by other studies the Swedish municipalities are considered 
particularly susceptible to corruption (see e.g. Bergh, Erlingsson, Sjölin, & Öhrvall, 2016). 
Supporting the governance of the municipalities is the Swedish Association of Local 
Authorities and Regions [SKL] with a strong commitment to fighting corruption. That top level 
political leadership commitment is something that in many developing countries cannot be 
taken for granted (Svensson, 2005). A centralised national office, or at least some sort of 
national coordination, is critical to lauding an anti-corruption package like this. In Assessing the 
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Relevancy and Efficacy of the United Nations Convention against Corruption the importance 
of such coordination through a national body or agency is stressed. They are described as the 
intermediary between governments and public opinion, making their political independence 
very important (Brunelle-Quraishi, 2011, p. 108). Therefore, being able to provide the applied 
findings of this research to such a body signifies a societal impact. The provisions were not 
administered through SKL but with permission directly to the local municipalities. Two 
municipalities were approached: and both committed to testing the anti-corruption package.  
A successful anti-corruption campaign has to take into account the particular context be 
it cultural, political, historical or economical. This is made evident by, for example, work in 
Hong Kong by the Independent Commission Against Corruption, and the same goes for any 
endeavour in a country like Sweden. Most importantly, lasting results rest upon a change in the 
culture of corruption. There are obviously other important factors like institutional change, 
improved governance, and transparency to name a few. Further, a free press that seeks to 
expose corruption at every level is critical to changing the culture, and the anti-corruption 
package did get some well-deserved media coverage at its onset. Whether or not the anti-
corruption package will proceed to more and possibly all municipalities remains to be seen. If 
it stalls it would not be the first to do so, particularly given the environment where political 
agendas often trump practical benefits. On the other hand, if it works, it should be scrutinised 
as to clearly establish how well and why it worked as it did, and in a way measuring the 
impact.  
 Work with Swedish municipalities is still in progress and the end result yet to be 
determined. It is however refreshing to see the formal enforcement measures through rules 
and regulations to be complemented by preventive action. As discussed throughout the thesis, 
the multifaceted nature of corruption demands that if not only looking for short-term 
solutions, sustainable anti-corruption also involves the pursuit of extensive preventive 
measures.  Where such measures are lacking, reliance is habitually placed on more-or-less 
defined offences and a variety of sanctions in cases of violation. However, this type of 
approach does not serve as a strong deterrent in practice (Carr, 2006). As supported by the 
findings of this research, prevention is therefore necessary to deny deviant behaviour its 
breeding ground and to address the issue of corruption before it takes root. One of the most 
central questions facing the anti-corruption establishment is thus how to create an 
environment, both politically and practically, that can make both the policies of enforcement 
and prevention effective. Heineman and Heimann (2006, p. 85) argue, each institutional actor 
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will have to overcome its long-standing internal cultural problems.  Developed nations, like 
Sweden, that want to be in the forefront of the fight against corruption, must show the 
political will to investigate and prosecute corruption, not only in national transgressions but 
also in multinational corporations when they engage in bribery abroad, and most importantly 
within the domestic state functions. Even in the face of political friction and resistance this is 
the way to change the mindset and culture of corruption. Being able to contribute to such a 
change is a significant contribution to the anti-corruption agenda - the essence of impact.   
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5.4   Validity and Reliability 
”There is general agreement that all research studies must be open to critique and 
evaluation. Failure to assess the worth of a study – the soundness of its method, the accuracy of 
its findings, and the integrity of assumptions made, or conclusions reached – could have dire 
consequences. Traditionally, such evaluation has centred on assessment of reliability and validity.” 
(Long & Johnson, 2000, p. 30) 
Validity refers to the degree to which this, or any research, accurately reflects the 
specific concept that it attempts measure or answers the question, or questions, posed. While 
its dizygotic twin, reliability, is concerned with the precision of the procedure, validity is 
concerned with the research’s success in measuring what it set out to measure or answering 
what it set out to answer. 
An excellent metaphor to understand the relationship between validity and reliability is 
that of archery.  The centre of the archery target board is considered to represent the 
concept being evaluated. For each snippet of data that is measured, evaluated and 
incorporated an arrow is let loose towards the target. If a perfect representation of the 
concept the arrow hits the centre of the target and the more off it goes the less accurately it 
reflects the concept.  
Figure 11. Illustration of archery analogy for relationship between validity and reliability. 
Figure 11 illustrates four possible outcomes. From left to right, in the first the target is hit 
consistently but hits are grouped off centre. That means that all data evaluated is systematically 
yielding values that are consistent but not in support of the null hypothesis. Note that in 
Grounded Theory establishing a null hypothesis in the first place is extremely rare. The second 
outcome shows hits randomly distributed across the target board. This type of result can be 
useful for broad generalisations that may hold macro validity but would break down on micro, 
i.e. individual data source, level. If this was the result of the initial sample using Grounded 
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Theory it would be hard, although not impossible, to discern where to direct the theoretical 
sampling for the next data set. From these two outcomes alone, it is possible to see some 
difficulties when applying validity and reliability to qualitative research in general and Grounded 
Theory in particular. Thus, it is pertinent to ask the question: to what extent are validity and 
reliability relevant to ensure credibility in this qualitative research project?  
For the novice researcher, undeniably including this researcher, it is challenging to 
demonstrate rigour when undertaking purely qualitative research because the lack of 
consensus about the standards by which such research should be judged (Rolfe, 2006). 
Qualitative research is sometimes criticised for lacking scientific rigour, poor justification of 
methods and analytical transparency (Sandelowski, 1993): in sum being nothing more than a 
collection of personal opinions subject to researcher bias. There is an ongoing debate about 
the role and relevance of validity and reliability as appropriate to evaluate qualitative research 
(see e.g. Long & Johnson, 2000). As argued by Noble and Smith (2015) in their paper ’Issues 
of validity and reliability in qualitative research’, qualitative methods inherently differ from 
quantitative methods in terms of philosophical position as well as purpose which implies an 
alternative framework of evaluation.  
As argued by Long and Johnson (2000, p. 35) regarding the alternative terms for 
reliability and validity in qualitative research: ”The need is not for new criteria or novel terms 
but for different means of addressing existing criteria.” Therefore, in light of critiques directed 
at validity and reliability, and the rigour of qualitative research in general, the classifying 
terminology used must be explained. Taxonomy is the science of classification, intelligibly 
described by Dawkins (1996, chapter 10) from where the following discussion is drawn. 
Dawkins claim that some associate taxonomy this with the inner workings of a museum, the 
preservation and presentation of ancient things and creatures, perhaps due to confusion with 
the similarly sounding taxidermy - the art of preparing, stuffing, and mounting animals with 
lifelike appearance. In any case, orderly classification is a practical necessity in many instances. 
The books in a large library would be nearly impossible to effectively use unless arranged in 
some non-random way. There is, however no single, unique, or most importantly, universally 
correct way of solving the problem of organising books in a library. Librarians can and probably 
do have vivid discussions and sensible disagreements with one another about how books 
should be organised. The arguments, however, will not be won or lost based a criterion of 
’truth’ of one classification system over another. Rather the criteria could involve concepts 
such as ’convenience for library visitors’ and ’speed of finding a particular book’. As pointed 
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out by Dawkins, in this sense the taxonomy of books in a library can be said to be arbitrary 
but that does not mean that it is unimportant to devise a good classification system. The same 
is true for qualitative research in general and, from the subjective perspective of the author, for 
this research in particular.  
The classifications for assessing the rigour of the research are not completely arbitrary. 
Instead it is based on a framework devised by Lincoln and Guba (1985) where the 
classification headings are: truth value, consistency, neutrality and applicability. Table 4 lists 
these headings with explanations adapted from Noble & Smith (2015).  
Table 4:  Terminology and criteria used for qualitative research evaluation. 
Quantitative research terminology and 
application to research 
Alternative terminology associated with 
qualitative research 
Validity 
The accuracy of concept. The precision of the findings 
accurately reflecting the data collected and analysed, and 
the extent the findings satisfy the research question(-s).  
Truth value (Credibility) 
Recognises that multiple realities exist; outlines the 
researcher’s philosophical position (that may have 
resulted in methodological bias) 
Reliability 
The extent to which the results are believable within the 
research paradigm. The rigour and consistency of the 
analytical procedures, including accounting for personal 
and research method biases that may have influenced 
the findings 
Consistency (Dependability) 
Relates to the ‘trustworthiness’ by which the methods 
have been undertaken and is dependent on the 
researcher maintaining a ’decision-trail’. Ultimately an 
independent researcher should be able to arrive at 
similar or comparable findings. 
Generalisability 
The transferability of the findings to other settings and 
applicability in other contexts 
Applicability (Transferability) 
Consideration is given to whether findings can be applied 
to other contexts, settings or groups 
 Neutrality (Confirmability) 
Achieved when truth value, consistency and applicability 
have been addressed. Centres on acknowledging the 
complexity of engagement with participants and that the 
methods undertaken, and findings are intrinsically linked 
to the researchers’ philosophical position, experiences 
and perspectives. 
 
Truth value (Credibility)  
The purpose of this research, and consequently design, is solely to generate substantive 
theory. The process of data collection for generating theory whereby the analyst jointly 
collects, codes, and analyses his data and decides which data to collect next and where to find 
them, in order to develop his theory as it emerges. This process of data collection is 
controlled by the emerging theory, whether substantive or formal (Glaser, 1978). 
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Notwithstanding, the qualitative researcher is expected to seek convergence and 
corroboration through the use of different data sources and methods (Bowen, 2009)Validity 
and reliability can be strengthened by further research and methodological triangulation i.e. the 
combination of methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon (Denzin, 1970). The 
truth value involves establishing that the result of the research is believable from the 
perspective taken by the research paradigm. Since it is from this perspective that the research 
is to understand and describe the phenomena of interest it is also the only perspective that 
can legitimately judge the truth value the results. Revisiting the writings on paradigm, the 
theory and the development thereof certainly concurs with the philosophical disposition 
presented and is thus considered, at least from this particular standpoint, credible. The 
ontologically relativistic and epistemologically constructivist philosophical paradigm of this 
research asserts that realities are social constructions of the mind and that there exist as many 
such constructions as there are individuals. Note that rejecting the idea of the existence of a 
single objective reality is not the same as to say that there are no universal truths to be found 
that overarch subjective realities.  
The argument here is that there are universal truths about moral, SUM-theory driven 
yet non-corrupt, behaviour to be found. Just as the laws governing gravity are clear and 
indisputable, and certainly not versions of the truth, recalling a documentary stating: “Gravity is 
not a version of the truth. It is the truth. Anyone who doubts it is invited to jump out a tenth-
storey window” (Dawkins, 2009). This can be visualised in what Harris (2011) refers to as a 
moral landscape, with peaks and valleys, where increased spatial elevation corresponds to a 
societal state of moral, non-corrupt, behaviour on a both individual and collective level. 
Decisions and subsequent actions determine movement over the moral landscape, with 
distinct right and wrong answers as to how to behave in order to reach any of the peaks. It is 
this view that changes morality from largely intangible to certainly quantifiable - with room for 
a debate on expectations of optimal behaviour. Also, there are most certainly universalistic 
truths that can be defined for a moral peak: SUM-behaviour being one of them. The tools to 
reach that peak, however, are not the same all over the world. The point is, that there are 
universal laws to be found and that behaviour according to those laws must be dealt with 
differently in the highly varied cultural context of the world, as long as one remembers, 
acknowledges and takes into considerations those universal laws.  
Observe that even if given an explanation for behaviour in the SUM-theory that holds 
truth value, being true relative to a context of use is not the same as to a context of 
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assessment. As Dummett (1959) observes in his classic article ’Truth’, one could in principle 
learn which positions in chess and other games were ’winning’ without having any 
understanding of the significance of winning. It is therefore of interest to further expand the 
remit of the SUM-theory, test it empirically and dive deeper into the intricacies of the ALL-
assumption. Notwithstanding further research, given the research paradigm of this research 
the SUM-theory and ALL-assumption hold a certain degree of credibility and truth value. 
Consistency (Dependability) 
Consistency is the qualitative counterpart to reliability. The latter is a common term in 
research contexts. Traditionally, reliability is based on the assumption of replicability or 
repeatability, which essentially means whether the same results would be obtained if the 
observed phenomenon were observed again. In qualitative research with diverse paradigms, 
such definition of reliability is challenging and epistemologically counter-intuitive (Leung, 2015). 
The essence of reliability therefore lies more within the concept of consistency (see e.g. 
Grossoehme, 2014). In general, something that is reliable means dependable or trustworthy 
and in research this is interpreted as repeatability or consistency. A finding is thus considered 
reliable and consistent if it would yield the same result again, and more so if repeatedly tested 
with different methods. This assumes that what is measured is not changing over time or that 
time dependency is irrelevant., This is not the case for the phenomenon of corruption. 
Further, the paradigm of this research makes such an assumption somewhat difficult as from a 
constructivist perspective the perceived reality and subsequently the phenomenon is in 
constant flux. To get around this dependence on subjectivity the argument for consistency 
must emphasise the need to account for the ever-changing context within which the research 
occurs. Silverman (Silverman, 2009, p. 472) has proposed a number of approaches in 
enhancing the reliability of process and results where constant data comparison is one, a 
fundamental pillar to Grounded Theory. So, for the research to be able to describe the 
phenomenon at hand, grounded theory provides the leverage to raise the theory to a level of 
abstraction less influenced by these changes.  
Therefore, even if power and wealth are contemporary vehicles to realise SUM-theory 
based behaviour resulting in deviant behaviour in pursuit of perceived advantages, it is not 
given that they always will remain such. For example, if society would dispense of the notion 
of money, would corruption automatically stop? Possibly, but probably not. There would be 
other prevailing advantages to the human striving for survival and reproduction that arguably 
could lead to deviant behaviour in the form of corruption. The deviancy itself is also a 
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normative concept and susceptible to change: however, the fundamental tenet of the SUM-
theory would still hold true. It is therefore likely that other researchers using the same or at 
least similar methods would reach the same conclusion. As for distinctly different, e.g. purely 
quantitative methods, the author dares not to make assumptions. Partly because even within 
the method applied here there is a methodological risk to consistency due to its unique 
incorporation of literature in a grounded theory study. This further fuels the conjecture that 
qualitative studies are more difficult to repeat and are inherently less reliable. While this does 
not automatically mean that any such project cannot be consistent, it does issue caution in 
establishing overall credibility. Nonetheless, if the SUM-theory survives not only the test of 
time but also continued research, hopefully by other researchers, there is a good chance that 
there are some very useful truths to be found for the anti-corruption establishments.  
Applicability (Transferability) 
The degree to which results of qualitative research can be generalised, or transferred, to 
other contexts or settings can be referred to as transferability. For the transferred results to 
have any significance they must somehow be applied to that particular context, or settings, 
ergo the applicability. The quantitative counterpart is generalisability, sometimes also referred 
to as external validity. From a qualitative perspective applicability is primarily the responsibility 
of the one doing the applying, however the process of generalisation can be facilitated by a 
thorough description of the research paradigm, context and central assumptions. From there, 
the person who wishes to apply or transfer the findings to another context is then ultimately 
responsible for explaining and justifying how sensible the manoeuvre is. In that sense the 
nature of applicability is twofold: where on one hand, it is the responsibility of the researcher 
to provide evidence that the findings of the research could be transferred and applied to 
another context. On the other hand, since the researcher cannot prove that the findings will 
be applicable, “it is, in summary, not the naturalist’s task to provide an index of transferability, it 
is his or her responsibility to provide the data base that makes transferability judgements 
possible on the part of potential appliers” (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 316). 
There are three elements of this research that aid in establishing applicability. The first is 
the thoroughly explained research paradigm, the second is the adaptation and advancement of 
the grounded theory methodology and lastly the level of abstraction on which the findings are 
presented. Compared to much quantitative research on corruption the philosophy of the 
research paradigm in this qualitative project is far more thoroughly explained. Coupled with a 
robust and detailed account of a rather complex methodology, the findings in its resulting 
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theory is lifted to a high level of abstraction. This elevation is intended to supersede the 
cultural and social context that surrounded data collection. Whether or not this is actually the 
case, will be up to subsequent researchers to either confirm or falsify. The information 
provided in the thesis can, however, guide such researchers to construct a setting where the 
findings of this research have meaning. Although researchers themselves make the final 
applicability and transferability judgements, the essence of this research is still captured. The 
SUM-theory is by any Grounded Theory account at best substantial, consequence of a 
conscious decision to not pursue a formal theory: and has clear delimiters in terms of 
conceptual scope. Yet, the results, given their level of abstraction, indicate sensible applicability 
to other contexts in conjunction with further research or real world application and 
evaluation.  
Neutrality (Confirmability) 
Neutrality or Conformability is the criterion when evaluation research that is unique to 
qualitative research. It could be associated with the quantitative idea of objectivity but that is a 
concept that would not mean anything in a constructivist qualitative paradigm, where 
researcher interaction is inevitable (see e.g. Patton, 1990). Having said that, there is nothing 
stopping someone from also evaluating quantitative research in terms of neutrality. However, 
it would probably have less meaning than for a qualitative project. Neutrality is considered 
when truth value, consistency and applicability have been addressed. It centres on 
acknowledging the complexity of engagement with participants and that the methods 
undertaken, and findings are intrinsically linked to the researchers’ philosophical position, 
experiences and perspectives. Miles, Huberman and Saldaña  (2013) consider the extent to 
which the researcher admits predispositions a key criterion for confirmability. 
Even though the paradigm of this research postulates that each researcher brings a 
unique perspective to a study, confirmability refers to the degree to which others could 
corroborate the results. There are a number of strategies for enhancing confirmability applied 
in this research project. First, by carefully documenting the procedures and checking and re-
checking the data in the constant comparison of grounded theory throughout the research the 
promise of confirmability is enhanced. Second, the research involved an active search for 
negative data that would contradict prior analytical conclusions. Third, academics and 
professionals in various disciplines were constantly probed when discussing the findings in 
order for them to play ’devil’s advocate’ in a search for non-conformance. Fourth, research 
caveats and design shortcomings are identified and described to counter potential bias or 
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distortion, for example, the time dependency of the phenomenon under study vis-à-vis the 
time consumption of the methodology can make the research findings obsolete post-haste.   
Even so, knowledge related to the past can not only satisfy an intellectual curiosity about 
corruption in a particular setting during a certain period, but a historical perspective of 
corruption (as well as anti-corruption) and its associated behaviour can also provide 
information about the continuities and discontinuities regarding patterns and practices of 
corruption as well as of policies and tools developed to prevent and repress it. In that sense, 
an almost historiographical account of corruption and its related behaviour can help in 
understanding the various roots and roles of corruption in a contextualised manner. 
Therefore, even as time passes, the then historical findings of this research may provide a 
glimpse into a complex phenomenon that in turn could open up some small yet significant 
path towards a better of understanding of contemporary corrupt practices by making 
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5.5   Conclusion  
”Often it is not so much the kind of person a man is as the kind of situation in 
which he finds himself that determines how he will act.” (Milgram, 1974, p. 205) 
What began as an exposé of the perception of corruption by contrasting two countries 
in a particular sector ended up spanning far more than just two nation states and certainly 
more than one sector. The research generated an overarching substantive theory of human 
behaviour as an explanation for corrupt behaviour. Having established that this is a qualitative 
research project within a constructivist paradigm with the researcher as an integral part of the 
process this final section of the thesis will focus more on the author. The section will provide a 
subjective account of the author’s journey and lessons learned, some reflections on what in 
retrospect could have been done differently and some thoughts on the future.  
One of the first questions that had to be answered when applying for the funding for 
this research was ’why does this research project matter?’. The answer went something along 
the lines of this being a novel perspective on an old phenomenon previously covered mostly 
by quantitative studies. Then as the project progressed and evolved it found its academic (and 
scientific) place in answering the question ’How can the perception of corruption inform our 
understanding of the behaviour associated with corruption and how does this translate into 
effective anti-corruption?’ At this point, over two hundred pages of describing how the answer 
was reached later, there is one more important outcome of this project that must not be 
forgotten. It has forged an academic researcher. The author has every intention to continue 
this mission of academic research, to explore strange new phenomena, to seek out new 
perspectives and to boldly state the findings - whatever they are and however inconvenient 
they may be.  
The project, if absolutely nothing else, has been an immense learning experience for the 
author and the amount of knowledge accrued is staggering. Not only have the depths of the 
phenomenon that is corruption been explored, but the philosophical core of what reality is 
has been questioned, probed and grounded. The behavioural sciences have been introduced 
and proved relevant not only to the development of the research but also to the 
development of the author as a researcher. Added to this the author has been provided with 
a number of opportunities to engage in other criminological projects related to private security 
regulation, industrial espionage and security management, to name a few. In a sense this 
research is about vulnerable situations, and to those routines of everyday life which create 
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criminal opportunities and corruption as a sometimes unintended by-product. The overall 
effect however is much larger, and the project has allowed the author over the years grow 
both as an individual as well as an academic.  
Are there things that could have been differently? Yes. There are obviously other 
methods and approaches that could have been used for a similar investigation of the 
phenomenon. Are there things that would be done differently if given the opportunity to do a 
similar project in the future? Most likely. For one, the author’s free advice to anyone 
considering using grounded theory as the method of choice should not underestimate the 
time consumed in constant comparison analysis. It is probably easy to loosen the noose of 
’constantly comparing everything to everything’ and go for a more relaxed, ’comparing most 
things to most things’ and from there to ’comparing new things only to the relevant things’ - it 
is a slippery slope from there and will quickly taint the beauty of the Grounded Theory 
methodology. Properly applied, the rigour created by constant comparison is second to none 
and while it may be questioned in terms of time efficiency it is and unequivocally remains an 
integral part of Grounded Theory.  
So, who cares about this research and perhaps more importantly who should care? For 
one the author cares. As mentioned, this has been irreplaceable experience on an individual 
level, but what about beyond that? Will this research be of use for other academics, 
practitioners or even policy makers? The answer is that it should. For grounded theorists the 
literature treatment system is unique and can provide valuable insight on how the 
methodology should be applied in other circumstances. Practically it is the author’s ambition to 
continue implementation of the anti-corruption framework in Swedish municipalities. After 
evaluation and refinement this should be of interest to not only other municipalities or 
similarly structured organisations but also other anti-corruption practitioners. As for 
policymakers the implications are uncertain but there is at least a possibility for interaction and 
synergies between this research and policy. The author hopes that this work contributes such 
that one day there would be a unified theory of corruption that would set the global agenda 
for fighting corruption. The theory would be unified in that it would provide not only a 
universally accepted definition but also describe corruption in a way that recognises both the 
role of agency and social context. It is possible that such a unified theory of corruption is the 
only solution to curb corruption in a consistent and long-lasting way.  
The final note draws its inspiration from an article by Garland (1996) on the limits of the 
sovereign state. In discussing an increasingly dualistic, polarised and ambivalent criminology the 
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distinction between a criminology of self and of the other is made. The criminology of self 
characterises deviant agents as rational consumers - just like you and me. From that 
perspective a highly interesting text is brought up as an example that also fits perfectly as a 
swan song for this project and its outcomes. The text in question is the Treatise on the Police 
of the Metropolis, written in 1795 by Patrick Colquhoun.  
Colquhoun's Treatise sets out an analysis of crime and a programme for its prevention 
arguing that increased crime is a consequence of a multiplication of temptation and 
opportunity. The analysis has nothing to do with individual abnormality or poor socialisation 
and deals with criminal opportunities rather than criminal dispositions. The common sense of 
Colquhoun's day was that no special theory of criminal motivation was necessary to explain 
the crimes of some classes of people: their law-breaking was a rational and situationally 
intelligible consequence of their social and economic position. Colquhoun's remedy for dealing 
with the crime focused upon the problem of prevention and opportunity reduction. This 
tentative conclusion drawn over two hundred years ago is qualitatively supported by this 
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APPENDIX 
I - Data management policy 
All data will be stored and managed in compliance with the Data Protection Act 1998. 
All original field data will be collected electronically or digitised post collection. Hard copies of 
data will be destroyed immediately after being digitised. All electronic data will be stored on a 
laptop, backed up onto an external hard-drive, both encrypted and accessible only by the 
researcher. No data will be located on any remote server. None of the original data will be 
shared. Participants will have the right to access their own data and will be able to withdraw 
permission any time during the data gathering phase, at which time they will be asked to 
confirm their permission. In accordance with the UK Data Protection Act (1998), original data 
will be destroyed either when permission is withdrawn or 6 years after completion of the 
thesis with exception of the consent form that is stored for 30 years after completion.  The 
identities of individuals and organisations will be coded to create anonymity in the raw data. 
Role and organisation descriptions will be sufficiently vague to prevent traceability, for 
example, “architect, personal assistant or construction company”. 
Published information output from the research will be in the form of a thesis, journal 
articles and presentations. This information will therefore be in the public domain, however 
untraceable anonymity will be maintained by continuation of the coding arrangements. It will 
also be necessary to ensure that participants cannot be identified through triangulated data. 
For example, any data in the public domain, which signals the identity of an anonymous 
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II - Ethics protocol matrix  
The approach to the research ethics is based on the guidance issued by British 
Psychological Society [BPS] (2014). The research will involve the collection of confidential 
organisational information and limited personal data. It is essential that disclosures do not 
cause harm to the participants or their organisations. All of the participants will be 
experienced, professional volunteers. They will be experienced in and accustomed to 
maintaining confidentialities.. They are not be considered vulnerable individuals. Nevertheless, 
as illustrated by the table below, there is a low residual vulnerability risk from inappropriate 
disclosures. The main objective at all times is for no harm to befall the participants, the 
researcher or other involved entities.  
Participant risks Control functions 
• Breach of confidentiality by improper disclosures. 
• Disclosure of incriminating information. 
• Disclosure of career limiting criticisms. 
• Disclosure of proscribed behaviour of organisation. 
• Disclosure of information, which is part of an on-
going criminal investigation. 
• Focus of research is on perception rather than 
contact with corruption.  
• Participants are accustomed to confidentiality issues. 
• Disclosure of risks and control measures in 
participant invitation information form. 
• Obtain signed consent. 
• Participant can withdraw at any time during an 
interview. 
• Permission to use data already obtained can be 
withdrawn up to the end of the data gathering 
phase. 
• Participant is anonymous. 
• Employing organisation is anonymous. 
Researcher risks Control functions 
• Participant recalls data. 
• Data ethically unusable. 
• Disclosure of proscribed behaviour could cause 
breach in researcher / participant confidentiality. 
• Remind participants of risks at start of interview.  
• Warn participants of risks of inappropriate 
disclosures in writing and verbally. 
• Sensitivity to when inappropriate disclosures are 
imminent, interrupt interviews or dialogue, change 
focus or terminate. 
• All data not in the public domain is anonymous. 
• Data in the public domain, which is traceable to an 
anonymous participant, is anonymised.  
• Anonymity in coding arrangements. 
• As last resort, discard data as unusable. 
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Table 1. Ethical risk analysis as suggested by the PBS (2014) 
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Please initial each box 
I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for 
the above study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask 
questions and have had these answered satisfactorily.  
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any point before the data is analysed time without giving any 
reason.  
I understand that data collected during the study may be looked at by 
individuals from the University or from regulatory authorities. I give 
permission for these individuals to have access to my data. 
I agree to my interview being audio recorded and to take part in the 
above study. 
 
[Signature]                  [Signature] 
 
Page 263 of 278 
[Participant name]        [Date]      Peter 
Stiernstedt 
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PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
 
Study Title:  
Widespread corruption within the Member States of the EU - perception or reality? 
 
REC Ref No:  [       ] 
 
You have agreed to take part in my research study and I would like you to understand 
why the research is being done and what it will involve for you. Please feel free to talk to 
others about the study if you wish and do not hesitate to ask if there is anything that is not 
clear. 
This study focuses on the perception of corruption in the Member States of the EU. 
The following pages contains information about the study and its outcomes as well as 
details on your participation and contribution to it. Please take the time to carefully study the 
given information carefully and bring any question that you might have to the attention of the 
researcher. 
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Brief summary of the study 
Corruption seriously harms the economy and society as a whole. Many countries around 
the world suffer from deep-rooted corruption that hampers economic development, 
undermines democracy, and damages social justice and the rule of law. The Member States of 
the EU are not immune to this reality. Corruption varies in nature and extent from one 
country to another, but it affects all Member States. It impinges on good governance, sound 
management of public money, and competitive markets. In extreme cases, it undermines the 
trust of citizens in democratic institutions and processes. 
EU Member States have in place most of the necessary legal instruments and institutions 
to prevent and fight corruption. However, the results they deliver are not satisfactory across 
the EU. Anti-corruption rules are not always vigorously enforced, systemic problems are not 
tackled effectively enough, and the relevant institutions do not always have sufficient capacity 
to enforce the rules. Declared intentions are still too distant from concrete results, and 
genuine political will to eradicate corruption often appears to be missing. 
There are many qualitative surveys comprehensively covering this topic, but few 
qualitative analyses of in-depth interviews. Such interviews could shed light on the theory 
behind the perception on corruption and if that theory corresponds with the ‘reality’ found in 
the surveys. The purpose would, similarly to the EU report on Anti-Corruption, be to 
stimulate a constructive forward-looking debate on the extent, as well as the best ways of 
addressing, corruption. Specifically by providing a substantial theory as an answer to the 
question:  
The purpose of the study 
In terms of outcomes, the study aims to by the analysis of in depth interviews, 
complement and contrast previous surveys and the ’reality’ found therein. This is done by 
developing a substantive theory for the perception of corruption in public construction 
procurement within the EU. Ultimately the theory developed in this study could inform the 
attitude towards not only corruption within the Member States of the EU but also how it is 
measured. Such theory could also create a starting point for further integration towards formal 
theory of the perception of corruption within the EU. Thus, a substantive grounded theory 
built from interviews could act as foundation for recommendations to design and direction of 
additional research.  
Why you have been invited 
The primary technique for the research will be semi-structured interviews. The 
interviews are planned with those that are believed to be able to provide high quality 
information on the topic. In essence this means that you are considered to have specialist 
knowledge about either the people, processes or happenings that is more extensive, detailed 
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Voluntary participation 
It is up to you to decide to join the study. When we meet I will take you through the 
study, explain the contribution you will be asked to make and then I will then ask you to sign a 
consent form if you wish to proceed. The study does not seek organisational information in 
any shape or form, the research is solely and absolutely focused on individual perception, 
therefore it does not seek the consent of any participant´s employer or host organisation.  
What happens if you participate 
I would like to conduct an interview with you, which will take approximately 60 minutes. 
Subject to your consent I will make an audio recording of the interview and will later 
transcribe that so that I can compare and analyse the various responses from all of the 
interviews I will conduct. Whilst the interview will be stored with a reference to help me 
identify your name, after the data has been analysed and if your data appears in my final thesis, 
it will be entirely anonymous. I expect that my research will take a number of years to 
conclude but your involvement will be limited to the 60 minutes whilst I conduct the 
interview. It is also possible that I will call upon you to do an additional  follow-up interview, 
naturally such participation is completely voluntary.  
Your expected contribution 
I have a schedule of open-ended questions and I am interested in your responses, 
opinions and attitudes to those questions. The questions are intended to instigate a normal 
but focused conversation rather than a formal interview. The main topic will be corruption 
and the perception thereof. You will not be asked to provide any information which is 
confidential or which would embarrass you professionally or constitute a breach of 
confidentiality or breach of fiduciary duty. If I suspect that any information provided in the 
interview represents such a breach I will pause the interview to ensure that my research does 
not rely on information provided in error. 
The possible disadvantages of participating 
You will be inconvenienced for about 60 minutes but I cannot envisage any other 
disadvantage or risk.  
The possible benefits of participating 
There will be no financial reward for participation but you may well benefit from the 
knowledge that you are contributing to research, which may advance or improve the fight 
against corruption, stimulate further educational research or generate policy documents or 
greater awareness of the issue. 
Why your participation is kept confidential 
When you join the study, it is possible that some of the data collected will be seen by 
authorised persons from the University of Portsmouth. Because the research is supervised, 
others may look at the data to check that the study is being carried out correctly. All of those 
 
Page 266 of 278 
people will have a duty of confidentiality to you as a research participant and will do their best 
to meet this duty.  
Subject to the provision that any offer of confidentiality may sometimes be overridden 
by law, your confidentiality will be safeguarded during and after the study. The interview will 
be audio recorded (with your consent) and then transcribed and analysed using a software 
programme called NVivo. At all times the data will be stored securely and it will be retained 
only until the final thesis is approved. At that point it will be destroyed. At any time before 
destruction, my research supervisor may review your data to ensure the study is proceeding 
correctly. 
What will happen if you want to discontinue your participation 
You may withdraw from the study at any time prior to providing consent and until the 
data from any interview has been analysed, at which time it will be anonymous but may have 
been integrated with other responses from other interviewees and so will be difficult to 
exclude from the study.  
If you have questions or concerns 
If you have a question or concern about any aspect of this study, you may speak with 
me or write or speak to Professor Mark Button, my supervisor. We will both do our best to 
answer your questions. Professor Button can be reached by e-mail at mark.button@port.ac.uk 
or by telephone on 023 92843923. If you remain unhappy and wish to complain formally, you 
can do this either by writing to  Dr Jane Winstone, the Faculty Ethics Committee Chair who 
can be reached at jane.winstone@port.ac.uk or by writing to Dr Phil Clements, the Head of 
Department who can be reached at phil.clements@port.ac.uk.  
What happens to the results of the study 
Generally you will be notified when the thesis is published although it will be several 
years before the research is complete. You will not receive any information unless you have 
given your consent to receiving such information. 
The organising and funding entity for this study 
The University of Portsmouth has granted the researcher a full bursary to complete this 
study. 
Ethical review of the study 
Research in the University of Portsmouth is looked at by independent group of people, 
called a Research Ethics Committee, to protect your interests. This study has been reviewed 
and given a favourable opinion. 
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St Georges Building,  
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Study Title:  
Widespread corruption within the Member States of the EU - perception or reality? 
 
REC Ref No:  14/15:37 
 
Dear [Name] 
Further to our recent conversation I would like to confirm your agreement to 
participate in a research study that I am engaged in as part of a PhD research project into the 
perception of corruption. Corruption varies in nature and extent from one country to 
another, but it affects all Member States of the EU. There are many qualitative surveys 
comprehensively covering this topic, but few qualitative analyses of in-depth interviews. 
Therefore the study aims to by the analysis of in depth interviews, complement and contrast 
previous surveys on corruption and the ’reality’ found therein. 
Attached to this letter is a information sheet providing clarification of several pertinent 
issues regarding the study and your participation. Should there be any questions please contact 
me. 
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VI - Sample memos 
Example of handwritten memo in Swedish from the author’s personal note book and an 
excerpt of a memo recorded in the NVivo software. The images have been redacted to 
maintain participant confidentiality. 
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As conditioned by the methodology the nature of the questions will evolve but there 
are two main theme that will permeate all of the interviews. Those are. 
• The perception of corruption. 
• The linkage between the perception of corruption and reality.  
Sample questions 
What is corruption to you?/How do you define corruption? 
What is your perception of corruption?/What do you think of corruption? 
How do you believe that perception corresponds with corruption in reality? 
What may be the issues with the linkage between the perception and reality of 
corruption? 
In your opinion, what are the main drivers of corruption? 
In your opinion, what are the main counter measures to corruption? 
Etc. 
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VIII - Critiques of situational crime prevention 
The thesis, having explored each of the classifications of the Situational crime prevention 
matrix from a SUM-theory perspective, providing some examples of how the use of various 
measures within this classification can contribute to preventing corruption this section 
acknowledge some of the criticisms that has been directed at Situational crime prevention as 
well as the responses thereto. 
Several decades after Situational crime prevention was first introduced there were still 
issues raised around the theory. In an effort to straighten out some of the misconceptions of 
situational prevention (seven of them to be exact) Clarke wrote a chapter in the Handbook of 
Crime prevention and Community Safety (Clarke, 2005). Here Situational crime prevention 
was referred to as both the science and art of reducing opportunities for crime. Science 
because there was and is a large body of research into the concept of Situational Crime 
prevention (many reviewed for this research), and art because despite this research those 
implementing situational crime prevention measures still had to rely on judgment and 
experience. It was argued that situational crime prevention was mostly implemented without 
adequate knowledge of its scientific underpinnings. The knowledge deficit, however, did not 
impede the growth of situational crime prevention, but did result in some rather poorly 
thought through crime prevention initiatives. Such failures obviously fuelled the criticism of 
Situational crime prevention, but as argued by Clarke (2005, p. 39) these criticisms are 
overstated and generally misconceived. It is, nonetheless, important to be familiar with these 
criticisms and the defence mounted by Clarke and others to add to the viability of the concept 
as a whole but also to highlight its potential use in an anti-corruption context. 
Note that all critique was not designed to necessarily overthrow the entire idea but to 
highlight its limits and also identifying shortcomings expanding its scope. As discussed, one of 
the main critics Richard Wortley, being indirectly responsibly for the increase from 16 to 25 
classifications, wrote a summary of the critique against situational crime prevention in 2010. 
Here he states that ”Criticisms of situational crime prevention are of two broad sorts – those 
questioning the theoretical and conceptual adequacy of the approach, and those attacking the 
ethical foundations and social outcomes of situational interventions.” (Wortley, 2010, p. 1). 
The following review of critique follows Wortley’s structure, expanded to encompass how 
these critiques and the responses thereto relate to the concept of corruption.   
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Theoretical and conceptual criticisms 
Bar some disciplinary differences in underlying assumptions, criminological theories 
explain deviant behaviour as either the response of an actor to social, cultural, or economical 
factors; or as an expression of a more or less intrinsic criminal disposition created by an actors 
biology and/or experiences. Situational crime prevention does not analyse the sociological 
context of deviance nor the development of a deviant disposition. Unsurprisingly some of the 
criticisms directed at Situational crime prevention are directed at these omissions. The four 
main criticisms discussed here are; one, the situational approach is sterile, simplistic, and 
atheoretical; two, situational prevention ignores the root causes of crime; three, situational 
prevention will only displace crime; and four, situational approaches are not appropriate for 
‘irrational’ crime. 
1. The situational approach is atheoretical  and simplistic 
This critique implies that Situational crime prevention does not have the same 
sophistication and complexity that some of the other criminological theories have. Situational 
crime prevention was and is based on a fundamental tenet that all behaviour arises from a 
person-situation interaction. From the ontologically relativistic and epistemologically 
constructivist perspective of this research the person-situation interaction and subjective 
interpretation thereof is fundamental - and there is nothing simplistic about it. Here situations 
are not just space in which crime occurs but it may also play a causal role in both initiating and 
shaping deviancy. That is a sophisticated process that is complicated to adequately grasp. 
Further critique along similar lines of simplicity, is that referring to Situational crime 
prevention’s over reliance on target-hardening. While target-hardening in fact is only one out 
of 25 techniques of situational prevention. Where application of each technique, target-
hardening included, is preceded by an analysis of the problem that is to be addressed. So the 
idea that Situational crime prevention is nothing more than common sense and a simplistic 
response to a complex social problem do not seem to rhymes well with the theoretical 
underpinnings previously discussed.  
2. Situational prevention ignores root causes of deviancy  
Given the deep rooted theoretical base on which Situational crime prevention rests 
upon there are factors that are omitted from the theory, particularly facts that are sometimes 
seen as root causes of crime. Examples are, societal governance, economic inequality, family 
structure, etc. A critique can then be formulated around Situational crime prevention only 
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addressing the symptoms and not the underlying, often more systemic, causes, thus providing 
a shallow solution to problems of deviancy.  It is, however a fallacy that understanding and 
changing underlying causes of behaviour is a prerequisites to changing behaviour. The role of 
situations in behaviour is but one cause irrespectively of other arbitrarily chosen root or non-
root causes, and conversely other criminological theories could be accused of not including 
situational factors. While this research is about increasing the understanding of corruption, it 
focuses on the behavioural aspects not the root causes. The central point in the context of 
Situational crime prevention, however, is that understanding is not essential for situational cues 
to work and consequently reduce corruption.  
3. Situational prevention will only displace deviancy  
If validity is given to a situational approach actually being able to prevent deviancy 
another critique is that, even if situationally prevented in one place the behaviour it would 
move to another. This stems from situational prevention not addressing the agent's underlying 
disposition for deviancy. Thus, if prevented from acting on this disposition in one place the 
agent would seek out another location, time, target or tactics to realise the deviant act. In a 
worst case scenario this can even be thought to worsen the gravity of the deviancy by acting 
as a catalyst for bad behaviour. In terms of applied situational crime prevention in general and 
to corruption in particular the critique carries a superficial logic that is easily refuted. Consider 
the opposite, if no security precautions were taken, if noting was done to thwart corruption, 
would related deviancy increase? If the answer is yes then taking precautions prevents rather 
than displaces deviancy. Also empirically it has been found that displacement is unusual and in 
fact the reverse effect is some times observed - that situational measures designed to reduce 
for a particular type of deviancy can have preventive effects beyond the original design (S. D. 
Johnson, Guerette, & Bowers, 2014).  
4. Situational approaches are not appropriate for ‘irrational’ crime  
The classification of various forms of deviancy as pertaining to rational and others to 
irrational behaviour is perhaps useful in some contexts but less so here. The critique goes to 
show that some deviancy prudent in nature, like shoplifting is more susceptible to situational 
cues than crimes of passion, such as for example sex offences. The latter sometimes caused by 
psychological deficiencies such that behaviour control is beyond rational choice and 
subsequently less influenced by situational factors. Explored in-depth in previous sections of 
this research the debate on the rational/irrational divide in deviancy is as interesting as it is 
futile for the purposes of effectively preventing corruption through situational intervention. It is 
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true that early situational interventions were largely applied to acquisitive crimes such as 
burglary. The decision-making process even of irrational crime, as previously more adequately 
described - rational yet limited by bounded rationality, can be sensitive to situational factors. 
Moreover there are ways to merge the rational with the non rational in decision-making 
theory, thus bringing rational choice theories minimal attention to the affective components of 
decision-making (see e.g. Walters, 2015). The final note is that for situational measures to 
effectively prevent corruption, even if executed as a crime of passion, the SUM-theory only 
presupposes an agent of perceived free-will in search of a self-interest oriented advantage.  
Social and ethical criticisms 
Situational crime prevention does not promote social reform, and lack the theoretical 
commitment to social causes of deviancy as well as the ideological commitment to social 
justice. Both generally embraced by social scientists, criminologists included. There can be 
many explanations for this; suspicion of government authority, scepticism of neo-classical 
economics, fear of corporate power,  distaste of inequality, distrust of wealth and (often 
radically misplaced) sympathy for the offender. This surmounts to the control agenda 
associated with Situational crime prevention being at least philosophically uncomfortable, and 
often cast as a politically conservative approach promoting Orwellian solutions to deviancy. 
The resulting five criticism discussed here are; one, situational prevention uncritically supports 
the status quo; two, access to situational prevention will become the privilege of the rich; 
three, situational prevention blames the victim; and four, situational prevention is invasive and 
oppressive; and five, situational prevention will create a fortress society. 
1. Situational prevention uncritically supports the status quo  
With its roots in work commissioned by the British Home Office critics have asserted 
that situational intervention is a tool by and for the authorities. A tool that can be used to 
promote the interest of the political and social elite instead of serving the broader public good. 
This critique is further rooted in the early applications of situational crime prevention against 
crimes generally associated with those pertaining to the lower echelons of society; burglary, 
theft and the like. While  this may be true, it should be noted that crimes perpetrated by 
those lower in the social hierarchy also primarily target their peers. Thus preventing that type 
of deviancy would in fact protect the poor and disadvantaged rather than a societal elite. 
Moreover, this very section of this research is effectively a move towards addressing deviancy 
that does include the political and social elite, as corruption in those arenas is just as pervasive 
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and perhaps even more detrimental to society. Achieving better governance by preventing, 
thus reducing corruption can not be considered as maintaining status quo.  
2. Access to situational prevention is a financial strength based privilege 
As expressed in the paper ”The evolution of security industry regulation in the 
European Union” (Button & Stiernstedt, 2016b), state-driven security with policing as one of 
its primary weapons of choice is no longer enough, and in many member states the private 
security industry has assumed a substantial position in the provision of policing. With private 
security on the rise and increasingly more societal security functions being privatised raises the 
issue of whether or not financial strength is largely the key to being able to afford counter 
measures. The possible consequence is that the situational prevention techniques develop into 
something only accessible to those with sufficient financial strength. Thus, creating an inequality 
in protection and subsequently in victimisation as perpetrators would seek out other, less 
protected, targets. The charge of displacement has been previously addressed together with 
its limited negative effect on situational crime prevention in general and for corruption in 
particular. As for those with more financial strength being able to buy more protection in the 
form of situational crime prevention, the claim is correct. Given the discussion on 
displacement the argument, however, would be that the more anyone invests in situational 
crime prevention measures the better for everyone. Regarding issues surrounding the 
privatisation of security the solution argued by the author of this research and others is 
primarily the more efficient regulation thereof (see e.g. Button & Stiernstedt, 2016a).  
3. Situational prevention places the burden on the victim 
The techniques applied by situation crime prevention originates from individuals taking 
precautions. Often precautions against their own victimisation, shifting focus from offender to 
victim. From certain points of view such shifting of responsibility can be morally indefensible. A 
good example is how rape victims sometimes are blamed for their lack of applying situational 
crime prevention in condemning the provocative clothes they wore. This type of victim 
blaming is appalling and should not be associated with what the situational approach is 
interpreted as achieving in the context of this research. In daily life humans adopt a number of 
situational prevention strategies and this is nearly a guide that suggest what measures can be 
effective in the context of anti-corruption frameworks. Here in some cases it is perhaps more 
appropriate to blame the victim, i.e. to penalise organisations that has not taken adequate 
measures to prevent corruption from occurring. This is exactly what can be observed in 
recent legislation like the American Foreign Corrupt Practices Act [FCPA] and the British 
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Bribery Act. Where the FCPA establishes that a company subject to US jurisdiction can be 
held vicariously liable for acts of its employees and agents, and similarly the UK Bribery Act 
creates a strict liability corporate offence for failure to prevent bribery. 
4. Situational prevention can be invasive and oppressive  
Some of the techniques included in the vast array available in the situational crime 
prevention approach may stir concerns about insidious social control. Any type of surveillance 
may be may be used for good, i.e. the prevention of deviancy, but may also infringe on 
personal freedoms and convey an invasion of privacy if misused. The key word here is 
misused. There has to be a system governing the application of the techniques and acting as 
control and fail safe in society to protect the citizens both in the intended way and also from 
unintended consequences. Personal freedoms must not be unduly curtailed and there should 
be no unnecessary invasions of privacy. Note that if there are obvious benefits to the potential 
inconvenience of a situational technique it will hopefully be tolerated by most people that are 
interested in their own well being and that of their fellow man. Take the example of airport 
screening to prevent terrorism, an inconvenience accepted by most - the efficacy of such 
screening can however be subject to debate (see e.g. Stewart & Mueller, 2008). 
5. Situational prevention creates a fortress society  
The logical endpoint for some critics is that situational crime prevention will create a 
society that is ran by fear and distrust full of obtrusive security measures. A segregated society 
where an elite live in safety and the rest in uncertainty. As noted earlier, the situational 
approach is more than just target hardening and some situational techniques actually involves 
”softening” the environment, as will be discussed further later in the thesis. In short, some 
classic techniques like improved street lightning may reduce the fear of crime without coming 
close to what can be labelled a fortress society. More contextually for corruption another 
example ”extending the guardianship” which will promote the collective sharing of good 
norms and values that will not only prevent deviancy but that potentially can also bring a 
community or organisation closer together. It is important to understand that the situational 
crime prevention approach does not advocate segregation of the deviant but rather arguing 
that measures can be deployed on the basis that the motivation for deviancy is available to all 
and by restricting opportunity deviancy can be prevented.  
It has been show that the major criticisms can be addressed and that situational crime 
prevention still holds some value. It has also been established how these criticisms relate to 
the prevention of corruption, and the particular implications that this can have as well as an 
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exploration of a response thereto. Whether or not new criticisms directed directly at the 
application of situational crime prevention techniques to prevent corruption can, and hopefully 
will, be the result of future empirical research. Critique that, just like the criticisms against 
situational crime prevention theory will instigate further development and adaptation of the 
SUM-theory for greater efficacy in the fight against corruption.  
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